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ABSTRACT

Slavery and Confederate Military Strategy and Policy, 1860-1865
by
David Campmier

Advisor: James Oakes

This thesis places slavery at the center of all aspects of the Confederate war effort; from the
beginning of the war until its end, the Rebel leadership in Richmond, in the army, and in the
states prioritized protecting slavery.
Historians of the Civil War and the Confederacy agree that the war began when southern states
declared secession to preserve the institution of slavery. When examining the war, scholars tend
to not analyze slavery and its impact on Confederate military strategy, logistics, conscription,
and military policy. This lack of study stands in stark contrast to how historians of the Union war
effort analyze the federal government’s development and application of military emancipation
policies. In many ways, it is impossible to fully understand the Union’s victory without
addressing how it attacked the institution.
The Confederacy’s protection of slavery as a war aim is examined in five crucial areas: the
secession crisis leading to preventive war, proslavery Confederate diplomacy with European
powers, military strategy that defended the Peculiar Institution, slaveholders complicating
impressment of slaves and conscription, and the failed attempt to arm slaves to fight for the
Rebel cause. Confederate President Jefferson Davis, the secretaries of war, state governors and
legislatures, and military officers grappled with defending slaveholders’ “property” and rights
amid a devastating war. In in most cases, protecting slavery was a consistent priority and a major
concern. The Rebels soon discovered, however, that their choice to defend slavery hurt their
ability to gain international recognition, win campaigns, use slaves as military laborers, conscript
troops, and potentially arm tens of thousands of slaves to buttress their armies.
The final aspect of this project is a brief examination of how ex-Confederate leaders and officers
wrote slavery out of the histories of the Civil War. They framed the study of the conflict such
that slavery never caused the war, and therefore slaves and the institution played no role in either
the Confederate or Union war effort.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my advisor and dissertation committee: Dr. James Oakes, Dr. David
Waldstreicher, and Dr. Benjamin Hett. Their comments challenged me and sharpened my
arguments and elevated my prose. I am indebted to my family: Mom, Dad, Dr. Brianna
Campmier, and Mark. Their constant love, support, and encouragement sustained me as I
researched and wrote. I want to thank Brianna and Mark for proofreading chapters. I also would
like to thank the incomparable James Reilly; his patience and insightful revision suggestions
were critical to the success of this project.

v

CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………...1
CHAPTER 1: Secession as a Preventive War Strategy……………….………………………....13
CHAPTER 2: Confederate Diplomatic Failures, “King Cotton,” and Slavery ………...……….34
CHAPTER 3: Confederate Military Strategy and Preserving Slavery…………………………..64
CHAPTER 4: Rebel Resistance to the Impressment of Labor and Property……………..…….115
CHAPTER 5: Confederate Conscription…………..……………………..…………………….140
CHAPTER 6: The Mirage of Confederate “Military Emancipation” …...……………………..168
CHAPTER 7: Slavery, Strategy, and the Lost Cause: Memory and the Confederate War….....212
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………………229

vi

INTRODUCTION

When the first Rebel cannon fired on Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, during the early
morning of April 12th, 1861, Rebels thought they understood the nature of the war they were
starting. They claimed that theirs was a war of independence, securing freedom for the southern
states and defeating the tyranny of a radical, abolitionist Republican party that had recently seized
control of the northern states and the federal government. Yet the subsequent civil war proved that
a different principle was at work from Sumter until the end: the Confederates fought for four
bloody, destructive years to uphold the practice of chattel slavery. A few days before the
bombardment, John B. Jones, a proslavery newspaper editor and later a clerk in the Confederate
War Department, “foretold the resistance of the Southern States, in the event of the success of a
sectional party inimical to the institution of African slavery, upon which the welfare and existence
of the Southern people seem to depend.”1 Confederates, through the choices they made regarding
military policy and strategy, proved they inherently prioritized the preservation of slavery during
the American Civil War.
Modern historians identify the precipitating cause of the Civil War as the election of
Republican Abraham Lincoln, whose ascension to the presidency represented a threat to the longterm survival of the institution of slavery. Historians note the Confederacy had multiple war aims,
including achieving independence, securing state sovereignty, incorporating all slave states into a
unified bloc, and preserving the institution of slavery. Scholarship diverges over which war aims
the Confederacy prioritized while fighting the Union. When discussing the subsequent course of

1

John B. Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, vol. 1
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co., 1866), 13. Entry from April 8th, 1861.
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the war from the South’s perspective, slavery’s role in influencing strategic and political choices
becomes less clear.2
Military historians studying the Confederacy have long considered the inherent paradoxes
of the South’s military plans. Often, there seemed to be no guiding or consistent principle that
determined whether they took a purely defensive stance or seized opportunities to invade the
North. Archer Jones argues that the South and Jefferson Davis had no “general strategy,” and that
Davis was torn between striking a purely defensive posture and maintaining the opportunity to
strike the Union with offensive campaigns. James McPherson, in Battle Cry of Freedom, notes
that there were strategic imperatives, but no organized, unified plan. Joseph Harsh notes that
logistical and political concerns demanded that the C.S.A. take the offensive as opposed to the
defensive to effectively fight and maintain control of the Upper South and the Border States.3
Scholarship about the Confederate war effort tends to analyze it as a sequence of tactical
and strategic choices, without fully exploring how slavery informed those choices from social,
political, and military standpoints. Historians wonder, for example, why Confederate leaders and
generals so often favored the strategic offensive, when such operations were inherently risky and
ultimately costly. Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson in Attack and Die posit that the ethnic
make-up of southern forces, who were mostly of “Celtic” decent, influenced them to execute
offensive strategies despite tremendous odds and high risks. Many works argue that it was not
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Archer Jones, Confederate Strategy from Shiloh to Vicksburg (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1961), xvii-xxi and 17-20; Joseph L. Harsh, Confederate Tide Rising:
Robert E. Lee and the Making of Southern Strategy, 1861-1862 (Kent: Kent State University
Press, 1998), Kindle edition, 9-10; Robert G. Tanner, Retreat to Victory?: Confederate Strategy
Reconsidered (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 87-90 and 115-7; and
Donald Stoker, The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010), 19-21.
3
Jones, Confederate Strategy from Shiloh to Vicksburg, 16-17; Tanner, Retreat to
Victory?, 141-8; and Harsh, Confederate Tide Rising, 17-21.
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ethnic or cultural characteristics, but rather flawed decision-making by the Confederate command,
that turned operational successes into strategic failures. Two such works that examine the
Confederate high command’s successes and failures are Thomas Lawrence Connelly and Archer
Jones’ The Politics of Command: Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy and Richard M.
McMurry’s Two Great Rebel Armies: An Essay in Confederate Military History. Both books claim
that internal divisions and disagreements beset the Confederate military, particularly among its
high-ranking generals and Jefferson Davis. Conflicting personalities created a lack of focus on
critical strategic choices, so much so that, in many cases, the Rebels were merely reacting to Union
movements rather than fighting battles on their own terms.4 From the standpoint of these
historians, poor strategic choices and internal strife among Confederate commanders explain how
and why the South lost the war.
According to Emory M. Thomas’ “Rebellion for Victory: Confederate Strategy and
Military Policy” in Writing the Civil War: The Quest to Understand, historians tend to view the
South’s strategy through a lens of failure, or “How and why did the South lose?” The inability of
southern generals to cooperate is a frequently cited explanation. Confederate generals were
notorious for the backstabbing of superiors or subordinates, and, as a result, Rebel armies failed to
coordinate attack or defense. Lost Cause supporters argue that the Union’s superior numbers wore
down the South through attrition, despite Robert E. Lee’s superior generalship. Historians have
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Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics
and the Southern Heritage (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1984), xiii-xvi; Thomas
Lawrence Connelly and Archer Jones, The Politics of Command: Factions and Ideas in
Confederate Strategy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998), ix-xv; and Richard
M. McMurry, Two Great Rebel Armies: An Essay in Confederate Military History (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1996), ix-xvi.
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successfully countered the Lost Cause argument, noting that the Confederacy was collapsing
internally, and suffering defeats in the western theatre.5
An exception to this vein of scholarship instead asks how the South succeeded for so long,
given the disadvantages it had. Gary Gallagher’s The Confederate War contends the “OffensiveDefensive” strategy was nearly successful and was the South’s best and only option for winning
independence. He contends that the Confederate public, after suffering many reverses during 1861
and early 1862, demanded that their armies attack. Lee’s aggression cheered them and made them
believe that they could win the war. Paradoxically, Lee’s victories ended up harming the South
more than helping it; they prolonged the war and made the changes the South endured more
widespread and permanent. Joseph L. Harsh’s works, Confederate Tide Rising: Robert E. Lee and
the Making of Southern Strategy, 1861-1862 and Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee and
Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862, agree with Gallagher’s assessment of
Confederate strategy. Though he focuses on campaign histories, Harsh clarifies how and why Lee
and other Confederate generals choose to invade the North—to put political pressure on Lincoln,
and to free up southern territory from continuous Union occupation and the dismantling of
slavery.6
Scholarly work on the South, until very recently, has not fully developed slavery’s role in
the South’s military strategy. Archer Jones’ Confederate Strategy from Shiloh to Vicksburg lays
Emory M. Thomas, “Rebellion for Victory: Confederate Strategy and Military Policy,”
in Writing the Civil War: The Quest to Understand, eds. James M. McPherson and William J.
Cooper, Jr. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 36-59 and Gary W. Gallagher,
“Blueprint for Victory: Northern Strategy and Military Policy,” in Writing the Civil War:
Historiographical Essays, William J. Cooper, Jr. and James M. McPherson, eds. (Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 9-11 and 21.
6
Gary Gallagher, The Confederate War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997),
61-70; Harsh, Confederate Tide Rising,1-15; and Joseph L. Harsh, Taken at the Flood: Robert E.
Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862 (Kent: The Kent State
University Press, 1999), 1-20.
5
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out the strategies the Confederacy employed in the western theatre and hinted at slavery’s
importance in military decision-making. For the most part, however, significant works of history
point quickly to preserving slavery as an essential objective, but then treat the rest of the conflict
as, first and foremost, a war for independence. Robert G. Tanner’s Retreat to Victory notes that
the South could not adopt a Fabian strategy given the divided nature of the population; this
included slaves who shifted their loyalty to the North. Tanner has a chapter devoted to
understanding slavery’s position in the war effort: giving up ground did not make sense because it
exposed slaveholding regions. The South had to attack Union columns before they reached the
slaves or, at the very least, fight battles where there were few slaves. Beyond Armstead L.
Robinson’s Bitter Fruits of Bondage and the Collapse of the Confederacy, 1861-1865, there have
been few works which comprehensively study the preservation of slavery as central and
detrimental to Confederate war aims and strategy. For Robinson, the war divided slaveholders and
non-slaveholders, and the turning point in their relationship was 1863, after the fall of Vicksburg.7
The way historians examine the South’s war effort, however, remarkably different from
current studies of the northern war effort. The recent study of the Union’s military policy and grand
strategy is inextricably linked to the development and execution of military emancipation. To be
sure, there are disagreements, mostly having to do with distinctions between the Union’s intentions
to emancipate slaves and the slaves themselves seeking their freedom. Scholars point to the
Union’s and Lincoln’s effective promotion of war-winning generals into high command, and their
superior organization and logistics. In Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones’ How the North Won:
A Military History of the Civil War, putting Grant and his lieutenants in charge of the federal war
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Archer Jones, Shiloh to Vicksburg 16-32 and Tanner, Retreat to Victory, 115-140 and
Armstead L. Robinson’s Bitter Fruits of Bondage and the Collapse of the Confederacy, 18611865 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2005) 1-11.
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effort is generally identified as the beginning of sustained Union success on all fronts. With a
change in command, a bigger and more coordinated war effort, and military emancipation, the
Union was able to wear down, divide, and defeat the Confederacy. In another vein, Mark C.
Grimsley’s The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865
identifies the hard war or “total war”—attacking Rebel civilian property—as a key to Union
victory. Through assaults on property, the Union hastened the Confederacy’s end, destroying warmaking capability and disillusioning the southern public.8 James Oakes’ Freedom National, John
Fabian Witt’s Lincoln’s Code, and Mark Grimsley’s The Hard Hand of War emphasize that the
Union government was crafting emancipation policy as a military aim in and of itself. Others, such
as Chandra Manning, argue that runaway slaves forced the federal government to adopt antislavery and emancipatory measures.9
Faust and Stephanie McCurry point to the centrality of slavery to the Confederate wartime
experience through studying the war’s impact on southern women and African Americans. Faust’s
Mothers of Invention: Women of the Slaveholding South in the American Civil War contends that
women of the slaveholding class gradually withdrew support for the rebel cause because of the
strains of managing households during the war required them to sacrifice expected protections and
comforts. The war challenged them to redefine elite planter women’s place in southern society and
culture. Faust’s work identified the intersection of gender, slavery, and the Confederate war effort,
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Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won: A Military History of the
Civil War (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 1-25; and Mark C. Grimsley, The
Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 1-17 and 120-38.
9
James Oakes, Freedom National: The Destruction of Slavery in the United States, 18611865 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012), 34-42; John Fabian Witt, Lincoln’s Code:
The Laws of War in American History (New York: Free Press, 2012), 214-8; Grimsley, The Hard
Hand of War, 120-142; and Chandra Manning, Troubled Refuge: Struggling for Freedom in the
Civil War (New York: Vintage Books, 2016), 3-30.
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and how the conflict to preserve slavery also complicated and endangered the institution. Stephanie
McCurry’s Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the Civil War South further analyzes
the gender, racial social, and cultural dimensions of the Confederates’ war. McCurry argues that
the Civil War revealed profound contradictions about the Confederacy; they fought to uphold
slavery and the paternalistic culture that buttressed it, but the war helped to wreck both. Her focus
on working-class women (in particular, soldiers’ wives) and African Americans shows how
crucially these communities’ actions impacted Confederate politics and the fate of the rebel cause.
McCurry asserts that slaves forced the nascent slaveholders’ republic into a competition for
loyalty, labor, and military service. Such competition undid the “Confederate political project.”10
The studies of the relationship among politics, nationalism, and military strategy from the
southern perspective at times argue for the centrality of slavery in the war effort. William W.
Freehling contends that the Confederate grand strategy was profoundly undermined through the
loss of the Border States; any strategy or plan that did not count on those states’ industrial,
financial, and manpower support ultimately doomed the Confederacy to defeat. Freehling noted
that citizens from the Upper South, especially where slavery was weakest, contributed little to the
Rebel cause or actively worked against it. It was nearly impossible for the Confederacy to rally all
Southerners around a proslavery nationalism. Armstead Robinson argues the Confederacy
defeated itself, though he notes that the source of self-defeat was the conflict between yeomen
farmers and slaveholding planters, and between the states and the central government. The
Confederate national government’s inability to reconcile these differences led directly to military
defeat, particularly as the C.S.A. lost control of the Mississippi River. Drew Gilpin Faust’s The
10

Drew Gilpin Faust, Mothers of Invention: Women of the Slaveholding South in the
American Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), x-xii, 8-18, and 305; and Stephanie McCurry, Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the Civil War South
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 1-2 and 5-9.
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Creation of Confederate Nationalism: Ideology and Identity in the Civil War South disagrees with
Gallagher. Faust argues that Confederate nationalism and upholding slavery were incompatible.11
The Confederacy’s late attempt to arm its slaves after Lincoln’s 1864 reelection
demonstrates the incompatibility of nationalism and preserving slavery. The limited scholarship
on this subject is the most direct analysis of slavery’s role in informing Confederate military
strategy and policy. Recent contributions to this small subset of research have attempt-ted to
understand the depth and seriousness with which Confederates approached the possibility of
emancipating their slaves. Bruce Levine’s Confederate Emancipation: Southern Plans to Free and
Arm Slaves during the Civil War carefully documents the lengthy debate and concludes that it was
the result of desperation and did not represent a new understanding of Confederate identity. Colin
Edward Woodward, in Marching Masters: Slavery, Race, and the Confederate Army During the
Civil War, catalogs the multitude of ways that the southern army relied upon slavery. Part of his
work was a study of the potential military emancipation of Confederate slaves to be used as
soldiers. For Woodward, it was merely an evolution of the way that the Southerners were already
using slaves in various military capacities as laborers. Jefferson Davis’ Final Campaign, written
by Phillip Dillard, boldly posits that Davis designed southern-driven emancipation both to win the
war and to create “a new Confederate identity,” and that many Southerners were willing to sacrifice
slavery in exchange for international recognition and thousands of new recruits in the Confederate
armies.12

11

William W. Freehling, The South vs. The South: How Anti-Confederate Southerners
Shaped the Course of the Civil War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), xi-xv; Robinson,
Bitter Fruits of Bondage, 1-11; Gallagher, The Confederate War, 1-14; and Drew Gilpin Faust,
The Creation of Confederate Nationalism: Ideology and Identity in the Civil War South (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989), 1-21.
12
Bruce Levine, Confederate Emancipation: Southern Plans to Free and Arm Slaves
during the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 1-14; Colin Edward
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In terms of Confederate military strategy and policy, southern leaders and commanders
consistently made choices and executed campaigns antithetical to winning a war on the primary
basis of achieving independence. Historians assume the Rebels fought a simple war of
independence. The studies typically look back to slavery after November of 1864 when Lincoln
won reelection, and the Rebels considered arming slaves. The imperative to uphold slavery through
military strategy and policy, then, has been inconsistently studied or ignored until it became too
salient to ignore. Davis, Lee, and others knew well the war’s purpose. This dissertation argues that
the preservation of slavery was the primary shaper of Rebel strategic decisions. From foreign
policy to strategy, from conscription to impressment, from Sumter to Appomattox—protecting
slavery was a crucial in the decision-making process of rebel state, national, and military leaders.
Chapter One investigates the secession movement in the slave states and highlights how
Southerners chose to fight a preventive war that, despite some proclamations to the contrary,
prioritized the preservation of slavery. This priority was reflected in Confederate military strategy
from the beginning to the end of the war.
Chapter Two focuses on diplomacy. The South consistently attempted to gain recognition
and military aid while upholding the “cornerstone” of the Confederacy, slavery. Their efforts
failed, in part, because the British government realized it would be difficult to “sell” an alliance
with the slaveholding South, if only because Britain had abolished slavery nearly 30 years earlier
and led the effort to end the slave trade. Only a few Confederate diplomats recognized this reality,
but they were ignored. Blatantly proslavery ambassadors pushed for recognition while holding to
preserving and expanding slavery.

Woodward, Marching Masters: Slavery, Race and the Confederate Army During the Civil War
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014), 10-12; and Phillip Dillard, Jefferson
Davis’s Final Campaign: Confederate Nationalism and the Fight to Arm Slaves (Macon: Mercer
University Press, 2017), 1-6 and 261-277.
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Chapter Three is an overview of the Civil War’s military history from the Confederacy’s
perspective, with attention drawn to the fact that its strategy was guided by the need to preserve
slavery. The touchstone strategic framework that the Rebels adopted was the so-called “offensivedefensive.” It was a strategy that Davis and Lee developed and asked other Confederate generals
to employ. It evolved from the earlier “cordon strategy,” which aimed to defend the entire Rebel
border against the Union armies’ destructive effect on slavery. The offensive-defensive added the
element of strategic offensives into the North. Prime examples were the 1862 invasions of
Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland, the 1863 invasion of Pennsylvania, and the 1864 invasion of
Union-held Tennessee. These campaigns were all designed to draw Union forces out of
slaveholding regions and to induce the Union to accept a negotiated peace with slavery intact.
Chapter Four analyzes the policy of impressment, the Confederacy’s practice of seizing
property from its citizens to supply the armies with material or labor. Impressment included the
Rebel armies taking slaves from loyal Southerners and putting them to work in a wide range of
capacities. Slaveholders across the South complained, resisted, and complicated the military’s
efforts to collect slaves, pointing out that state governments and Richmond should protect their
rights to “property.” While impressment did furnish the army with needed laborers, its military
effectiveness was blunted because both Richmond and the states acquiesced to the demands of
slaveholders.
Chapter Five studies conscription, focusing on the difficulties that southern slave society
had in furnishing troops to the front-line field armies. The Confederacy ineffectively leveraged its
population through a military draft that was hamstrung by the Twenty Negro Law. Paranoia about
slave revolts led many Southerners to evade national service in favor of “partisan-ranger” units
that operated locally, to defend against both Union aggression and their slaves.

10

Chapter Six examines Confederate “military emancipation,” contending that there is a
greater context to the issue than the 1864-1865 debate on the subject. This chapter also considers
Rebel reactions to the Union’s employment of black troops. The practice of offering “No Quarter”
to captured black Union troops during the war hampered the South’s ability to replenish its ranks
because the Union government halted prisoner exchanges to punish Confederates for killing or
mistreating black soldiers. Additionally, the Rebel policy of enslaving captured black Union troops
undercut their attempts to induce African Americans into their own military in exchange for
emancipation. Unlike other groups fighting for independence in the 18th and 19th centuries, the
Confederates failed to utilize this vital manpower resource.
Chapter Seven reflects on the ways and reasons that slavery was written out of the military
history of the war. As soon as the war ended, Rebel generals and soldiers claimed that they fought
for states’ rights and liberty, but not slavery, and that a desire to defend slavery had not guided
their actions. This chapter argues, however, that the defeated Confederates writing in the Lost
Cause mythos were drawing on the last five months of the war—in which Southerners questioned,
but never abandoned, their defense of the “Peculiar Institution.” They instead emphasized the
shared “suffering” that united slaveholders and non-slaveholders.
Alexander Stephens infamously proclaimed that the cornerstone of the Confederacy was
“the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery, subordination to the
superior race, is his natural and moral condition.”13 So too was slavery the cornerstone of the
Rebels’ war effort. While Jefferson Davis outwardly disagreed, slavery was at the heart of the war;

13

Frank Moore, ed., The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events with Documents,
Narratives, Illustrative Incidents, Poetry, etc., vol. 1 (New York: O.P. Putnam, 1862), 44-46.
Alexander H. Stephens’ “Cornerstone Address,” March 21, 1861.
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it proved impossible for him and any other Rebel to disentangle the preservation of “the Peculiar
Institution” from the conflict.
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CHAPTER ONE
SECESSION AS A PREVENTIVE WAR STRATEGY

When Robert E. Lee and J.E.B. Stuart rushed into Harper’s Ferry, Virginia, at the head of
a column of United States Marines, Maryland and Virginia State militiamen were relieved to see
them. They had hurriedly responded to a raid on the federal arsenal in town. Abolitionist John
Brown and a group of African American men, together with Brown’s sons, had snuck into the
facility, taken hostages, and claimed the arms stockpiled there. Their goal was to instigate a general
slave revolt across the entire South. The first step in their plan was to seize and distribute arms to
slaves in the area. Brown’s grand crusade soon hit a snag because the militia mustered and
surrounded Brown’s posse.
A bloody stalemate ensued, and the militiamen took casualties when they attempted to
apprehend the insurgents. Once bloodied, the militiamen held back, not wanting to risk their lives.
The Virginia governor called for federal aid; the nearest troops were the Marines based in
Washington, D.C. President James Buchanan sent them under the command of two nearby, trusted
(and southern) U.S. Army officers, Lee and Stuart. Once Lee, Stuart, and the Marines arrived in
Harper’s Ferry, one Maryland militiaman quipped he could abandon his post and leave the fighting
to the Marines. They were, he reasoned, “paid for such business.” It was left to the federal forces
to attack and apprehend Brown. It was clear a militia response was not enough; Southerners wanted
federal military support.14
John Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry represented the violent lengths some abolitionists and
supporters of slavery were willing to go to achieve their respective political visions. On the one
14

David M. Sullivan, The United States Marine Corps in the Civil War, vol.
1 (Shippensburg, Penn.: White Mane Pub. Co., 1996), 1-28.
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hand, the pro-slavery political vision enshrined the right of one person to own another. The antislavery political vision, on the other hand, demanded freedom for slaves and the end of the
“Peculiar Institution.” As the Republican Party and Abraham Lincoln won the federal elections of
1860, the slave states found themselves facing opponents on two fronts. Externally, as the number
of free states surpassed the number of slave states, and as more anti-slavery members of Congress
filled the halls of the Capitol, proponents of slavery expected that the federal government would
act to interfere with slavery and prevent its expansion into the territories. The Republicans, during
the 1850s, made it clear in their party platforms, campaigns, and speeches that they sought the
“ultimate extinction of slavery.” The anti-slavery party planned to quarantine or cordon the
institution of slavery by surrounding the slave states with free states. Not only did this halt the
expansion of slave states into the western territories of the United States, but it also outnumbered
the slave state representatives in both houses of Congress. If war between the states came, the
Republicans assured pro-slavery politicians they would use military force to emancipate slaves.
Internally, the South had a potentially restive slave population, and Washington might not
protect slaveholders in the event of a revolt. This was particularly frightening in counties where
African American slaves outnumbered whites. Southerners came to demand federal support in
putting down slave revolts towards the end of the 1850s. Their demands were an extension of
slavery supporters’ demands that the federal government uphold the property right to own slaves.
As the Republican Party grew and won elections in the free states and Congress, Southerners
worried that the national government would no longer offer support for maintaining slavery, and
instead withhold support or undermine the institution. Southern whites feared a violent upheaval
leading to the dissolution of their political-economic system. Brown’s raid, in the context of the
ongoing violence and discord in Kansas over the territory’s application for statehood, ingrained in

14

Southerners that abolitionists and the anti-slavery party sought the violent destruction of slavery
and the desolation of the slave states.
Most scholars agree that slavery caused the war. Opinions differ, however, over how
secession happened and over what issues about slavery mattered the most. Kenneth Stampp in And
the War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis, 1860-1861 argues that the existence of slavery
was the cause of sectional divisions, and that there was no way for the North and South to
compromise. David Potter’s The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861 asserts that the battles in Congress
over the expansion of slavery into the territories tore the country apart, starting with the Wilmot
Proviso and ending with Lincoln’s election. James McPherson argues in Battle Cry of Freedom:
The Civil War Era that the secession project was a counter-revolutionary effort to preserve slavery
from the “revolution” in the North—the electoral success of an antislavery party. Manisha Sinha’s
The Counterrevolution of Slavery: Politics and Ideology in Antebellum South Carolina asserts that
the state’s planter-politicians took the lead as the South’s antidemocratic counterrevolutionaries
and used their positions of power to argue for preserving slavery through secession. James L.
Abrahamson in The Men of Secession and Civil War, 1859-1861 claims that the war came because
Southerners fell prey to an emotional reaction to a wide range of perceived threats. William Link’s
Roots of Secession: Slavery and Politics in Antebellum Virginia points to the “infra-politics” of
slavery—reacting to how slaves behaved—in a changing Virginia economy, which produced
anxiety for the security of white folk. Michael Holt in The Fate of Their Country: Politicians,
Slavery Extension, and the Coming of the Civil War reaffirms the importance of the federal debate
over slavery’s westward expansion, and asserts that “short term” partisan decisions doomed the
Union. Bruce Levine, by contrast, in Half Slave and Half Free: The Roots of Civil War contends
that the contrasting political-economic systems of the North (free labor) and South (slave labor)
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caused the war. William Freehling’s The Road to Disunion: Volume II: Secessionists Triumphant,
1854-1861 contends that a minority of slaveholders, in a South divided by region, class, and slave
ownership, were able to exploit fears and events to convince others that the best security for
democracy and the Southern economy was separation. Mastering America: Southern Slaveholders
and the Crisis of American Nationhood, written by Robert E. Bronner, asserts that Southern
thinkers developed a proslavery version of American nationalism and, when challenged by the
1860 election, Southerners rushed to defend and reinterpret this proslavery nationalism. We Have
the War upon Us: The Onset of the Civil War, November 1860-April 1861 by William J. Cooper
contends that slavery’s expansion into the territories was the “immediate crucial issue,” while the
longer-term question “concerned the character of the Union and who would wield power in it.”
James Oakes’ The Scorpion’s Sting: Antislavery and the Coming of the Civil War explains how
the Republicans’ “cordon of freedom” project aimed to put slavery on the course of extinction,
and that Southerners left the Union to stop the cordon from going into effect.15
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For Southerners, therefore, the Republicans’ plan to surround and then “encourage” each
slave state to abolish slavery on its own was tantamount to a declaration of war. Lincoln’s election,
which could put the Republican plan into action, was an act of war. Secession commissioners—
representatives of seceded states, sent to communicate with other slave states—and other proslavery speakers used the language of war to describe the sectional crisis between North and South.
In this light, the secession movement and subsequent civil war were preventative efforts to halt the
federal government’s assault on slavery. Southerners protested that the northern states and the
President-elect sought to prohibit slaveholders from moving their property anywhere in the
country. Worse still, they worried about the proliferation of emigrant societies that, Southerners
claimed, armed abolitionists and instigated violence against slaveholders. Slaveholders and
southern non-slaveholders alike feared that abolitionists “agitated” among bondsmen. They
believed the federal government under Lincoln would not protect them in the event of slave revolts.
Southern secessionists claimed they faced a siege on their borders and an encirclement at home.
The “cordon of freedom” hemmed them in and denied them their right to move their “human
property.” Where slavery existed, increasingly “agitated” slaves surrounded white populations.
Southerners believed they were stirred up by northern or black Republican interlopers. Southern
representatives at secession conventions reasoned that leaving the Union was the best guarantee
of perpetuating slavery and protecting the “liberty” and safety of all southern whites. Secession,
some believed, would lead to war, and some Southerners welcomed it as a just reaction to the much
longer conflict between the sections. Rebel leaders assured white Southerners it was possible to
beat the Yankees and maintain all the South’s political, social, and economic institutions, including
slavery.
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The Republican Party’s “plot” to put slavery on a course of ultimate extinction was a
declaration of war, according to pro-slavery Southerners. Robert Toombs’ speech before the
Georgia Legislature on November 13th, 1860 illustrated the dimensions of preventive war to defend
slavery.16 While Toombs framed potential secessionist initiation of war as defensive, the main
themes of his speech were violent retaliation and prevention of an inevitable and growing threat
before it grew too strong to counter. The Republican Party, Toombs explained, understood how
denying slavery’s expansion and preventing the retrieval of runaway slaves were existential threats
to the Peculiar Institution. Lincoln’s election took away the only security that the constitutional
“right” to hold slaves had. As with other statements supporting secession, the Senator claimed
Lincoln and the Republican’s assault on slavery was a war upon the South’s domestic institutions.
He then argued that the slave states needed to respond to the prolonged assault on slavery before
Lincoln assumed the office of the Presidency. “Then strike while it is yet today,” Toombs declared.
He advised his listeners, “Withdraw your sons from the army, from the navy, and every department
of the Federal public service. Keep your own taxes in your own coffers - buy arms with them and
throw the bloody spear into this den of incendiaries and assassins...” The Senator urged his fellow
Georgians not to trust in the Constitution or in Republicans’ promises because the abolitionists
were already at war with them. The conflict would reach new heights on Inauguration Day,
Toombs warned, and their enemies would be strengthened and emboldened through control of the

Secessionists did not use the term “preventive war,” though their writings and
discussions articulated a vision for that type of conflict. A current, simple definition of
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government: “The enemy on the fourth of March will intrench himself behind a quintuple wall of
defence. Executive power, judiciary,…army, navy, and treasury. Twenty years of labor, and toil,
and taxes all expended upon preparation, would not make up for the advantage your enemies would
gain if the rising sun on the fifth of March should find you in the Union. Then strike while it is yet
time.” The Georgia senator concluded that they should claim their sovereign right to secede, and
then fight a war of independence if “the abolitionists should object to it...”17
Joseph Brown, governor of Georgia, in an open letter to the people of the state, laid out the
connection between the Republican ascension to power and preventive war. He stated his letter
would discuss three propositions: “Is the election of Mr. Lincoln to the Presidency, sufficient cause
to justify Georgia and the other Southern States in seceding from the Union? What will be the
results to the institution of slavery, which will follow submission to the inauguration and
administration of Mr. Lincoln... What will be the effect which the abolition of slavery will have
upon…the large class of nonslaveholders and poor white laborers…” As to the first and second
propositions, Brown repeated what many pro-slavery Southerners thought and said at the time;
Lincoln’s election was the embodiment of a Republican takeover of all three branches of the
federal government. From their new positions of power, the Republicans would then enact their
“platform of avowed hostility to our rights” and work to abolish slavery in the states along with a
carefully charted plan. The threat was sufficient enough to justify the secession of Georgia and the
southern states, Brown concluded. 18
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Brown then turned his attention to the third proposition, how the abolition of slavery would affect
working-class whites in the southern states. It was in this section that Brown laid out the necessity
of secession and subsequent preventive war: to prevent the economic and political equality of black
and white people. The loss of slavery would affect slaveholders and non-slaveholders alike; the
governor assumed that it was impractical to pay for the slaves’ freedom due to the exorbitant costs.
The tax burden, he figured, would fall mostly on the poor man. The aftereffects of freedom for
slaves could prove to be an even greater menace to working-class whites. With millions of new
freed and poor slaves, whites would then compete for land, jobs, and homes. Blacks and whites
would be accorded equal rights in court, go the same schools, serve in the militia together, and
“enter each others’ houses in social intercourse as equals; and very soon their children must marry
together as equals.” Brown added, “May our kind Heavenly Father avert the evil, and deliver the
poor from such a fate.” More likely, the governor thought that the freed slaves would go into the
mountains, where there was a “healthier climate.” There they would start “plundering and stealing,
robbing and killing, in all the lovely vallies of the mountains.”19
The Georgia governor connected preventive war and heading off the potential race war in
the context of secession. Though he claimed all Southerners would “…defend our rights against
so foul a domination and they would come down like an avalanche and swarm around the flag of
Georgia…” he did not think secession would lead to war. A war would start if the federal
government compelled them to remain, Brown reasoned. Georgia could not be the only southern
state not to secede because it would be isolated and vulnerable in the event of a servile insurrection.
Brown concluded that the only condition for going to war with the North was to stop the “black”
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Republicans from starting a slave Rebellion or civil war in the southern states. Georgia’s best
security laid in solidarity with the other seceding slave states and not in submission;
Secession is not likely, therefore, to involve us in war. Submission may. When the
other States around us secede, if we remain in the Union, thousands of our people
will leave the state, and it is feared that the standard of revolution and Rebellion
may be raised among us, which would at once involve us in civil war among
ourselves. If we must fight, in the name of all that is sacred, let us fight our common
enemy, and not fight each other.20
The Deep South states of South Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Florida, Texas, and
Georgia left the Union within weeks of Lincoln’s election and before the President-elect assumed
office. These states had large enslaved populations and, in some of these states, slaves
outnumbered whites. When state representatives and secession commissioners across the South
met to discuss leaving the Union, many in favor used the language of war and conquest to describe
anti-slavery policies and the Republican Party. For the representatives of the Deep South states,
Lincoln’s election was an acknowledgment that a state of war already existed between the
slaveholding and non-slaveholding states. As John W. A. Sanford, a secession commissioner from
Georgia, in a speech to the Texas Secession Convention, stated that northerners “have publicly
proclaimed their determination of waging an unceasing warfare against its [slavery’s] further
extension and longer toleration.”21
Southern governors played a crucial role in supporting secession; they seized federal forts,
armories, arsenals, and hospitals weeks or days before state conventions met and declared
separation. Governor A.B. Moore of Alabama eagerly supported the call for a secession
convention to respond to Lincoln’s election and the many wrongs Republicans committed against
the South: “They have invaded the State of Virginia, armed her slaves with deadly weapons,
20
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murdered her citizens, and seized the United States Armory at Harper’s Ferry. They have sent
emissaries into the State of Texas, who burned many towns, and furnished the slaves with deadly
poison for the purpose of destroying their owners.”22 As John A. Winston reported to the Governor
of Alabama, Louisiana’s Governor was willing to carry out “the solemn duty now devolved upon
us of separating from all political connection with the States so disregarding their constitutional
obligations, and of forming such a government as a high sense of our rights, honor, and future
peace and safety shall indicate.”23 Eight days later, the governor seized the U.S. arsenals at Baton
Rouge, Fort Jackson, and Fort St. Phillip (January 10, 1861), then the U.S. Marine Hospital
(January 11, 1861), and then Fort Pike (January 14, 1861).
Secession commissioners for their part, made clear the threat that Lincoln’s election was
to the South’s institutions and peace. They claimed that Lincoln and the Republicans wished to
subjugate the South through law and military force, and destroy slavery. The commissioners
further claimed that, after slavery’s destruction, the “black Republicans” would seek to make
blacks and whites in the South politically, economically, and socially equal.24 John Gill Shorter,
an Alabaman commissioner, wrote to Georgia Governor Joseph Brown and claimed that “the great
and powerful party who have produced this result calmly awaits the 4th day of March next, when,
under the forms of the Constitution and the laws, they will usurp the machinery of the Federal
Government and madly attempt to rule, if not to subjugate, and ruin the South.”25
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While federal force certainly was on the minds of secessionists, they considered the lack
of federal protection to be just as dangerous as using the law and the Constitution to enact antislavery policies. Mainly, they expected that the federal government, under Lincoln’s and the
Republicans’ control, would not stem the supposed flow of violent abolitionists into the territories
and slave states. They further feared that the government would let the slave states attempt to
handle slave revolts on their own. George Williamson of Louisiana addressed the Secession
Convention of Texas, playing upon fears of racial strife and abandonment by the federal
government. He claimed, “If she [Texas] remains in the Union the abolitionists would continue
their work of incendiarism and murder. Emigrant aid societies would arm with Sharp’s rifles
predatory bands to infest her northern borders. The Federal Government would mock at her
calamity…Experience justifies these expectations. A professedly friendly federal administration
gave Texas no substantial protection against the Indians or abolitionists...” Williamson argued that
Texas, Louisiana, and all the other slave states had only one alternative. The states had to band
together or be made a “theatre for abolition emissaries from the North and from Europe.”26
At this convention, the representatives of the Deep South made the first seven declarations
of secession. All stated that breaking the country apart, if accomplished before Lincoln and the
Republicans took control of the Federal government, was the best security for slavery and the best
hope of ending the “war” on the institution. South Carolina’s convention issued a Declaration of
the Immediate Causes, which described their urgency: “On the 4th day of March next, this party
will take possession of the government. It has announced that the South shall be excluded from
the common territory, that the judicial tribunals shall be made sectional, and that a war must be
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waged against slavery until it shall cease throughout the United States.” 27 Georgia’s Declaration
explained that war already existed between the states: “This hostile policy [the Republican Party’s
plan to destroy slavery] of our confederates has been pursued with every circumstance of
aggravation which could arouse the passions and excite the hatred of our people, and has placed
the two sections of the Union for many years past in the condition of virtual civil war.”28
Mississippi’s “Resolutions of Secession,” passed on November 30th, 1860, enumerated the North’s
assaults on the slave states and demonstrated how they treated anti-slavery policies as acts of war.
The document cited the Republican Party’s platform to set slavery on “the course of extinction.”
The final set of resolutions concluded:
That they have encouraged a hostile invasion of a Southern State to excite
insurrection, murder, and rapine;
That they have deprived Southern citizens of their property and continue an
unfriendly agitation of their domestic institutions, claiming for themselves perfect
immunity from external interference with their domestic policy;
We of the Southern States alone made an exception to that universal quiet;
That they have elected a majority of Electors for President and Vice-President on
the ground that there exists an irreconcilable conflict between the two sections of
the Confederacy in reference to their respective systems of labor and in pursuance
of their hostility to us and our institutions, thus declaring to the civilized world that
the powers of this government are to be used for the dishonor and overthrow of the
Southern Section of this great Confederacy.29
Resolutions and declarations in other Deep South states claimed a similar assault on the South.
Alabama’s Ordinance of Secession claimed the Republicans were “…avowedly hostile to the
domestic institutions and to the peace and security of the people of the State of Alabama…”30
Florida’s Declarations of Causes claimed that “By the agency of a large proportion of the members
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from the non-slaveholding States books have been published and circulated amongst us the direct
tendency and avowed purpose of which is to excite insurrection and servile war with all their
attendant horrors.”31
Despite the eagerness among the first seven Slave States to leave the Union, the upper slave
states left several months after the Deep South. Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas
left when, after South Carolina militia fired on Fort Sumter, Lincoln called for 75,000 troops to
put down the Rebellion. These states did not believe Lincoln’s election alone was the manifestation
of a war on the South’s institutions and enough cause to leave the Union. These states were divided,
and achieving consensus on secession was more difficult.32 Lincoln’s call for troops rapidly
changed minds; a call for troops portended a wave of widespread disruption and violence, and
slave revolts could follow. The metaphorical state of war that existed in the realm of anti-slavery
policies became a real war. Alexander H. Stephens, soon to be the vice president of the
Confederacy, spoke to the Virginia Secession Convention in favor of separation from the Union.
The Georgian reiterated what governors, secession commissioners, and conventions proclaimed:
“A war is upon us—upon you and the Confederate States alike. The extent of this war no human
being at this moment can foresee. Whether it be short or prolonged; whether it will be bloody and
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waged on the part of our enemies, with a view to subjugation and extermination, are matters of
uncertainty…”33
Tennessee Governor Isham Harris’ two addresses on secession before his state’s legislature
illustrated how Lincoln’s call for troops overcame many states’ initial reluctance to leave the
Union. The governor, like others in the South, firmly cast Tennessee and other slave states as
victims of the anti-slavery party’s aggression that only the North could reverse. Harris’ first
address was on January 7th, 1861, before Fort Sumter. Harris did not call for secession outright.
Instead, he believed that there was room for compromise, though purely on pro-slavery terms. If
the northern states did not “comply” with their demands and “refuse to abandon at once and forever
their unjust war upon us, our institutions, and our rights” then the only alternatives were to share
“a common destiny” with the other slave states in a “homogenous Confederacy.” The critical
difference between Tennessee and the Deep South seemed to be the perception that an
administration and federal government that supported anti-slavery policies were not necessarily
waging war.34
Lincoln’s call for troops changed Harris’s views rapidly; there was no possibility of
compromise. In his April 25th, 1861 speech before the Tennessee Assembly, the governor
proclaimed that Lincoln had “wantonly inaugurated an internecine war between the people of the
slave and non-slave holding States.” He then referred to his January speech, stating he believed
the state of being “in imminent danger” and acknowledged that he presented the North with “the
strongest argument for peace.” Instead, North and South were “communities at war” because of
Lincoln’s “treachery.” Now was the time, he begged, for Tennessee to throw in its lot with the
33
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South. His reasoning was clear: “The note of war has been sounded, and in the imperial
proclamation, recently issued, the people of the Confederate States and all who sympathize with
them are treated as Rebels, and twenty days is allowed them to ‘disperse’ - and return to their
allegiance to the authorities at Washington.” If Lincoln and the Republicans were willing to use
military force to address the difference over slavery, there was no preventing them from turning
that coercive power on all slave states. Harris explained that the call for military force was a tipping
point from his perspective; in short, there was no going back to the status quo. Tennessee and other
slave states could not expect “…the reconstruction of a peaceful Union, upon terms of fraternity
and equality, at the end of an internecine war.”35
The border states of Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri chose to stay in the
Union or, at the very least, faced significant hurdles in leaving it. Representatives and leaders from
these states were not convinced that Lincoln’s election and subsequent call for troops to be
indicative of an existential threat to the Peculiar Institution. Instead, representatives from each
state reasoned that remaining in the Union provided the best chance of keeping slavery functioning.
They could arguably wait out Lincoln and the Republicans, or find some political solution to curb
the anti-slavery party’s policies. In short, they could take Lincoln at his word that he would not
interfere with slavery where it already existed.
Secession commissioners and pro-Confederate speakers, nonetheless, tried to convince the
citizens of the border states that they shared a common destiny in protecting slavery, and that they
must respond to the Republicans’ war on the institution. Alabama secession commissioner S.F.
Hale wrote about the North’s war on the South in terms familiar to pro-slavery Southerners in a
letter to Kentucky Governor Beriah Magoffin during December of 1860. Hale coyly conceded that
35

Robert H. White, Messages of the Governors of Tennessee, vol. 5 (Nashville:
Tennessee Historical Commission, 1959), 278-287.

27

Lincoln’s election alone was an insufficient reason to break up the federal Union, but he
subsequently argued Lincoln was a “…representative of the fanaticism of the North, which…has
been making war upon the South, her property, her civilization, her institutions, and her interests.”
The commissioner claimed that northern fanaticism included both the exclusion of slavery from
the western territories and, even more egregiously, Lincoln’s and the Republicans’ intention to
grant equal political rights to all African Americans. According to Hale, using the most
inflammatory and racist language possible, Lincoln’s election was:
…nothing less than an open declaration of war --- for the triumph of this new theory
of government destroys the property of the South, lays waste her fields, and
inaugurates all the horrors of a San Domingo servile insurrection, consigning her
citizens to assassinations, and her wives and daughters to pollution and violation,
to gratify the lust of half-civilized Africans. Especially is this true in the cottongrowing States, where, in many localities, the slave outnumbers the white
population ten to one.
The results of staying in the Union while under assault from “Black Republicans,” he predicted,
would be disastrous; slaveholders and non-slaveholders alike, he claimed, faced degradation and
an eternal race war. The only remedy was “prompt, bold, and decided action,” and Hale
encouraged Kentucky leaders to join Alabama and the other slave states in secession.36
Governor Magoffin agreed in his reply; he was a staunch supporter of slavery but was
reluctant to call for secession. There was a war upon the southern slave states’ institutions, but he
was less sure of secession and possible war as a means to defend slavery. The best option, the
governor opined, was for all 15 slave states to stand together and remain in the Union. A
convention with delegates representing all slave states would be necessary to ensure one message.
Magoffin then admitted that a civil war was inevitable unless the affected states stood as one. The
Lincoln administration, he supposed, would not likely use force to push its policies if it meant war
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with “13,000,000 freedmen.” If his guess was wrong, then they would have to defend themselves
through military action as a last resort. Magoffin ended his reply to Hale with the tantalizing
promise that the Kentucky legislature would receive a copy of his letter to the governor, in the
hope that they would agree with secession.37
Kentucky did not leave, and its legislature proclaimed the state’s “neutrality” because the
pro-union sentiment in the state was vocal and energetic. That border state’s “neutrality” was
echoed in Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware. In each of these states existed significant numbers
of loyal Unionists. The leaders and representatives of these states, though they may have
sympathized with the Confederates and were pro-slavery, were unconvinced. They remained in
the Union, despite the secessionist commissioners’ pleas.
Nonetheless, eleven states left the Union and formed the Confederacy. When Jefferson
Davis arrived in the Confederacy’s first capital, Montgomery, Alabama, for his inauguration as
the Confederacy’s President, he privately worried that winning a civil war was going to be nearly
impossible. He wrote to his wife that beyond the “plaudits and flowers” of his inauguration, he
saw “troubles and thorns innumerable.”38 The new President felt daunted and worried he was
managing a losing effort. In another letter, addressed to Francis W. Pickens, the Governor of South
Carolina, Davis stated at no point did he anticipate a peaceful resolution of secession. The Rebel
president reasoned that the South was woefully unprepared for war, though war appeared to be the
only option available to the new country. Davis then assured Pickens he would soon send a military
adviser with instruction as to how South Carolina militiamen could capture Fort Sumter.39
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Despite his misgivings, Davis publicly joined other Confederates in voicing a belief that they could
win a war with the North. Alexander Stephens, in his pro-secession speech before the Virginia
convention, stated that, because the North would be waging a war of extermination,
…it will require all the resources of money and men of the Southern people to
maintain their cause successfully, unless, fortunately, by immediate and prompt
action, such a decisive blow shall be given, on our part, as will turn the tide of
victory in our favor at the outset, and show our full power to sustain independence.
In this way it may be a war of short duration; but this is rather a hope than an
expectation.40
For his part, Davis was eager to establish and protect the new government’s territorial
claims, and took aim at the remaining U.S. installations in the Confederacy, Fort Sumter included.
Davis’ objective ran up against Lincoln’s ironclad desire to hold those installations. Jefferson
ordered the attack, even though it would set off a massive Federal response. Davis and others had
hoped the urgency and speed with which the slave states initially left the Union could avoid war,
especially after Sumter. Furthermore, this seemed to be an accurate perception because four more
states joined the Rebel government. Before hostilities erupted, Davis predicted that, if the border
states left the Union as well, there might be no war, because having to face 15 slave states in total
would be an effective deterrent to federal military action.41 Though the border states did not secede,
Davis and others assumed all slaveholders or communities that supported slavery would align with
the Confederate cause.
Early on, it seemed as if they would have enough support to match the Federal forces. The
Rebel president himself was bowled over when the states rapidly organized thousands of troops,
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and he soon gained more confidence in the cause.42 Further buoying Rebel spirits was the
tantalizing possibility of international recognition and intervention. Davis and others expected that
Britain and France would align their interests with the success of the Confederacy. In speeches,
including one given February 14th, 1861 in Stevenson, Alabama—as well as during interviews—
Davis consistently stated that Britain would come to their aid.43 Ensuring the steady flow of slaveproduced cotton across the Atlantic to feed European textile mills appeared to the Confederates to
be a strong incentive to break a Union blockade. Without southern cotton, the Rebels assumed that
European economies would suffer. Behind these confident claims, however, Davis did not have
any concrete evidence that the Europeans would side with them. At that time, he had made only
initial contact with the British Foreign ministry.44
Moreover, Davis and other Rebel leaders doubted the Yankees’ “martial spirit” and
commitment to fight was a match for their own. Southerners, by and large, scoffed at the thought
that Northerners could pose a threat. Davis himself assumed the only way federal forces could win
was to outnumber the Confederates, and even that, he felt, was doubtful.45 South Carolina
Governor Pickens, writing to Davis, agreed the North was no significant threat; the northern
government, Pickens claimed, “will fall to pieces because it has with itself the seeds of rottenness
and decay.”46 As for the Confederates, he claimed their cause was “just and holy.” He praised the
tens of thousands of men already in the field, and the financial support that citizens and
businessmen provided abundantly.47
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Crucially, southern leaders—Davis included—believed they could “whip the Yankees”
and preserve slavery at the same time. Slavery was a military advantage along the lines of the
North’s industrial might, Confederates boasted. Slaves would toil in the field, producing food for
the war effort while white men were away. So long as overseers supervised the enslaved
population, there would be no threat of slave revolts. Davis argued in a November 1861 address
to the Confederate Congress that slave labor could insulate the Rebel states from the damaging
impact of the “paper blockade.” Slave labor could produce for the Confederate army food,
clothing, and arms. Davis predicted that plantation owners would shift slaves from cultivating the
great southern staple—and European powers, which initially supported blockade, would then
recognize the Confederacy.48 Moreover, some southern military officers and civilians believed
slaves were a source of labor for the army or local government. In the early days of the war,
slaveholders “donated” slaves or sent them to the army when officers asked.49
The act of creating the Confederacy and fighting a civil war was a direct response to the
“Black Republicans’” political war against slavery. The Rebels believed this conflict was the
capstone to a much longer war, to which they finally responded with organized military force.
Southerners knew full well that leaving the Union and attacking federal installations would lead
to war. The difference, however, between the long war they had been suffering and the
‘preventative war’ they intended to fight on April 15th, 1861 was that the slave states now had
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control. The preventative war the Rebels began had two objectives: protect slavery and win
independence. The Rebels were preventing an anti-slavery “sectional party,” the Republican Party,
from interfering with or encouraging assaults on the Peculiar Institution. As citizens of the
Confederacy, Southerners could defend or expand slavery as they pleased and could expect that
their new national government would protect the property and lives of its citizens from the threat
of servile insurrection.
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CHAPTER TWO
CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC FAILURES, “KING COTTON,” AND SLAVERY

When the South Carolinian militia fired on Fort Sumter on April 12th, 1861, most
Southerners understood they faced severe supply and manpower disadvantages in their struggle
with the North. The Rebels, nonetheless, believed that they could win regardless of the
disadvantages they faced because they assumed European powers would act in their favor.
Southerners expected that the British and French would recognize the C.S.A. as an independent
nation in return for a steady supply of slave-produced cotton. After recognition, the Europeans
would then help to forcibly lift the Union blockade of southern ports and, it was hoped, distract
the Union from further invasions into Confederate territory. Barring that, the French and British
could intervene and mediate an end to the war, preferably with the South recognized as an
independent nation. Despite knowing how crucial effective diplomacy was to the cause, the
Confederate Department of State failed to accomplish its lofty goals because of its inflexible proslavery policies and representatives. While the Confederates were able to secure some loans and
buy military supplies abroad, diplomatic efforts in Europe, especially with the British, revealed
how and why the Confederate’s rigidity on the issue of slavery undercut their higher goals. The
Rebels assumed the English could overcome their commitment to abolition because Southerners
believed that the European industrial economy needed slave-produced cotton to remain financially
viable.
Historians emphasize cotton and international power-balancing as being central to southern
attempts to entice Europeans powers into recognizing the South and fighting for the South. F.L
Owsley’s King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America (first
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published in 1931) comprehensively sums up this theme in the historical literature. Owsley argues
that “moral causes” did not prevent the English from intervening in the war, setting up a long-held
view that realist strategic interests held sway. Owsley notes that cotton failed as a diplomatic
bargaining chip because the Rebels failed to understand how flexible and diverse the English
economy. There was little reason, then, for the British to risk war for cotton when they could rely
on surplus or new sources of the fiber.50
Howard Jones has further developed and modified the cotton diplomacy theme. His
contribution in the 1995 edited volume The Union, the Confederacy, and the Atlantic studies the
paradoxical impact that the Emancipation Proclamation had on the English prime minister’s
cabinet and Foreign Service office. He asserts that Prime Minister Henry John Temple (Lord
Palmerston) and Foreign Secretary John Russell became interested in mediation and potential
military intervention for fear that the Emancipation Proclamation could instigate a race war. Jones
subtly shifts his thesis on union emancipation efforts in Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of
Freedom: The Union and Slavery in the Diplomacy of the Civil War. Jones argues that Lincoln’s
initial commitment to Unionism allowed the British to ponder pursuing national interests—a
steady supply of cotton—by recognizing the Confederacy. When the Union achieved military
successes and fully committed to anti-slavery programs, the British government lost interest in
recognizing the C.S.A. Jones entirely shifts his position on slavery, cotton, and diplomacy in Blue
and Gray Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Foreign Relations. He contends that
the British government acted contrary to their usual pattern of international action. The
Confederates were in the unenviable position of needing victories to earn recognition and support,
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but requiring help to sustain victories. Palmerston and Russell realized that there was a significant
part of their population that supported the Union and anti-slavery policies.51
Amanda Foreman tracks how Confederate representatives in England communicated the
South’s interests and hopes for recognition, and how the issues of slavery and cotton complicated
their efforts. She argues that the South could not get the British to intervene because the British
were not interested in cotton as much as they were interested in protecting “freedom of the seas.”
The British textile mills could source cotton elsewhere. Access to slave-produced cotton never
provided enough of an impetus to recognize the South and intervene in the war. Foreman implies
that a poorly designed policy may have been masquerading as southern diplomatic incompetence,
and that their “cotton diplomacy” was never going to secure recognition and full military aid. It
potentially did not matter who sang the praises of slavery as it related to British interests if the
British were never going to accept pro-slavery overtures in the first place.52
Other scholars have fully committed to understanding Anglo-Confederate relations
through the lens of abolition. The most critical work in this field is Mary Ellison’s 1972 book
Support for Secession: Lancashire and the American Civil War. Ellison posits that the British
working class of Lancashire, where many textile mills operated, did not support the Union and
instead favored the Confederacy, fearing that a lack of cotton could close the mills. She challenges
the long-standing belief that the English working class supported the Union because it represented
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the type of democracy they hoped for in England, and that they were staunch abolitionists. Though
they supported abolition, the Lancashire mill workers were suspicious of the Emancipation
Proclamation. They thought that the Lincoln Administration was not seriously committed to
abolition, and that the best remedy for slavery was an independent South ending slavery on its
own.53
R.J.M Blackett contributed a chapter to the 1995 edited volume The Union, the
Confederacy, and the Atlantic Rim, in which he examines northern and southern propaganda
efforts in Lancashire. He notes that support for either belligerent was more contested than Ellison
portrayed. Blackett’s chapter, like Ellison’s book, does not link popular support among the English
working class to influencing government policy. Nonetheless, it demonstrates that slavery, not
cotton alone, was part of the public debate about Britain’s role in the Civil War. Blackett was
perhaps more successful in demonstrating the link between public support and diplomatic strategy
in Divided Hearts: Britain and the American Civil War. He traces how trans-Atlantic pro-North
and pro-South societies tried to sway the British population’s opinion of the war. He concludes
that class was no accurate indicator of support for the Federals or the Confederates; some workingclass people supported the South, and some aristocrats supported the North. Moreover, he notes
that the pro-North societies were far more effective in marshaling support, especially when
galvanizing the public over emancipation.54
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Charles Hubbard, in 1998, wrote The Burden of Confederate Diplomacy. It represents a
combination of Owsley’s and Ellison’s work in Civil War diplomatic history—cotton diplomacy
in the realm of ambassadors and consuls and public sentiment over the issue of slavery. Hubbard
argues that Confederates over-emphasized convincing factory workers and their representatives to
force the recognition of the C.S.A., even though the working class did not have the political sway
that the Southerners assumed they had. Hubbard contends that the South’s initial, scattered cotton
diplomacy, withholding cotton from the international market, did more harm than good, exposing
that they were far more dependent on the fiber than the British.55
Don H. Doyle’s The Cause of All Nations: An International History of the American Civil
War analyzes the competing efforts to convince the British to remain neutral or to intervene in the
war. The diplomatic clash between the North and South in Britain centered on selling a Union
version of a democratic government or a Confederate version of a hierarchal class-based
republican government. The working classes preferred the northern vision of representative
government while the aristocracy, though they could not openly support slavery, wanted the
southern example of representative, democratic government.56
Emory Thomas’ The Confederate Nation and Robert Bonner’s Mastering America:
Southern Slaveholders and the Crisis of American Nationhood address the proslavery dimensions
of Confederate nationalism and its relationship to the Rebels’ diplomatic efforts. The failure of
Confederate diplomacy rested, according to Thomas, on the diplomats’ impatience and the Rebel
government’s inability to transparently represent itself to other governments. With some countries,
including Britain, they soft-pedaled slavery. Confederate Secretary of State Robert Toombs
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instructed the Rebel commissioners to Britain to state that slavery was the cause of the war, while
anticipating that they would later soften the Rebels’ proslavery image. With Mexico, Confederate
representatives claimed they had a shared economic system (slavery and peonage). Bonner further
contends that Southerners tried to consolidate proslavery nationalism in the Confederacy during
the Civil War. This drive to define Confederate nationhood strained the relationship between the
states and the national government, and between the planters and the working class. Their ultimate
failure resulted, in part, from the fact that the southern government positioned itself as a paternalist
master; when the hardships of war reached the Confederate people, they became disillusioned.57
Diplomats can address multiple audiences. In broad strokes, diplomats frame their nation’s
interests in terms that politicians and the public in the target country can understand and accept.
Representatives can also tailor their overtures for domestic consumption, reinforcing the purpose
of domestic policies and shaping the national identity. While Confederate diplomats represented
the fledging nation’s interests abroad, they also spoke on behalf of competing visions of
Confederate nationhood and the South’s cause. Thomas’ argument about their diplomacy, that they
“tried to be all things to all people,” includes the southern public. The diplomats’ emphasis on the
virtues of slavery on the international stage reinforced the “masters” nationalism at home, as
Bonner notes.58
Confederate citizens and leaders alike hoped that economic interest would define European
action; namely, that the Europeans would overlook the southern states’ fighting for slavery and
focus on the British and French economies. The Southerners’ assumptions were wrong. No matter
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how they argued that Britain needed Confederate slave-produced cotton, the British government
pursued “strict neutrality” because the European power prioritized abolition and anti-slavery above
trade. The Confederates maintained their proslavery convictions and did not understand that the
viability of the cotton trade did not supersede British commitments to abolition and anti-slavery
policies. The Confederate State Department and President Davis never moderated or even
appeared to moderate the South’s desire to expand the institution of slavery. As such, the British
government and its representatives did not believe that the South would ever abandon proslavery
commitments.
During the 1870s and 1880s, military matters dominated the hundreds of books devoted to
studying the war; diplomacy was less of an interest. Edwin De Leon’s The Secret History of
Confederate Diplomacy Abroad was an exception; it presented his perspective on Confederate
diplomacy. He was a Confederate representative overseas during the war and had intimate
knowledge of the inner workings of the Rebel diplomatic corps. 59
De Leon called the outspoken southern support for slavery and the politics which furthered
the growth and survival of the institution, a “fallacy” of the Confederate cause and, therefore, of
the nation’s diplomacy. He argued that the early rhetoric in support of the secessionist movement,
especially Alexander Stephen’s “Cornerstone of the Confederacy” speech, was not representative
of the cause. He maintained that slavery was not a significant cause of the war; he asserts that the
South seceded and fought the war for the noble cause of national self-determination and freedom
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from the tyranny of the northern states. The many proclamations of the secession movement prove
him wrong—not to mention, of course, the wartime rhetoric and policies which supported the
institution as well.
Nonetheless, De Leon noted slavery was the major stumbling block in the Confederacy’s
diplomatic efforts. Whenever Confederate diplomats and ambassadors attempted to advocate for
their cause, Union representatives would quickly note that the South stood for slavery. Southern
support for slavery, in De Leon’s opinion, made the British and French cautious in their support
and actions. In other words, the South set up, for the European powers, a high threshold of support.
The British in particular had to ignore the South’s outspoken pro-slavery posturing, something that
proved impossible to do.60
Britain was the key player on the international stage, and the Confederate State Department
coveted their recognition and their military intervention. The British perspective on the American
Civil War revealed that they understood the war from multiple angles: a battle over slavery, a
question of supplying cotton to European industries, and a potential fracturing of a burgeoning
strategic rival. Nonetheless, one concern stood out to the British Foreign office above all others.
They readily accepted that the war started over the issue of slavery. The chief diplomat to the
United States, Lord Richard Lyons, wrote to his superior, Foreign Secretary Russell, on the eve of
the Civil War that the southern slave states intended to leave the Union. He stated that the election
of 1860 transferred federal power from a “pro-slavery party” to the “anti-slavery party;” the South
fought to protect itself and its institutions from the power of the Republican party. 61 In another
dispatch, as South Carolina was on the verge of declaring its secession, Lyons noted that the
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Southerners feared a slave revolt if they remained in the Union controlled by the Republican
party.62
With their overall understanding of the war well established, it becomes clear why the
British hesitated to throw their support to the South. In December 1860, even before the Rebels
fired the first shots on Fort Sumter, Lord Lyons summed up the British approach to treating with
the Confederacy. While he would later criticize the Lincoln administration for instigating the war,
the British ambassador reported to Russell that “…there was little moderation to be expected from
the Cotton-growing states.” Lyons’ dispatch of December 1860, written and read before the
“Cornerstone” speech, proves that the British government understood what was at stake during the
war—that the South wanted to protect and expand slavery, and the North elected a President of a
political party which was avowedly anti-slavery.
The second half of the December 18th, 1860 Dispatch (#317) had far more critical insights
into the near-impossibility of recognizing, supporting, and fighting for the Confederacy. As Lyons
noted, even if the South succeeded in achieving its independence, the British government and
people would be profoundly uncomfortable dealing with the Confederacy, even though they
wanted to avoid disruptions in the cotton trade. Why? The answer was simple: the Confederacy
was founded on the principle of protecting and expanding the institution of slavery, Lyons
observed. He elaborated further that, “Unless the Seceding States can be induced to act with
moderation upon the question of slavery, they may rouse a feeling of indignation and horror in
Great Britain which will overpower all consideration of material interest.” For the British
ambassador, there was no indication that the Rebels were interested in moderating their pro-slavery
ambitions; talk of reopening the trans-Atlantic slave trade proved that the South would not pull

62

Ibid., vol. 1, 7. Dispatch from Lyons to Russel, 4 December 1860.

42

back from its goal. Lyons thought that the Confederacy would never back down from its proslavery rhetoric either. To do so, the ambassador mused, would be tantamount to admitting they
were wrong on the question of slavery’s expansion and right to exist, and therefore wrong to leave
the Union in the first place. Lyons concluded, “It is apprehended that we shall have very
considerable difficulty in placing our relations, commercial or political, on a satisfactory footing
with a people imbued with such sentiments, immense as is the importance to us of procuring a
cheap and abundant supply of their staple commodity.”63
As early as 1860, Southerners wondered how they could pressure the British into
supporting their cause. One potential avenue was to not sell or ship cotton to England in the hope
that, lacking the fiber, the British government would be forced by its people to intervene in the
war on the South’s side. The cotton embargo was neither Davis’ idea nor Confederate
congressional law. It originated from local and state government officials and private individuals.
Davis, in fact, prevented Congress from passing an embargo bill, realizing that it could anger the
British, and encouraged cotton sales if buyers had blockade runners.64 The informal cotton
embargo, however, was arguably far more damaging. It was less associated with strategic
imperative and more linked to forcing the British government’s hand. Some wealthy planters
across the South during 1860 and 1861 believed that, if they withheld the sale of cotton to the
British Empire, it would force the English—and by extension the French—to provide direct
military aid and fight on the South’s side.
The Confederate and state governments realized that their only currency that was worth
anything on the international market was cotton. It was clear from the outset of the war that the
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South would have to purchase weapons, munitions, and cloth because they could not manufacture
these materials at high volume. Simply put, they had to leverage the European industrial sector
because, despite their best efforts to build their industrial capacity, there was an immediate need
for war material beyond what they could take from federal armories and arsenals around the South.
Cotton, then, would be the trade currency to get needed supplies. There were some problems, of
course; when planters shipped the 1860 cotton crop, only a few hundred thousand bales left
southern shores, well short of the 2 million expected.”65 A dearth of cotton meant little buying
power as loan security.
In the context of cotton’s importance to the Rebel economy and global buying power,
multiple offices of the Confederate government, including the Treasury and War departments,
carefully monitored how, when, and where cotton was sold and shipped. Officials tracked some
shipments and altered others when cotton left southern ports. They were trying desperately to avoid
war profiteering and price gouging with their precious commodity, and this proved difficult as
blockade runners demanded payment in gold or cotton. Strict control of cotton exports made
practical sense though, at times, it made paying for needed war supplies difficult. There were clear
and strategic reasons for implementing these controls.
Planters, however, gravely misunderstood their place within the global cotton market. To
be sure, the South produced an incredible amount of high-quality cotton for manufacturing and
industrial interests in Europe, mainly Britain. The price of cotton was rising ever upward, and the
crop was growing larger and larger; it seemed by 1860 that nothing could dethrone King Cotton’s
place in the market. Many planters believed that no other producer could replace their cotton
output. Even when the war was decidedly against them, planters still maintained that southern
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slave-produced cotton would remain “king.” A Confederate supporter, Duff Green, argued that
India could never replace the South’s ability to meet English cotton demand fully.66 The only threat
to southern cotton production was internal; without the expansion of slavery, the growth of the
cotton supply could stop. Republicans and their anti-slavery policies portended a severe threat to
the overall health of the institution of slave-produced cotton.
Two other factors worked against the planters’ calculations; first, recent harvests of
American cotton were historically huge bumper crops. Once shipped and sold, British textile
manufacturing had a massive surplus of cotton that could last them beyond 1861 and perhaps well
into 1862. In fact, an impending cotton shortage worked in favor of British merchants. As De Leon
notes, with less cotton available, “...the famine—strange as it seems—pays the manufacturers
handsomely…the glut of the manufactured article and the consequent depreciation of price has
been prevented by our civil war, and the stoppage of the cotton supply.”67 The second factor was
a shift that many planters did not foresee. As less cotton reached Britain because of the improving
and tightening blockade, the English textile industry turned to other parts of the world for its cotton
supply. Specifically, the British colonies in Egypt and India were able to adequately replace the
cotton lost through the disruption of the American Civil War. The South’s best opportunity to get
supplies was during the beginning of the war when the blockade was a “paper” blockade, and the
Union navy had not assaulted and closed Confederate ports to traffic.
The only reason that the informal embargo existed was that planters and states believed
that the English economy could not survive without slave-produced cotton. Confederate
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commissioners approached negotiations with the expectation that the British government would
fawn over them and readily accept their demands if the Confederates could prove they could fight
on equal terms with Union forces. For the Rebel diplomats, it was a simple proposition: by helping
the South, the English would help themselves economically and on the world stage. Lyons was
dismissive of the notion that cotton alone could be used to bend the Europeans to the Rebels’ will,
calling it “preposterous.” He pointed to the direct danger of the cotton embargo, which was born
from King Cotton diplomacy; if withheld, any commodity could be produced, found elsewhere, or
substituted. Nonetheless, and with an exasperated tone, Lyons noted that “In answer to all
arguments, they [the Confederates] are apt to repeat their senseless cry that ‘Cotton is King.’”68
When the newly minted Confederate States of America sent its first three commissioners
overseas on March 31st, 1861—Pierre Rost (Louisiana), William L. Yancy (Alabama), and
Ambrose Dudley Mann (Virginia)—expectations for European intervention into the war were
exceptionally high. The Confederate representatives abroad were primarily chosen for their
political connections and ideologies, rather than their capabilities as diplomats. Rost, the
commissioner to France, was acquainted with elite French society but did not speak French.
Yancey was a secession extremist and poorly tempered for diplomatic work, but was influential
enough for Davis to appoint him. Mann had some experience in foreign relations, but his most
important qualification was that he was Davis’ friend.69
Nonetheless, in speeches across the South, soon-to-be President Jefferson Davis
proclaimed that the British and French would recognize the C.S.A. as a matter of course. His faith
in their potential activity in the war was simple: “England and France will not allow our great
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staple [cotton] to be dammed up within our limits.”70 In an interview with The New-York citizen
on March 31st, 1861, Davis argued that Britain and France would intervene to ensure the
continuous flow of cotton to protect their textile industries, especially after Lincoln proclaimed a
blockade of southern ports.71
From the Confederate perspective, there was little reason for the European powers not to
get involved in the coming war. Whether through confirmation bias, supposition, or information
abroad, the South believed that the powers were interested in resolving the slaveholders’ rebellion
in their favor. Unbeknownst to the Rebels, Lyons recommended that Britain should support the
North over the South: “To Englishmen sincerely interested in the welfare of this country, the
present state of things is painful. Abhorrence of slavery, respect for law, more in complete
community of race and language enlist his sympathies with the side of the North.”72
Davis, however, received letters informing him that recognition was right around the
corner. On July 20th, 1861, he received a letter from Rost. Rost informed the president that the
French and English were wondering how and where they are going to get and pay for southern
cotton. He commented that “…without cotton many millions of their population are doomed to
misery and starvation…” and he supposed even further that necessity would force the European
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powers to raise the blockade and that France took it as a given that it would happen eventually.73
Beverly Tucker indicated that the British were on the verge of recognition because they worried
about their economy and were tired of U.S. tariffs.74 South Carolina Governor Francis W. Pickens
relayed to Davis a message from a British Consul, Robert Bunch, after the assault on Fort Sumter;
Bunch claimed that England was interested in reconciliation, but if the Lincoln Administration
raised the blockade, the British Empire would move in and recognize the South.75 Even well into
1862 did Confederate civilians and officials alike expect England to act; De Leon, in an informal
interview with Palmerston on July 30, 1862, mentioned that Great Britain had recognized separatist
movements in the past, especially in Latin America.76 Lyons’ dispatches create the impression that
Britain’s anti-slavery stance and her need for cotton carried equal weight, but that the
Confederacy’s overt support of the Peculiar Institution complicated any diplomatic efforts. When
the Confederacy declared its independence, he noted that southern politicians and leaders had not
retreated from their proslavery advocacy.77 When the Rebels fired on Fort Sumter, Lyons claimed,
“The taint of slavery will render the cause of the South loathsome to the civilized world.”78
While the British continued in their reluctance to support a proslavery government, France
seemed to be more open to friendly relations with the Rebel states. Louis Napoleon III was
73
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sympathetic to the Confederate cause, and seemed to represent to the Confederate state department
their best hope for European intervention. From the earliest moments of the war, the Emperor
seemed willing to act; Davis received a letter from Louis T. Wigfall on February 11, 1861,
claiming that the French minister said the Emperor would recognize the C.S.A. if the minister was
sent to the president and received at once.79 Davis’ commissioner in England, A. Dudley Mann,
also seemed to confirm that the French were interested, claiming that the Emperor intended to send
Prince Napoleon to assess the American situation after the battlefield victory at Bull Run. Dudley
further claimed that the cotton supplies in Europe were in question as the war got underway; he
recommended that they should universally withhold cotton until the British and French lifted the
blockade.80 When the French Prince did land on southern shores, he seemed to engender even
greater hope that they would intervene, but nothing came of it.81
Emperor Napoleon did not want to act alone; he intimated that France would directly
support the Confederacy only if Great Britain were to join them. The Emperor had reasons for his
reluctance; he had the vision to construct an international, commercial “Latin Empire” (a collection
of French-led or –controlled Central and South American countries). The English and American
governments were a stumbling block to this plan until the Civil War opened the door for the French
to act. When Rebel commissioners arrived in Europe, they understood that both powers would act
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together. Edwin De Leon, writing to President Davis during late October 1861, indicated that
France was willing, and England was not.82
The more focused task for Confederate diplomats was to convince the British cabinet,
Parliament, and its people that it was in their interest to side with the rebellious southern states. If
they won over Britain, they could receive the full support of the French. Davis acknowledged that
this was a difficult task, in an interview with British newspaper reporter William H. Russell. The
main obstacle was the anti-slavery sentiment in England.83 Mann wrote to Davis during the spring
of 1861 and informed him that the Lincoln Administration had sent Fremont to speak with wellknown abolitionist groups at Exeter Hall. He believed that Fremont had little influence beyond
abolitionists. By contrast, the Confederate commissioners met with MPs. Ultimately, Mann argued
they needed to use the cotton trade as leverage, and that would overcome British hesitancy to
negotiate with the Rebels.84 De Leon’s October 1861 letter provided further insight into the British
mindset, and into what the Confederates thought they could use as leverage. De Leon claimed that
the British would deplete their cotton reserves by March 1862. British newspapers, however, still
attacked pro-South Members of Parliament on the issue of abolition, and for even meeting with
Confederate commissioners.85 The situation did not improve by late fall, 1861. Mann wrote to the
Confederate president, observing that no popular newspaper saw fit “…to espouse the cause of
slavery.” Mann was still confident, despite initial rough going: “The Britshry are not yet prepared
82
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to give their sanction to such an advocacy [of slavery]…The time is not distant, in my opinion,
when they will cease to rail at our cherished institution.”86 As De Leon notes, the Confederate
commissioners and diplomats believed that, while the British and French governments “exercised
a prudent reserve” when dealing with the Southerners, “the current of diplomacy and the tide of
public opinion abroad, both seemed setting in strongly towards the new Confederacy.”87
The Confederate commissioners turned to their main bargaining chip, “King Cotton,” to
induce the British government into action and hopefully quiet anti-slavery support in England
during the spring and summer of 1861. The cotton that was slave-produced for the industrial sector
of Europe was irreplaceable, according to southern diplomats. Sterling R. Cockrill, a Nashville
lawyer and Arkansas River cotton planter, proposed on June 18, 1861 that the Confederate
government take control of two million bales to influence foreign affairs and establish national
credit; in his words, “King Cotton must sustain the army.”88 Governor of Alabama Andrew B.
Moore, in February, questioned Davis about the process and reasons for trading cotton with
Europe. “The cotton power,” he claimed, “is a momentous question, I would ask that the attention
of the Congress be called to the interdiction of the export of cotton from all Confederate ports until
the close of the war or negotiations of treaties of Amity and commerce with the nations of Europe
that may want cotton from us for their consumption.”89 One Tennessee citizen had the most radical
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and spiteful proposition; he recommended the C.S.A. burn all cotton to send a message to the
North and Britain about the “consequences” of the war.90
To look only at the surface of their efforts belies an essential feature of their program; the
fiber itself was not what they were selling to the British and French empires. Instead, cotton was
vital evidence that demonstrated the necessity and importance of protecting southern slavery in the
context of a global economy. At the heart of it, the Confederate vision for enticing the British and
French into war with the Union depended on proving that, even though the powers had abolished
slavery, they too relied heavily on the Peculiar Institution’s productive power. The South hoped
the Europeans believed their economies would fail without slave-produced cotton.
Moreover, as would become apparent to some observers, the issue of slavery and the
Rebels’ investment in and commitment to the institution made it difficult even to approach the
other issues British and French faced. To be sure, some members of Parliament and the cabinet
were interested in allying with the Confederates for strategic reasons—namely, the weakening of
a potential world power rival. In some cases, Confederate ambassadors did receive assurances that
the British government would shift from its policy of neutrality, but there were very few influential
politicians in Europe who were willing openly to ally themselves with the cause of slavery.
Although their statements to the Confederate representatives were conflicting, the British
cabinet initially agreed with Lyons about the war and the role that slavery played in it. For his part,
Lyons reported consistently to Russell whenever anti-slavery measures were introduced or passed
by the U.S. Congress, indicating that the British government cared about abolition and slavery as
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issues during the war. In a May 20th, 1861 dispatch, Lyons described how Union Secretary of State
William Seward had been advised to approach European powers; leading Republicans suggested
that he deemphasize measures which harmed the cotton trade but speak up on how the North was
advancing abolition and emancipation.91 By way of example, when Union General Benjamin
Butler issued his “confiscation orders” and Congress approved them, Lyons dutifully passed his
report of the orders along to Russell.92
Though the C.S.A.’s proslavery commitments hampered them, the commissioners’ efforts
garnered some discussion of recognition in the British Parliament and Cabinet. De Leon claims
that “while the friends of the South were animated, elated, confident, the advocates of the North
were uneasy and apprehensive” about the possibility of recognition. The Confederate
commissioner and his colleagues supposed that a majority in the House of Commons supported a
motion that challenged Russell’s diplomatic dealing with the South.93 The Foreign Secretary
received the three commissioners as private individuals only, not as official representatives of the
C.S.A.. This status appeared to contradict the Queen’s Proclamation of Neutrality and Belligerent
Rights. The document declared that Great Britain would not take any side and recognized both the
North and South as “legal combatants.”94 The first motion in Parliament to reverse this decision
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was introduced in June 1861. The 1861 motion, introduced by W.H. Gregory, did not pass because
another MP, William Edward Forster, introduced a counter-motion.95
Having failed to secure recognition through Parliamentary maneuvering, the Confederacy
put its best hope in the Trent Affair.96 The capture of Confederate commissioners on the British
ship Trent nearly instigated a war between the Union and the British Empire. As Confederate war
department clerk J.B. Jones noted in his diary on December 23, 1861, “Mr. Benjamin, [the
Secretary of State] I learn, feels very confident that a rupture between the United States and Great
Britain is inevitable...Some of our officials go so far as to hint that in the event of a war between
the United States and Great Britain, and our recognition by the former, it might be good policy for
us to stand neutral.”97 For his part, Davis stated his belief that the Union would not release the
diplomats due to public pressure, and this would lead to the British government recognizing the
C.S.A. and going to war against the U.S.A.98 The Rebel commissioners already in London
confirmed Davis’ and Confederate hopes. In a series of dispatches from the commissioners to
Davis, the Confederates’ feverish hopes took shape. Rost wrote two dispatches, December 24th
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and 26th, 1861, detailing what he, Yancey, and Mann did while the Trent Affair roiled Anglonorthern relations. They attempted to get Spain to recognize the South (and failed) and pursued
funds to print propaganda. He reported that the British Navy and Army were prepping a campaign
to crush the blockade and invade the northern states.99 Yancey’s dispatches to Davis were similar
in tone to Rost’s. Yancey believed that the British public and government were willing to go to
war, especially considering a rumor that the Union may have seized Mason and Slidell again (the
Union did not).100 Almost a month later, Yancey still fervently hoped that France and England
would intercede as he awaited Mason’s and Slidell’s arrival in England.101
Nonetheless, the essential parts of the English government that could lend the South the
support it desperately wanted were unconvinced and knew that there was very little support for the
slaveholding South in the English government and among the people at large. Confederate
commissioner Mann relayed his frustration that the Palmerston government refused to alter its
strict neutrality policy even if the Confederates won victories on the battlefield. The Trent Affair
had nonetheless buoyed his hopes; the French Emperor supported Palmerston when the Union
Navy detained Mason and Slidell, and therefore Mann expected that Palmerston would support
Napoleon when he sought to lift the blockade. Better still, Mann claimed that there was a “cabinet
understanding” in Palmerston’s government that Europe would force the North to lift the blockade
considering how the North violated international norms, such as with the Trent. The London Times,
however, provided a prescient rejoinder to Confederate assumptions; the paper warned the South
that though Britain nearly came to blows with the North, it was not out of support for the
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Confederacy.102 Even during the midst of the most extreme diplomatic incident between Great
Britain and the Union, the Trent Affair, Lyons continued to report on Union anti-slavery efforts.103
The British minister continued to track how and when the federal Congress acted to dismantle the
laws and practices that had upheld slavery.104
The beginning of 1862 introduced a personnel shuffle within the Confederate diplomatic
corps, which included returning the undiplomatic Yancey to the southern states. De Leon claims
that the cantankerous Alabaman learned an essential truth about why Rebel overtures were failing.
In a speech at a New Orleans Hotel on March 13, 1862, Yancey claimed that foreign relations
between the C.S.A. and Europe were desperate. He asserted that the Rebels had no friends in
Britain and that “The sentiment of Europe was anti-slavery, and that portion of the public opinion
which formed and was represented by the Government of England was abolition.” He stated these
observations again in a secret session of the Confederate Senate, where a raucous debate raged
over the direction of diplomatic goals.105 De Leon’s views paralleled Yancey’s, but he did not want
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to abandon the foreign mission. He argued in a letter to Benjamin and Davis that the “cotton
famine” policy was too weak to change the Europeans’ neutrality positions, and that their efforts
should focus on France rather than Britain. More significantly, however, De Leon argued that
The greatest stumbling block in the way of our foreign alliance is the perpetuation
of the institution of slavery. That sentiment is stronger abroad than even
considerations of interest—stronger probably in France than in England. Can we
make no concessions in that direction? Can we not offer a gradual emancipation to
at least a portion of our negroes—say at the expiration of twenty years—so as to
give our friends abroad an answer to the cry that this is a war for the perpetuation
of slavery?106
His proposals went unheeded because, as De Leon notes, “With regard to the matter of
emancipation, or of slavery generally, they regarded it as impossible to make any concessions, in
the then temper of our people—and evidently thought I was overstating the feeling in Europe, and
the necessity of any action upon it.”107
Despite no clear indication that the European powers would intervene, Southerners held
out hope, perhaps to fatally deluded levels. Observers noted that Southerners seeded too much
cotton, expecting that Britain would break the blockade, and not enough food.108 Even the mere
rumors of British intervention caused wild fluctuations in the cotton market.109 The hopes for
European intervention into the war reached a fever pitch during the waning months of 1862,
especially as the Union midterm elections came to an end. War clerk J.B. Jones hoped that as the
election results chipped away at the Republican Party’s hold on the federal government, France
and England would move in to arbitrate and recognize the Rebels in return for a commercial
monopoly. His mood soured as there was no indication that the French or English would act. For
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Jones’ part, he could not comprehend their “blunder;” the reward seemed to be worth the risk. The
disappointed clerk elaborated in his diary on December 1, 1862, as to why the European powers
refused to get involved:
The news from Europe is not encouraging. France is willing to interfere, and Russia
is ready to participate in friendly mediation to stay the effusion of blood—but
England seems afraid of giving offense to the United States. They refer to the then
approaching elections in the North and lay some stress on the anticipated change in
public opinion. Popular opinion! What is it worth in the eyes of European powers?
If it be of any value, and if the voice of the people should be allowed to determine
such contests, why not leave it to a vote of the Southern people to decide under
which government they will live?110
The relations between the Confederacy and the European powers grew strained as Rebel
negotiators, and the Department of State, struggled to balance the quest for international
recognition with the domestic, political imperative to advance the cause of a proslavery nation. An
1863 letter from Florida governor John Milton to Davis expressed his concerns about neighboring
states that ordered planters to stop growing cotton and instead grow food. Specifically, Milton
argued that such regulations could potentially anger the French and British and cloud the
Confederacy’s position as the world’s foremost slave and cotton economy:
While it is contended that Foreign Nations cannot exist without the cotton produced
by slave labor in the Southern states, I would most respectfully present to your
serious consideration, whether or not of the legislative power of these states shall
prohibit the cultivation of cotton by slave labor (of which Foreign nations will be
informed)….their antipathies to slavery and their necessities for cotton may not be
successfully appealed to by the United States Government for co-operation to
abolish slavery and to raise Cotton without slave labor.111
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Milton, unlike his fellow governors and even some in the Confederate Department of State,
explained that the seceded states should emphasize how the institution of slavery was essential to
the international cotton trade. His views represented the need among Rebel leaders to reinforce the
international importance of the slave-cotton economy at home. If the Confederacy’s “cornerstone”
was slavery, then the Confederate public had to believe their nation’s political-economic system
was valued on the world stage.
Confederate diplomats made little headway throughout 1863 to accomplish their lofty
goals. Jones jotted down in his diary during the middle of July 1863 that some members of
Parliament and pro-southern press outlets were calling for recognition. Jones wrote the entry after
the twin military disasters of the Gettysburg and Vicksburg campaigns. For Jones, the time to
intervene was now if the British feared a militarily empowered North with a million soldiers in its
armies.112 The one constant that remained was despite military successes or failures; the
Confederates maintained their allegiance to the institution of slavery. Jones recorded receiving a
letter on July 31, 1863, from Confederate Congressman E.S. Dargan. Dargan proposed that the
Rebels abolish slavery in the hopes of enticing the British and French to “interfere” to save the
Confederacy. The European powers would never, Dargan foresaw, agree to help them until they
set the slaves free. His views were not well received and were quickly dismissed.113 Even in
diplomatic matters smaller than recognition, but no less critical, such as financing the Rebels’ war
effort, a commitment to proslavery politics overrode the full range of policies, resources, and
people needed to keep the war effort afloat from abroad. Jones reported that Secretary of State
Judah P. Benjamin faced severe criticism for continuing to retain the service of Spence, the State
Department’s financial agent in England. Spence was a staunch supporter of the South and wrote
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an extremely well-sold book that advocated the case for southern secession. The only sticking
point was that he was an anti-slavery activist. To be sure, he was a successful financial broker for
the C.S.A., but his anti-slavery views forced the Secretary and the President to restructure the
agents who handled the South’s money in Europe. This caused confusion and interruptions in
keeping the Rebel treasury solvent.114
The lack of progress soon led to frustration and desperation in the Confederate State
Department. The President and the Secretary of State terminated Mason’s mission to Great Britain
during August 1863. In an October 1863 letter from Secretary of State Benjamin, the cabinet
advised Davis to expel all British consuls from Confederate territory, acting on Yancey’s advice
from the previous year. Expulsion of British representatives was the Confederacy’s last gasp for
attention, and to redress what they thought was highhanded behavior. English emissaries had
demanded the Rebels exclude foreign nationals from the South’s sweeping draft. The Rebel
cabinet resented the interference into the Confederacy’s most vital military policy.115
By 1864, the tensions between the C.S.A. and Great Britain had not eased. Mason reported
to the president, from Paris, that the English Foreign Office was “very friendly” with U.S.
diplomats, and that the British government was actively hurting the Confederate cause. 116 On the
eve of the 1864 military campaign season, Mason accused Seward and the Union state department
of bullying Russell and Palmerston by threatening war if Britain should recognize the South.117
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Supporters of the Rebel cause continued to struggle to reach the British populace and government;
Charles S. Morehead, who wrote pamphlets in support of the Confederacy, mentioned to Davis
that “It is useless to argue the abstract question of slavery in Europe and I have endeavored to
present it in a different aspect.”118
It was a poorly kept secret, however, that some in the Confederacy considered freeing some
of the slaves. Lyons dutifully conveyed these reports to Russell but also included Seward’s analysis
of the report. As the Union Secretary of State noted, a limited number of African American slaves
could be freed and still uphold the institution. Seward argued that slaveholders could keep slave
women in bondage and the children those women had would become slaves, thus continuing the
institution.119 Ultimately, for the reasons Lyons reported and for the simple fact that the war was
nearly over, the British and the French were unconvinced, and merely observed as the Union
defeated the C.S.A.
For all their efforts to convince the British to overcome their commitment to abolition, the
Confederate State Department and Davis secretly felt out whether the European powers would
recognize the South if it emancipated its slaves during the winter of 1865. On January 4 of that
year, Benjamin and Davis ordered Farrar Keener to Europe; Keener worked with Mason and
Slidell to approach the British and French with the emancipation plan. Keener’s secret orders
directed him to emphasize to European officials that the South only fought for “self-government.”
The orders from Benjamin stated the Confederacy willing to sacrifice slavery to win recognition
and survive the war.120 Keener, Mason, and Slidell met with high-ranking officials in both
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countries, but their mission failed because the European powers understood that the C.S.A. could
not win.121 Keener’s failed mission was kept secret because Davis and Benjamin realized that there
was little support for emancipation.
Even if the mission had been successful, as Davis noted to J.D. Shaw, the states would
have needed to approve the plan. In the same letter, however, Davis claimed that “the chief obstacle
to recognition has been an unwillingness to be embroiled in a quarrel with the United States. If
slavery or any other cause had been the impediment, our advances to European Governments
would have led to the disclosure of their reasons for not acknowledging our independence.”122
While the British and French governments did not explicitly state that their reluctance to support
the South’s claims was because of slavery, Davis’ diplomats and commissioners throughout the
war, including De Leon and Yancey, publicly and privately informed him that slavery was
hampering their efforts.
Davis’ post-war writings represented a distinct effort to write slavery out of the war; this
is true of his examination of the South’s efforts at international outreach. After the war, the
defeated former President downplayed slavery’s role in diplomacy. Davis’ 1881 two-volume series
The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government only briefly examined foreign relations with
European powers. Davis described small successes the South achieved during the war and
defended the Confederacy’s behavior abroad. The Confederacy succeeded in smaller goals (such
as purchasing weapons, ships, and supplies; moving Treasury funds overseas; and trading or using
cotton as collateral for loans), which did not involve Britain or France abandoning their Neutrality
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loans. It took him almost two months to reach Europe. He arrived in London February 21st and
then arrived in Paris on February 24th after sneaking past the Union military and Federal
authorities. Keener guaranteed that the South would have been recognized if he had been sent to
Europe on this mission to offer the possibility emancipation during 1863 instead of 1865.
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policy. Davis did not clearly explain why the C.S.A. was not recognized and did not receive
European support. He instead emphasized how the Federal government violated Constitutional and
international norms during the war.123
The Confederacy failed to receive decisive European support because they fought to
uphold the institution of slavery and never substantially deviated from that policy. Of the few
avenues they had to earn international support—abandoning pro-slavery policies, adopting antislavery postures, perhaps limited emancipation—they were reluctant to engage in any of them.
The Confederates’ troubled diplomatic efforts were one of several factors that caused its defeat.
As some historians have noted, there may be a case that southern diplomats were incompetent.
Moreover, southern representatives may have misunderstood the southern states’ place in the
international trade market. However, their dedication to upholding slavery is what really
determined the course of Confederate diplomacy. The South’s dedication to pro-slavery policies
drove the resulting failures in foreign relations—lack of international recognition, military support,
and aid in lifting the blockade.
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CHAPTER THREE
CONFEDERATE MILITARY STRATEGY AND PRESERVING SLAVERY

On July 17, 1864, two Union men crossed Confederate lines and traveled to Richmond on
an amateur diplomatic mission, without the backing of the Lincoln administration. There, they
tried to discern if there were terms on which the North and South could negotiate for peace. The
northerners received an audience with Jefferson Davis, and published their conversation with him
in the Atlantic Monthly. Davis reiterated that the purpose of the offensive-defensive strategy was
to prevent the North from invading the South, and so long as Union troops were present in the
Confederacy, the war had to continue. Davis proclaimed, “We are not fighting for slavery. We are
fighting for Independence.” He stated that the Union tied its war efforts to emancipation, and it
would be impossible for the South to accept peace based on emancipation because one state could
not “vote slavery out” of another. Davis, prodded further on emancipation, “[showed] some angry
feeling”:
And Emancipation! You have already emancipated nearly two million of our
slaves, — and if you will take care of them, you may emancipate the rest. I had a
few when the war began. I was of some use to them; they never were of any to me.
Against their will you ‘emancipated’ them; and you may ‘emancipate’ every negro
in the Confederacy, but we will be free! We will govern ourselves. We will do it, if
we have to see every Southern plantation sacked, and every Southern city in
flames.124
Despite his grand protestation that the Confederacy did not fight for slavery, Davis could not
separate the war from it. His northern guests read between the lines, past the President’s
statements about independence, concluding that “there can be no peace so long as Mr. Davis
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controls the South. Ignoring slavery, he states the issue —the only issue with him, — Union, or
DisUnion. That is it. We must conquer or be conquered. We can negotiate only with the
bayonet.”125
The basic shape of the Confederacy’s evolving military strategy revealed that they fought
to achieve independence and thereby preserve slavery. While fighting for separation, the rebels
prioritized shielding the institution of slavery from wartime interruptions, the threat of servile
insurrections, and the Union military’s emancipation policies. Confederate armies, under Jefferson
Davis’ and Robert E. Lee’s command, operated under a strategy that Davis called “the OffensiveDefensive.” Rebel units would attempt to protect as much Confederate territory as possible while
seizing opportunities to invade federal holdings. On both sides of the border, they prioritized areas
that supported slavery or were dense in slaves. This doctrine later expanded to include antiemancipation strategies, as Union columns freed slaves and then started to reconstruct formerly
seceded states. As the Union Army grew larger, and as the Rebels struggled to match their enemy,
the institution of slavery deteriorated. It became impossible to accomplish both ends. The danger
was clear; any place the Union army marched, slavery withered. For most of the war, this was an
unacceptable fact that had to be countered as a strategic priority. By the time the South pivoted
towards fighting purely for separation, it was too late. Preserving the Peculiar Institution had
dominated Confederate military policy, planning, and strategy for most of the war.
At the war’s outset, Rebel political and military leadership understood that they had a
mandate to protect not only Confederate territory, but the local “institutions” that resided there.
How could they claim to be a nation if they couldn’t protect their territory or defend the
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“cornerstone” of the nation? State governors and citizens demanded a cordon to protect them. 126
Tennessee governor Isham Harris forwarded messages from local officers requesting aid and
weapons for the defense of western Tennessee.127 Christopher Danely, representing the Arkansas
military board, sent Davis a memorandum which demanded that the Confederacy defend the state’s
northern border and send two generals to do so.128 M. Goodman, a resident of Palestine, Virginia
(now West Virginia), feared an invasion from the North and urged the War Department to “not to
look at the coast but the safety of the lives and property and to the Honour of our noble
Confederacy.”129 A cordon strategy also had an added benefit. Rebel commanders wanted to gather
men, arms, and supplies, and this strategy allowed them to do so from as wide a territory as
possible. By remaining in stationary defensive positions, Rebel armies hoped to speed the process
of recruitment, organization, and supply.
As the war started in earnest, the War Department in Richmond ordered troops to deploy
along a nearly 1000-mile front. Davis then divided the Confederacy into eight military
departments, which he further separated into districts. Commanders in each department had wide
latitude in determining objectives and deciding how and where troops would be employed. These
commanders often operated independently of one another and protected their own commands
instead of aiding threatened neighbors. The first few battles between field armies were sporadic.
The Rebels’ cordon strategy benefited from this initial strategic environment; Confederate forces
were available at widely scattered points, and in enough numbers, to repel invading Yankee
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columns. The battles at Bull Run, Virginia, and Wilson’s Creek, Missouri, were Confederate
operational successes. These victories, however, neither ended the war nor shifted the conflict
firmly in favor of the South.
Confederate leaders recognized slavery was under threat, despite the cordon, and required
additional protection against the forces of abolition. Speaking at Cartersville, Georgia, before the
war, Davis had identified “a hell-born fanaticism whose moving impulses and spirit was the
destruction of our institutions.”130 This could take the “exceedingly offensive” form of fomenting
a slave Rebellion, and he used the example of the Haitian Revolution to illustrate the dangers posed
by Lincoln and the Republicans.131 And, in fact, in the first engagements of the War, the Rebels
heard of the disruptive impact that Yankee invasions had on slavery. Former Arkansas governor
Thomas S. Drew reported that slaveholders fled before Nathaniel Banks’ forces in Missouri, taking
their slaves with them when possible. Banks had gone beyond then-current federal law in the state,
enacting an emancipation order without approval.132
These risks to slavery encouraged Davis and the War Department to consider leaving small
units scattered across the South, in addition to the field armies guarding the Confederacy’s borders.
Lawyer Spencer Adams of Shiloh, Alabama, was one of many citizens and politicians who
clamored for this localized protection. He wanted Davis to focus on defensive operations to wear
down the Union forces and fight for an armistice—yet he demanded Davis protect the Gulf Coast
states and not Virginia, which had not yet declared secession.133
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Adams’ sentiments were widely shared; citizens in the Deep South felt vulnerable. Areas
with many slaves—coastal regions and counties that bordered navigable rivers—seemed to beg
the most for protection. In a letter to the Confederate president, Davis’ nephew Charles J. Mitchell
laid out the Union’s threats to slavery on the rivers and the coasts. Mitchell noted it would only
take a small force to steam down the Mississippi or Tennessee Rivers and capture batteries at
Memphis and Vicksburg. From those positions, the Union naval and land forces could operate in
the “river parishes,” where there were few people to defend them because the men were already
away in Confederate service. These river counties were home to massive plantations; in Madison
Parish, slaves outnumbered the white population nine to one. Mitchell worried that federal forces
could instigate a “John Brown Raid.” The threat of violent slave revolts, he stated, led to much
anxiety, and if one occurred, “Such a panic would ensue as would be ruinous to our cause.” Davis’
nephew hoped the president had a plan to defend the water approaches.134
Mitchell’s worries were clear-sighted. Part of Winfield Scott’s “Anaconda Plan” was to
send federal forces up and down the major rivers in the Rebellious states to divide them and offer
further invasion routes to the Union armies. Confederate civilian and military leaders understood
the waterborne threat and requested weapons or permission to form local units to prevent U.S.
forces from inciting servile insurrection. Citizens from Camden County, Georgia, pleaded for a
garrison at nearby Fort Clinch and additional fortifications on several rivers and harbors. These
Georgians feared piracy, and a “slave Rebellion should the enemy land and supply them with
arms.”135 George W. Gayle, a lawyer and Dallas County, Alabama resident, said that the largest
slaveholding county in the state needed its men to remain at home to “save ourselves from the
134
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horrors of insurrection.”136 James M. Finch, a Powhatan, Virginia farmer, recommended that a few
infantry or cavalry companies be put on patrol in the county to guard against a servile insurrection.
He contended, “ours are envenomed, deadly foes, ready for any dirty work, and their agents may
be wiring among our slaves.”137
Some of the densest slave populations were along waterways. So, stationary Confederate
defenses along the rivers fulfilled two imperatives: deny the Federal forces use of a waterborne
“highway” and protect the adjacent slave plantations. Unlike the cordon strategy, which would
later prove disastrous, protecting slavery by defending the coasts and waterways aligned with
sound strategic principles. The waterways were logical avenues for invasion, so it made sense to
deny the enemy access to them. Waterways, for both armies, were transport avenues for potentially
massive quantities of supplies and troops. Rivers, unlike railroads, were not easily disrupted, and
thus required fewer troops and artillery to control them. 138
Despite these realities, the Rebels were not looking to fight a purely defensive war. While
Davis claimed the southern states had no interest in invading the northern states, he threatened that
they could attack and inflict damage.139 In a speech delivered in Atlanta, Davis proclaimed the
Confederacy's desire for expansion and willingness to take aggressive action.140 There were
significant advantages to going on the attack, as John Slidell, future Confederate envoy to France,
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contended. Slidell reasoned the Rebels should “carry it [the war] into Africa” as soon as
possible.141 The quote referred to Ancient Rome’s invasion of North Africa to attack Carthage,
after Hannibal crossed the Alps and assaulted the Italian peninsula. There was a significant “moral”
effect in accomplishing a successful offense. The former senator called for the capture of
Washington D.C. in order to gain an advantageous bargaining position with European powers
regarding loans. If the war was prolonged, and the nascent Confederacy remained on the defensive,
then Slidell thought it would be difficult for the South to raise funds to fight the war.
From secession onwards, Southerners salivated at the opportunity to take the war into the
North. In the eastern theatre, geography lent itself to a cordon strategy followed by rapid
offensives. The Union defeat at the First Battle of Bull Run represented such an opportunity.
Robert Toombs incorrectly claimed that Federal forces were weak because they had lost 80,000
men. He urged Confederate forces to strike before their own men reached the end of their
enlistment terms. He suggested the Rebels invade Maryland and cut off the enemy’s
communications, then surround and isolate Washington, D.C. If they were successful, the city
could fall without a direct attack, or the Southerners could force the Union army to fight a battle
in disadvantageous conditions.142
While some southern leaders actively fed into the delusion that an offensive campaign
landing a decisive blow could end the war, most were content with “liberating” the Border States.
Confederate leaders eagerly eyed Kentucky and Missouri, even though Unionist majorities kept
these states from leaving the United States. Southerners eagerly looked for every scrap of news
that might indicate the Border States were joining the Confederacy. Francis W. Pickens, a former
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U.S. Senator turned South Carolina governor, predicted in January 1861 that the nascent
Confederacy would soon grow to include Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, and
Tennessee. All the slave states, he reasoned, were united as a “slaveholding race”143 Jefferson
Davis stated in February that he expected the border states to join the Confederacy in “60 days.”144
Southerners thought Kentuckians were eager to join their cause. Davis received a message on April
22, 1861, from citizens of Columbus, Kentucky, claiming that sentiment for the C.S.A. was strong.
They requested that the South seize the city, fortify it, and perhaps move on Cairo.145 Kentucky
men volunteered for the Rebel army in encouraging numbers, and the C.S.A. received them with
open arms.146 News from Missouri indicated similar support for the Confederacy. Thomas Bryant
of Missouri reported that the recent convention at St. Louis, which supported remaining in the
Union, did not represent the whole of the people.147
The Confederates saw an opportunity to exploit the chaos in Missouri in order to claim it
for the Rebellion. Thomas Reynolds, a friend of the Rebel president and southern sympathizer in
the state, explained to Davis there was enough organized support for the South to justify sending
troops. He supposed three-fourths of the state’s citizens supported the Confederacy. 148 Reynolds
tried mightily for several months to organize and gather Confederate resources to take control of
the state. He found himself stymied when he discussed his plans in Richmond with Davis and the
War Department. Davis was not enthusiastically supporting an invasion and military support for
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the pro-southern militias in the state. Though Claiborne Fox Jackson, the pro-South Missouri
governor, proclaimed the state’s independence, supported Sterling Price’s militia forces, and
worked closely with Rebel leaders, Davis noted the governor had also negotiated with the Union
general in the state to stop any southern invasion. Davis accused Jackson of bad faith and thought
sending troops to the state would be a disaster. Davis maintained this view even after Rebel forces
won one of the first major battles of the war, Wilson’s Creek, and Federal troops retreated to North
and central Missouri. Larger military concerns may have informed Davis’ thinking; southern
troops were still deployed in a 1000-mile cordon and needed to be organized. Davis may have
worried that shifting one command into a border state would open a gap that could be exploited
by northern troops. After the war, the Rebel president argued that his reluctance stemmed from his
desire to respect the people of Missouri’s decision. 149
Kentucky seemed to offer more promise than Missouri; the state proclaimed its neutrality,
and each side waited for the other to make the first mistake in violating that neutrality. Davis and
other Rebels wanted to be careful.150 Tennessee governor Harris believed that maintaining
Kentucky’s neutrality was vital to the security of his state.151 General Leonidas Polk, nevertheless,
ordered his subordinate General Johnson Pillow to cross the border and capture Columbus,
Kentucky. Polk claimed he invaded the state because the Yankees looked poised to do so. The
bishop-general argued that his decision met the standards of military necessity that Davis had
supposedly set. Polk further argued, “The people of Western Kentucky [are] in arms to resist the
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enemy and invite assistance in organizing my force.”152 According to Polk, pro-Confederate
sympathizers begged him to act and defend their interests from imminent Union and “abolitionist”
threats.153 William Preston, a Rebel officer stationed in Bowling Green, wrote to Davis on
December 28, 1861, begging the president to proclaim that the Confederacy would protect
slaveholders’ rights.154
Davis and Polk claimed that taking the city was a necessary defensive measure spurred on
“by the descent of Federal troops.”155 The commander of Confederate troops in the western theatre,
Albert Sydney Johnston, agreed. Johnston thought Kentucky could be a strategic buffer to defend
the river approaches into Tennessee and the Mississippi River; if they gave up their positions in
the state, they would give up those vulnerable approaches. Union forces, moreover, were moving
to capture Bowling Green. The Confederate general wanted to get there first because the town was
a hub for the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, another avenue for a Union invasion.156 During the
second and third weeks of September, 1861, Rebel forces advanced into the state along a broad
front, occupying the southern portion of Kentucky after they marched into Columbus.
As Preston said in his December letter, Confederates did discover the presence of proslavery whites; however, they were not necessarily eager Confederate sympathizers. When Polk
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rode into Columbus, the citizens and commissioners at first showered the Rebels with adulation.157
The celebrations ended abruptly; Kentuckians in the secessionist bastion wanted Polk to
withdraw.158 Significantly, the state’s legislature demanded only that Confederate forces
withdraw, and did not require Union forces under Ulysses S. Grant, which had occupied Paducah,
to do the same.159
Polk’s advance into the “neutral” state was a disastrous blunder. The state’s legislature had
voted repeatedly to remain in the Union. Though its governor was a southern sympathizer, the
legislature overrode his vetoes.160 Polk violated the state’s neutrality for little gain; the Rebels lost
a buffer between them and Union forces. Many Kentuckians who wanted to join the Confederacy
had already made their way South. The pro-secessionists that remained were a minority in the
state, even though they continued to offer hope that their fellow citizens felt the same way they
did.161 In September, 1861, in keeping with its earlier votes, the state’s legislature requested
military aid from the Federal government, and soon officially joined the Union side. The Rebels
did not withdraw from southern Kentucky. With it, they created a continuous 1000-mile front from
the Atlantic coast to the Mississippi River. Southern Kentucky became part of the Rebel front,
over which the Confederacy spread three armies.
The early results of employing the cordon strategy seemed positive, but this later proved
to be a mirage during the winter of 1862. In the western theatre of operations, the cordon defense
quickly revealed its disadvantages. The Union army was larger there, and thus could afford to fight
on this extended front. Federal troops simply overpowered smaller southern units and forced them
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to retreat. There were early warning signs. In September 1861, Jacob Thompson, a politician
representing a committee for the defense of Memphis, noted that the Federals could easily take
advantage of the lack of coordination among Rebel commands, and take possession of Memphis,
the Mississippi, and western Tennessee with their superior numbers. The geographical distance
between each Rebel army made it difficult for each to support the other in the event that they came
under attack or wanted go on the offensive themselves. It also meant that the Confederate forces
were operating on independent lines of communications and logistics, meaning they were not
sharing supplies with each other.162
In the eastern theatre, the cordon defense met with early success because Confederate
forces outnumbered the Yankees in many places along the Atlantic coast. The Union navy and
army struggled to organize, supply, and coordinate sustained amphibious assaults.163 The
northerners did not want to risk too many troops on these experimental operations. They tried to
overcome their numerical disadvantage by welcoming runaway slaves, freeing them, and bringing
them into federal service. Nevertheless, even in slaveholding counties along the coast, the Rebels
enjoyed a superiority in numbers and could counter these Union raids effectively.164
Looking at the overall strategic picture, east and west, the Confederates concluded that the
cordon defense could not be sustained. They saw two options. The first option was to trade space
for time and to reinforce their field armies – in other words, a strategic retreat. The purpose of
strategic retreat, also known as the Fabian strategy (or elastic defense), is to allow an enemy to
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advance until the opportunity arises to deal them a crippling blow on ground of one’s own
choosing. “Retreating to victory” relies on two elements during the retreat phase: a friendly local
population and ample supplies.
The Confederacy faced a deficit in both areas. While whites in the Deep South would
universally support the Rebel forces, there were millions of potential Union allies present as well—
the slaves. The slaves knew well what the Union Army represented, and during the war, fugitive
slaves provided intelligence, logistical support, and manpower to Union forces. In the Upper
South, the loyalties of whites were uncertain, especially in pro-Union or anti-Confederate regions.
Simply put, Confederate forces could not unequivocally count on the entirety of the southern
population if they deemed a retreat strategy to be the best option.
In terms of supply, the areas that the southern armies would retreat through lacked the food
production and easy access to war material that would support them as a capable fighting force.
Appalachia had comparatively few farms and produced just enough food to support the local
population. The Deep South would most likely fail to supply Confederate forces as well. Although
this region was an agricultural powerhouse, its massive plantations grew cotton during the early
phases of the war. Later, when state governments encouraged Deep South yeomen and planters to
grow food, slave labor disruptions and poor timing ruined the harvests.165
So, militarily, strategic retreat was problematic. Politically, if Rebel armies were to
concede territory to the Union, they were, in the eyes of many, stating that the Confederacy could
not protect southern civilians or their property. There was an additional problem with
withdrawal—it allowed slaves to run away. The Union would have the ability to dictate anti-
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slavery policies, install anti-slavery governments, and more quickly achieve the Republican
Party’s aims of abolishing slavery and restoring the Union.166
In 1862, Confederate leaders designed and put into practice the offensive-defensive
strategy. Davis characterized Confederate military activity as inherently defensive. At the same
time, he had long thought the Confederacy had to attack, rather than passively defend against
invasions. The offensive-defensive strategy meant defending southern territory as much as
possible; then, having defeated Union armies, strike Northward to seize the strategic initiative
away from the federals and carry the war into the North. He explained an early vison for the
strategy in an 1861 letter to his brother Joseph E. Davis: “Troops are daily arriving from the South,
and I hope before long to be able to change from the defensive to an offensive attitude. It will be
thus only that we can hope to check the progress of the war by teaching the enemy its evils and
discouraging the sending out of their surplus population.”167
In the grand scheme of the war, the fighting in the southwestern territories was a sideshow,
but an illustrative one. Rebel armies invaded the southwestern federal territories and “reclaimed”
them for the purposes of setting up pro-slavery governments there. In the far west, Jefferson Davis
granted permission to Texas colonel John R. Baylor to invade the territories of New Mexico and
Arizona and claim them for the new Confederate States of America. These territories, Southerners
believed, would be well suited to slavery and were possible starting points for the new nation’s
expansion after the war was over. Baylor and his men experienced some initial success, quickly
overrunning the federal garrisons. The ambitious colonel then established a pro-slavery
government and proclaimed himself the governor of the new territories. Baylor and others tried to

166

Robert G. Tanner, Retreat to Victory?: Confederate Strategy Reconsidered
(Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 2001), 142-5.
167
Papers of Jefferson Davis, vol. 7, 203. Letter to Joseph E. Davis, June 18, 1861.

77

introduce slavery into the region and ensure that the local populace accepted the new pro-slavery
regime.168
Rebel control over the territories was short-lived, however. The colonel-turned-governor
angered both the settlers and the Confederate government. Baylor soon found himself forced to
return to Texas; Davis stripped him of command after he murdered a newspaper editor and ordered
the massacres of Apache Indians. Rebel holdings in Arizona and New Mexico were lost as federal
force mustered western settlers, some of whom fled Confederate control when the Rebels
attempted to conscript them. The project to bring slavery to the territories failed.169
In the two main theatres of the war, the offensive-defensive strategy had mixed results in
1862. In the west, concentrating and then attacking Union forces failed at Shiloh. Albert Sydney
Johnston gathered the southern troops stationed along a broad front, stretching from southeastern
Kentucky to the Mississippi River, into one army. Johnston planned to surprise and defeat in detail
three Union columns, which were attempting to converge on Corinth, Mississippi, a vital
Confederate railroad hub. Defeating these columns when they were smaller than the combined
force was well worth the risk. Victory would allow Johnston’s forces to recover Union-occupied
regions. Shiloh, however, was no victory. At best, it was an operational draw, but a strategic defeat.
Johnston died, and the Confederate army did not stop the three Union columns from uniting. It
was only due to Union cautiousness that Rebel forces were able to forestall further incursions into
the Deep South and its productive slave plantations.
In the east, Lee discovered in the Seven Days Battles that concentration followed by rapid
attacks drove McClellan’s Union Army of the Potomac off of the peninsula between the James
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and York Rivers. Going on the attack took the momentum away from the Union forces, and
allowed the Rebel commander to dictate how and when the fighting would occur next. The
offensive maneuvers reflected a new desire to accomplish Confederate war aims, which included
shielding counties—like those between the James and York—densely populated by slaves.
Thereafter, according to Davis and Lee, the Confederate armed forces’ preference should be to
fight battles where there were few slaves. In terms of the offensive-defensive strategy, Rebel
commanders had to intercept Union columns before they invaded and occupied Rebel territory.
When Union forces occupied southern land, Davis and Lee understood that Union occupation
meant interruptions in producing food and war material for the Rebel armies, and an irrevocable
loss in control over the slave population, a key source of Confederate labor.170
Under the auspices of taking the war to the enemy, Lee marched northward in late July of
1862, intending to invade Pennsylvania through western Maryland. The Confederate leadership in
Virginia had been anxiously waiting for an opportunity to take the war to the North. The midterm
elections for the Union were rapidly approaching, and the Democrats seemed to be gaining ground
as the war soured for the North. Negotiations with the British and French appeared to reach a state
in which the European powers could intervene to end the conflict. Battlefield victories on enemy
soil could tip the balance during this delicate time for the North. Confederate pressure in both
theatres aimed to shape northern and European sentiment.
Additionally, Lee and Davis believed that an invasion on northern soil would push Union
forces to abandon their gains along the Deep South’s coast. The Deep South states had complained
for months that Richmond and Rebel generals were not doing enough to protect them. These states
had the largest populations of slaves in the Confederacy. Union commanders were turning some
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of those slaves into soldiers. Lee believed that, if he could take the troops stationed in the Deep
South and use them in his northern invasion, Union armies would be repositioned to counter him.
Federal troops would leave not only the Deep South coast, but also the state of Virginia, which
had borne much of the fighting the previous six months, especially in the Shenandoah Valley and
around Richmond. Lee and Davis reasoned that, without Yankee interruptions, Virginia farmers
and slaves would be secure enough to harvest foodstuffs for the state and the army. Both men
believed that they could establish a base of operations in Maryland, a border slave state, for
months. As a result, the Union army would have little opportunity to “abduct” slaves in the state.
They hoped Confederate forces could take the war away from the Rebels’ interior to the frontier,
the Border States.171
As with the 1862 Kentucky Campaign, Confederate leaders expected that the presence of
southern troops would cause Old Line State inhabitants to throw in their lot with the seceded states.
As they had with Kentuckians, they assumed that Marylanders were desperate to escape the yoke
of the North’s “tyrannical” abolitionist policies. Lee issued a carefully crafted proclamation, which
Davis approved, to sway the public. Again, they were mistaken. Lee was not able to maintain a
long-term presence in the state. He and Confederate forces needed time to win “hearts and minds,”
but the Battle of Antietam forced them to end the invasion. Logistical problems hampered
Confederate maneuvers; Rebel quartermasters struggled to get reliable access to food and
ammunition.172 Nevertheless, Lee’s invasion had yielded positive results for the Rebels. It shifted
the prime fighting months of summer and fall onto Union soil and encouraged the federal
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withdrawal from Virginia. In other theatres, it drew Union resources away from some of the
Union’s successful incursions along the Confederacy’s Atlantic coast.
In the west, by mid-1862, Union forces had established footholds in northern Mississippi
and Alabama. The Bragg and Smith offensive, also known as the Heartland Campaign, was a Rebel
effort to draw those Union forces into Tennessee and Kentucky. In August, Confederate major
generals Braxton Bragg and Edmond Kirby Smith invaded Kentucky, where Union garrisons were
small, on the assumption that larger federal forces would be drawn in to oppose them. Other goals
of the campaign were similar to those of Lee in Maryland. While Rebel troops swept the state of
the Union armies and garrisons, Southerners could set up a friendly state government. Politicians
promised that Kentuckians would race to fill the Rebel armies and supply them. The southern
forces even brought with them tens of thousands of rifles to arm the waves of recruits they
expected. Bragg issued a carefully worded proclamation, which Davis approved from Richmond,
that laid out Rebel intentions. The Southerners' outreach appeared to be working when the
Confederates, while in state, oversaw the inauguration of a pro-slavery state governor, Richard
Hawes. Hawes led a shadow government loyal to Richmond. This provisional government, with
the backing of Bragg’s and Smith’s armies, tried to rally slaveholders during the inauguration, but
Union forces attacked the very same day.173
The Confederacy’s far-reaching goals rested on Bragg’s and Smith’s ability to hold their
ground in the state and maintain a long-term presence there. The Rebel generals met one essential
requirement: they won battles, due in part to the Union forces’ collective incompetence,
passiveness, and slowness. After a wing of Bragg’s army fought Union General Don Carlos Buell’s
Army of Ohio and won at the Battle of Perryville, Bragg’s subordinates pressed him to continue
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to attack and sweep the Union out of the state. The grouchy commanding general did the opposite;
in October, Bragg ordered his own army to retire. Support for the Confederacy was lacking; there
were not thousands of Kentuckians filling up his ranks or providing material support for the Army
of Tennessee. Part of their troubles in attracting Kentuckians was their route through the state.
Both Smith and Bragg marched through the eastern counties, where there were few slaves and
even less love for the Confederacy. Union troops shielded the densely slave-populated parts of the
state from the invasion columns and channeled Bragg and Smith east.
Another reason Bragg’s offensive stalled was that he awaited additional supplies and men
to support his isolated army. His troops, he noted, were forced to forage and scavenge for food.
Moreover, he felt that Confederate reverses in other theatres, notably after Lee withdrew from
Maryland, left his army exposed and isolated. Union forces, freed up by that withdrawal, could be
shifted quickly west. He worried that he could soon be surrounded and lose the army. The general,
with few options, revised his account of the invasion’s goals and proclaimed that this grand raid
into Union territory was a success. Bragg stated that he was able to seize food and weapons for his
army, and draw Union forces out of northern Mississippi and Alabama.
The Heartland Campaign did have one somewhat lasting result—Union forces, drawn out
of northern Mississippi and Alabama, did not return to those regions until 1864. But the larger
political purpose of the 1862 campaigns was not realized; the Democrats did not regain control of
the U.S. Congress. By the end of the year, most Confederate major field armies went on the
defensive across most theatres, and tried to hold essential chokepoints. The choice to go on the
defensive served to consolidate forces and prevent the Union army’s further advance. Lee held his
ground in northern Virginia, and Bragg retreated from Kentucky to make a stand in Tennessee.
Lee smashed Union general Burnside’s disastrous charges at Fredericksburg, and Bragg fought
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Rosecrans to a stalemate at Stones River, but then withdrew. Rebel forces continued to hold points
along the Mississippi, and contained Union forces operating along the Atlantic coast. In short, the
Confederate forces did succeed in stymieing deeper incursions into the southern states and
shielding counties densely populated by slaves.
The mixture of successes and failures of 1862 perhaps gave the Rebels, and President
Davis, hope that they could win the war, and that preserving slavery was possible. Though Rebel
armies failed to sway the 1862 elections in favor of the Democratic party, invasion columns did
throw Union forces back from the Deep South. In a message to Congress, Davis claimed the
Confederate victories across the South proved their commitment and cast doubt on the northern
people’s will and stomach to continue the brutal war.174
The situation, however, became graver on the first day of the new year, when the
Emancipation Proclamation was officially promulgated on January 1st, 1863. In practice, the
proclamation freed only those slaves in areas occupied by the Union. But Davis stated that he
shared the southern people’s fear that the Union now squarely targeted slavery. Lincoln’s order,
he opined, doomed an “inferior race” to extermination, and would lead to “assassination” attempts
on the lives of slave masters. Davis implied that Southerners would easily overcome a Unionsponsored servile insurrection, even if it would wreck slavery.175 He and other Rebels believed
that a war waged specifically for emancipation would fail. Southerners thought that northerners
would not suffer a war to free blacks, and blacks would understand freedom as a risky proposition.
Jones jotted down during 1862 and the winter of 1863 that Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation
hardened the South’s resolve to fight and would have no effect on their mostly loyal slaves.176
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The Union, on the other hand, understood that the Proclamation intensified a military
strategy that was already yielding results. The Union, from the early stages of the war, had
threatened and then attacked slavery. Lincoln and the Republicans, when the first slaves ran to
Union lines, steadily ramped up pressure on the Peculiar Institution wherever the Union army
could reach. The first and second Confiscation Acts, passed August 1861 and July 1862, prevented
Union officers from returning runaway slaves. When Union land and naval forces occupied
counties along the Atlantic coast and in Louisiana, outspoken abolitionist generals had organized
and armed runaways into regiments, even before Lincoln’s proclamation. The proclamation itself
expanded the scope of the federal armed forces’ assault on the institution, beyond the reach of the
Union army.177
Despite fears of widespread and immediate servile insurrections, the effects of the
Proclamation were gradual but compounded. Slaves, once freed, could augment the Union armed
forces’ strength, but only if federal troops could reach, protect, and provide for them. Northerners,
at times, struggled to deal with the consequences of emancipation; there were thousands of people
to feed, pay, and secure, as the experiences in Louisiana and on the Atlantic coast demonstrated.
Slaves threw their support to the Yankees when they were able. The shift in “loyalty” took away
labor and resources from the Confederacy. The Rebels accurately understood that even the briefest
presence of Union columns started the difficult-to-reverse transfer of people and labor. As
northerners recruited slaves into the army, the transfer of loyalty and labor represented an acute
undermining of slavery.178 To defeat emancipation, the doctrine of “offensive-defensive” took on
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a different character. The Rebel armed forced were expected to operate as runaway slave patrols,
whether they were defending southern territory or invading the North.179
The campaign season of 1863 found the Confederates engaging in a mix of offensive and
defensive strategies designed to counter the Union’s ever-growing interruption of slavery. Davis
ordered Bragg to halt his withdrawal from western Tennessee. The beleaguered commander of the
Army of Tennessee was to stand his ground, fortify his position, and, with reinforcements, let the
enemy attack him. The president hoped his strategy would create a repeat of Fredericksburg, in
which Rebel forces inflicted maximum casualties while suffering only a few of their own.180
However, Rosecrans, the Union general, did not take the bait, and he and Bragg began a period of
general inactivity that lasted months, until July of 1863. The inactivity favored the Confederates;
it allowed them to draw resources and men from central and eastern Tennessee, and it safeguarded
northern Alabama and Georgia from Union invasion. The lull in combat also gave the Rebels the
time and ability to move troops from theatre to theatre, supporting other Confederate commanders
who needed assistance.
During the winter and early spring of 1863, Davis worried about the security of defensive
points along the Confederacy’s western rivers. The president complained to Theophilus H. Holmes
in late January about the general’s failure to hold Arkansas Post. Rebel defenses there had
protected the state’s central river valley, where slaves labored to produce food and supplies for the
war effort. Union forces could now easily invade or raid the region.181 Davis reiterated his concern
a month later, ordering Holmes to secure the Arkansas and Mississippi rivers using moveable and
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permanently placed cannon batteries to attack Union ships.182 The president and Rebel secretary
of war also approved guerilla attacks on U.S. Navy ships, delivered by craft steaming up and down
the rivers and working in conjunction with gun emplacements. Confederate authorities hoped that
guerilla attacks and artillery would be an effective response to Yankee forces burning property and
“devastating” slave plantation estates along the river.183 The Rebel president’s worries were
compounded when Union general Nathaniel Banks raided the Arkansas River Valley, destroying
machine shops, cotton, and livestock, and emancipating slaves; and General Frederick Steele led
an 8,000 man invasion of the state and captured the capital, Little Rock.184
Davis, and most other southern political and military leaders, thought that the most potent
threat to the Confederacy and slavery was the Union’s effort to control the Mississippi River. The
Yankees, early in the war, had made it an objective to seize the river—and they experienced some
initial success at its northern and southern ends. Federal forces captured New Orleans in 1862, and
took principal forts along the river that same year. There were, however, Rebel strongholds that
denied the Union uncontested navigation of the river, and allowed Southerners to move supplies
across the river from the “Trans-Mississippi” states of Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana. Vicksburg,
Mississippi, was the principal defensive point the Confederates held. U.S. Grant’s army, though it
struggled and failed to take the city throughout 1862, showed no signs of retreat. During February
1863, Davis ordered Joseph Johnston to inspect and shore up the city’s defenses.185
Though the president claimed he trusted John C. Pemberton with the command of the Rebel
forces in Vicksburg, Grant’s continued and successful operations against the city were cause for
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alarm.186 Davis wrote to his brother of his alarm that Grant and Porter landed troops South of the
town. He was upset that Pemberton lost cavalry support; without it, Pemberton could not attack
Union supply lines or stop federal cavalry raids. In short, Vicksburg needed reinforcements.187 The
next day, May 8th, 1863, Davis ordered E. Kirby Smith, commander of the Department of the
Trans-Mississippi, to attack Banks and help Pemberton.188 Kirby was slow to act, even though the
frequency and aggression of Grant’s attacks presented an urgent threat.
The Confederacy’s larger military situation, and their aim of preserving slavery, made
Vicksburg a vexing problem in 1863. Lee won a significant victory in northern Virginia, at
Chancellorsville. Success in the battle gave Lee confidence and a window of opportunity. The
general reported to Davis that his army would march Northward and bring the war to Union soil.
He believed it was critical to act on the northern populace’s morale.189 It seemed to Lee and Davis
that the northerners were growing impatient with Lincoln and the Union’s inability to win
victories, and the cost in lives and money. A defeat of Union armies on northern soil, the president
and the general hoped, would push the Union populace to force Lincoln into negotiating for peace.
A victory for the Rebels might even overcome the European powers’ hesitation to recognize the
fledgling slave republic. Regardless of the outcome, Lee believed the Rebels had to strike quickly;
the longer the war dragged on, the greater the damage that Union armies wrought on the southern
states and slavery.
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Directly related to preserving slavery was drawing the emancipationist/ abolitionist armies
out of the South. In a second report, Lee assumed that, if he marched northward, federal troops
across the South would pull out and rush to defend the U.S. capitol. Federal armies, essentially,
would be forced to interrupt their invasions and emancipations. With fewer Union troops to oppose
them, Confederate forces could reclaim those regions of the South that were experiencing an
upheaval of the Peculiar Institution. With Union forces withdrawn, the Confederacy would have
the time to reinforce its armies in all theatres. Lee mentioned specifically that his army’s invasion
would allow other Rebel forces to forage and collect supplies in Kentucky and northwest Virginia,
essentially reasserting a pro-slavery control over the regions.190
Both Lincoln and Davis fixated on the Mississippi city on the bluff. Lincoln called it “the
key,” and Davis likewise stated its importance. The town was well-understood to be a strategic
defensive point, but it had additional value. Vicksburg sat at the heart of Mississippi River Valley
slave plantations. Confederate control of the city and the surrounding region ensured slavery could
survive once the Rebels drove out the Yankees entirely.191 Addressing Vicksburg’s dire situation,
Davis conferred with Lee. He reasoned Lee could support Pemberton, break the siege, and defeat
Grant. The general argued there was no need to send part of his army to reinforce Pemberton.
Davis ultimately agreed, telling his most trusted general that Vicksburg’s defenses would hold
until Johnston arrived to lift Grant’s siege.192 A month later, in June of 1863, Davis’ confidence
fell. As Lee moved into Pennsylvania in late June, his invading forces did not draw Union forces
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away from that key city. Davis struggled to understand how generals Pemberton, Beauregard,
Bragg, and Bolivar refused to support each other as Grant besieged Vicksburg.193
The inability to coordinate his generals in the region to help Pemberton soon haunted
Davis. The president, in a private letter to a relative, Reuben Davis, dated July 18th, 1863,
excoriated his commanders. They did not combine their forces to destroy Grant and rescue the
city. Instead, Confederate forces found themselves attacked and defeated in detail. Here Davis was
unreasonable and unfair to the commanders. The structure in which they operated made it possible,
even preferable, to look out for their districts at the expense of others. After all, each state and each
slaveholder demanded protection, and the bedrock principles of the Rebellion were the protection
of states’ rights and slavery. If Rebel armies abandoned one area to help a commander in another,
that region became vulnerable to the irreversible process of emancipation. Out of caution,
commanders that could have helped Pemberton did not, and the general sent with reinforcements
to aide Vicksburg—Johnston—concluded that he could not win the battle.
Vicksburg fell to Union forces on July 4th, 1863 when Pemberton surrendered the Rebel
garrison to Grant’s forces. The Confederacy lost control of the strategic defensive post, nearly
30,000 Rebel troops were paroled, and plantations in the nearby counties lost hundreds of slaves.
To feed freed slaves, the Union army transformed the plantations into free-labor enterprises.194 In
the face of defeat, the only hope that the Rebels had, Davis considered, was to draw the enemy
deep into Rebel territory and allow the people to rise against the Union columns.195 Later, when
recapping the bitter defeats of the late summer of 1863, Davis was all too aware of what they had
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lost: railroads, control of the Mississippi River, and communications with areas west of the river,
including the Department of the Trans-Mississippi.196
The Confederate defeat at Vicksburg wrecked the chance for slavery’s survival in the
region and beyond. Sherman took a keen interest in destroying the South’s ability to support a war
effort, and this included allowing slavery to die. The Union general led his troops on a raid to
Meridian, Mississippi, to destroy the railroad junction there and anything that supported the Rebel
cause along the way. In a letter to Joseph Johnston, Davis pondered why he was retreating before
Sherman’s forces, allowing the Union army to attack and destroy the “fruitful” regions of the Deep
South, which contained large numbers of slaves. Davis wondered why Confederate troops failed
to protect slaveholders’ property when Union armies became hubs for emancipation.197 Johnston’s
reply was emblematic of why southern generals seemed paralyzed; he did not want to lose their
army in battle at Vicksburg or Jackson, Mississippi, nor did he want to cede control of territory he
was assigned to protect.198 Confederate commanders attempted to salvage the situation throughout
the fall of 1863 by challenging control of the all-important river. William Hardee reported on
September 15th, 1863 that his associate, Taylor, had threatened southwest Louisiana but failed to
draw the federals out of New Orleans. Hardee requested that Davis allow him to attack Union ships
cruising up and down the Mississippi from his base in Mobile.199
In short, the Rebels were frustrated in their hope that the defense of Vicksburg and the
Deep South would be relieved by Lee’s northern offensives. Developments in the eastern theatre
had started promisingly. Lee’s victory at the Battle of Chancellorsville stunned the Army of the
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Potomac, and forced Lincoln to make another change of commander; he removed Hooker and
replaced him with George Meade. Lee’s victory, and the resulting chaos in the Union army, were
what inspired Lee to invade northern soil once again. His reasons for the offensive, agreed upon
with Davis, have been enumerated above.200
As the Army of Northern Virginia advanced, it took African Americans and enslaved them,
arguing that these free citizens were, in fact, runaway slaves.201 This was an instance of the
institution of slavery, in and of itself, being used as an offensive, rather than merely defensive,
weapon of war. Lee hoped that the Union army would be so desperate to stop the Rebels that he
could easily defeat them in smaller pieces on ground of his choosing. The Union Army wrecked
Lee’s hope when they were able to concentrate their forces at the crossroads village of Gettysburg,
Pennsylvania. After suffering severe losses in the largest battle of the war, Lee retreated. The only
saving grace was Meade’s reluctance to press his advantage, allowing Lee to retreat with his army
intact. Far from forcing the Union to settle for peace, Gettysburg hardened northern resolve and
Lee’s supposedly invincible Army of Northern Virginia looked vulnerable. For the rest of the war,
most of the Army of Northern Virginia would fight defensive battles in its own state. Davis gave
his blessing to Lee’s planned defensive posture; the Army of Northern Virginia could remain on
the operational, strategic, and tactical defensive.202
Shortly after Gettysburg, Lee sent units from his army to help Bragg.203 Bragg desperately
needed reinforcements. Davis, though a friend to the struggling officer, excoriated Bragg’s
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generalship.204 Bragg’s fortunes in the western theatre were decidedly mixed during 1861 and
1862, but trending towards disaster during the latter half of 1863. In a series of rapid marches and
flanking maneuvers, Rosecrans nearly maneuvered Bragg’s army out of Tennessee. Davis sensed
this was a critical moment. In a letter to William Preston Johnston, an officer ordered to inspect
each field army, Davis noted that Bragg and Buckner needed to work together and attack Union
supply lines using cavalry raids or turning movements. In this way, they could hold the
mountainous region of the Georgia-Alabama-Tennessee border. This region offered many
defensible locations, mountain passes, and ridges, where smaller forces could fight advantageously
against a larger foe. This border region was thus uniquely suited to protecting the Deep South,
where millions of slaves lived and worked, from Union invasion and subsequent emancipation. It
was also a potential springboard for offensive campaigns to reclaim middle Tennessee and
Kentucky.205
The divisions that Lee sent to help were commanded by his principal subordinate, James
Longstreet. With these reinforcements, Bragg successfully counterpunched at Chickamauga and
drove the Union Army of the Cumberland back to Chattanooga, where he surrounded them. Davis
and the Confederate War Department were jubilant. Davis wrote that this victory would draw
additional Union forces to Chattanooga, allowing Lee to send troops to Southwest Virginia and
eastern Tennessee to secure and reclaim those parts of the states.206
It appeared that the Army of the Cumberland would soon surrender, but things went wrong.
The cantankerous general struggled to cooperate with his subordinates, and he alienated officers
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sent to aid him. The internal fighting soon led to operational mistakes. As Lee and Davis predicted,
Union armies were drawn to Chattanooga, but only a few of these troops were moved from the
eastern theatre. Grant’s, Sherman’s, and Burnside’s armies, with only two corps from the Army of
the Potomac, rushed to lift the siege of Chattanooga. While Longstreet was able to tie down
Burnside in East Tennessee for a short time, Bragg bungled the opportunity to capture the Union
Army of the Cumberland. Within weeks, Bragg’s army was embarrassingly driven off Missionary
Ridge and into northern Georgia. The Union armies were now poised to march into the cotton
slave states of Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina.
In a year of disappointments, the Confederacy’s most significant achievement was not, at
its heart, a military success at all. Southerners succeeded in preserving slavery in most places
where the Union threatened it, because Davis and Confederate military leaders emphasized antiemancipation operations. The best example was Rebel activity in North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Georgia. The coastal regions of North and South Carolina, though the federal army and navy
pressured them, were still in Confederate hands. Davis, Seddon, Governor Vance, and Governor
Bonham worked efficiently to defend the port cities of Wilmington and Charleston.207 At first
glance, this may seem to be a waste of resources and men; many of those units could have
supported Bragg, Johnston, or Pemberton. The threats to these cities, though significant, seemed
to pale in comparison to the reverses the Confederates suffered in the western theatre throughout
the summer of 1863. Further, the Union blockade also became tighter; the Federal navy steadily
blocked or captured supply ships trying to sneak supplies and weapons into the Confederacy. It
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might seem unimportant that those ports were in Confederate hands, since they were unable to
receive shipments.
Nevertheless, consider Confederate planning and strategy from the perspective of
preserving slavery. As noted, some of the densest populations of slaves lived near these cities or
along the coast. The Union Navy and Army, in a limited way, had already threatened the “Peculiar
Institution” a year prior. Some of the most radical assaults on slavery took place in the southern
theatre. The Yankees could have significantly expanded their reach into that theatre if they had a
large and secure port through which to supply their armies reliably. This was a lesson that both
Union and Confederate leaders knew well from the Peninsula Campaign of 1862. Davis and Lee
believed this threat to be real. Early in the year, on February 5th, 1863, Lee predicted that the
Union would attack Charleston in order to force the Rebels to reinforce the city. Two days later,
Davis promised the South Carolina governor full support and reinforcements for the city in the
event of an attack.208 Lee also reasoned that, if the Union captured Wilmington, Charleston, or
Savanah, the coast would be “ripe for depredation,” referring to the threat of emancipation. 209 A
port-base for a Union army in the theatre would have been disastrous for slaveholders, some of
whom, by that time, knew from experience how Union military emancipation worked. By staving
off Union assaults on these cities and containing Union forces on outlying islands, Confederate
forces maintained slavery in the region.
Though military historians typically look at 1863 as the war’s turning point, this is in
hindsight only. 1864 is the pivotal year for the war. 1864 was Lincoln’s reelection year, and the
Confederates believed they could prevent the reelection of a man they perceived to be an unpopular
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president whose anti-slavery polices were also unpopular.210 Herschel V. Johnson argued to Davis
in a private letter that there was “very strong hostility” to Lincoln’s presidency, based on the 1863
state elections. Johnson believed it was possible that “if Lincoln could be defeated—or the
candidate of his party—in the next Presidential election, it would end the war and lead to peace.
These elections show strong opposition to Lincoln, especially in the North Western States.”211
The Confederate shaped its strategy around the offensive-defensive, though they found
themselves on the defensive because of the overpowering size of the Union armies. The
Confederacy lost strategic initiative from the start of 1864. Lincoln installed Grant as General-inChief of all Union armies. Once in command, Grant desired to cut the Confederate’s ability to
shuttle troops from one theatre to another. He ordered all Federal armies to move in concert and
attack Confederate armies and regions from multiple approaches. In doing so, Union forces would
presumably outnumber and outflank the hard-pressed southern troops. The 1864 Union strategy
also included direct threats to slavery; Grant’s commanders targeted regions that were previously
untouched by Federal forces. As such, they contained populations of slaves that the Union could
emancipate.
The Confederates responded by evolving the offensive-defensive strategy. Rebel forces
employed an elastic, reactive defense that relied on multiple columns of Rebel troops to distract or
defeat Federal forces who were on the attack. This type of defensive strategy was an evolution of
the cordon strategy, but it had a significant difference. It required Confederate columns to be
mobile and work with one another. In principle, one force would hold the attention of the main
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Union body while another Confederate force would attempt to surprise supporting Union columns,
cut off supply routes to the main Union body, or threaten Union territory. The hope was that the
large Union body would retreat to protect its weak point, or because it had depleted its supplies.
At the very least, such operations would force Union armies to spend time, men, and resources
elsewhere and allow small Confederate armies to match up more evenly against a numerically
superior foe.
Once a Union army invaded, they not only attacked slavery, but also set up “abolitionist”
loyal governments. In 1864, the Rebels would work to preserve the institution using the same
broad approaches they had employed previously. The first was to affect northern public
sentiment—especially important during an election year, because it could usher in Lincoln’s defeat
in the presidential race. The other method was to inflict severe losses on the North, so that Lincoln
pulled back Union armies and settled for a negotiated peace.
In the first half of the year, the military situation looked promising for the Confederacy.
Rebel forces turned back a combined Union army-navy invasion up the Red River during March
of 1864. Nathaniel Banks, commander of the Union Department of the Gulf, sought to strike deep
into Confederate territory in Louisiana and east Texas. Many slave plantations along the Red River
continued to support the Rebel war effort, and many slaveholders had previously fled to east Texas,
driving their slaves into the region to avoid Union emancipation efforts. Bank’s expedition met
with disaster almost as soon as it started. A smaller Confederate force blocked his path; Banks
missed several opportunities to rendezvous with the Union navy and other Federal ground forces.
By May 1864, he claimed that poor weather and a lack of supplies compelled him to turn around.212
Reuben Davis, writing to President Davis, noted that Banks had indeed damaged slavery along the
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Red River. He reported that retreating Union forces took with them thousands of slaves, who
jumped at the chance for freedom.213 Even Rebel victories proved costly to the institution of
slavery.
Lincoln’s chances for reelection seemed to wane as the Union forces failed to secure
significant victories, and attritional warfare claimed the lives of tens of thousands of northern men.
Even with a new commander, it seemed the Yankees could not beat diminished Rebel armies. The
Confederates, and the opposition Democrats, sensed an opportunity. The Democrats selected
George B. McClellan, popular former commander of the Union Army of the Potomac, as their
nominee to run against Lincoln. The official party platform demanded “immediate efforts be made
for a cessation of hostilities.”214 Confederate leaders, including Davis and Stephens, thought
McClellan’s potential electoral success and presumptive “peace” platform represented the best
hope for Confederate victory. Some members of Lincoln’s party wanted to choose a different
candidate to represent them, thinking that Lincoln was vulnerable. The president himself looked
at recent Democratic Party successes in local elections, and concluded that McClellan would win
the presidency.215
Grant’s plan for operations in Virginia embarrassingly collapsed. The Army of the Potomac
hammered away at the Army of Northern Virginia. The two rival armies fought a series of
attritional battles during the Overland Campaign of 1864. There were staggering losses for both
armies, though Grant continually received reinforcements while Lee’s reserves dwindled. Lee,
however, still held. The supporting Union columns failed to meet their objectives, placing more
emphasis on the duel between Grant and Lee. Finally trapping Lee at Petersburg, Grant settled into
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besieging Rebel forces there and at Richmond. Other Confederate forces in Virginia fared better
against ineffective Union drives, turning them back or bottling them up.
Under siege and with their options dwindling in Virginia, the Rebels’ focus shifted to
Georgia. Sherman’s drive to capture Atlanta threatened to upend the Confederacy. Beginning in
May of 1864, the excitable Union general proceeded cautiously, and methodically swept the Rebel
Army of Tennessee out of mountainous Northwest Georgia. Joseph E. Johnston planned a Fabian
defense when facing Sherman’s army during the Atlanta Campaign. Johnston refused to give battle
unless he believed that his forces had an overwhelming defensive advantage. He found one such
opportunity at the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain; when Sherman attacked, Johnston’s men stood
their ground in difficult-to-reach positions on the mountain. Confederate forces inflicted grave
casualties, with relatively few of their own. The battle was Sherman’s worst defeat of the
campaign, but Johnston did not have another such opportunity.
In July, Johnston’s army became pinned down outside Atlanta when Sherman once again
outflanked him. Johnston lost the confidence of Jefferson Davis and the Georgia government. Not
only did Confederate leaders fear that this “retreat to victory strategy” imperiled one of the most
important cities in the Confederacy, but it carried the same risks that had caused them to reject it
at the beginning of the War. They feared that additional losses of territory would shake the resolve
of Rebel troops and civilians, and embolden slaves to leave or revolt against their masters. If
Sherman were able to capture Atlanta, he could easily take and disrupt the slave economy in central
and coastal Georgia.
The Union’s difficulty in Missouri—a brutal guerilla war that showed no sign of abating
—inspired Confederate leaders in Richmond and the Department of the Trans-Mississippi to
undertake a bold invasion. In August of 1864, Major-General Sterling Price had a window of time

98

in which to strike Northward into Missouri, and then west to raid and destabilize Kansas, which
was a base for Union operations. The full-scale invasion plan soon fell apart because the troops
Price needed were transferred out of the department and sent to the Department of the West. Price’s
plan then changed from an invasion to a “grand” raid that would sweep through southern and
western Missouri, then into Kansas, and subsequently withdraw South into Confederate-friendly
Indian Territory (present-day Oklahoma).
The full-fledged-invasion-turned-raid aimed to take advantage of a pro-slavery, proConfederate population, and flip the Border state to the Confederate cause. Slaveholders in the
state had suffered the loss of their property from almost the beginning of the war. Union
commanders in Missouri and Kansas issued orders to free slaves and, in some cases, their troops
enthusiastically emancipated the enslaved. A secondary object of Price’s raid was to re-enslave
the freed blacks in both states or, at the very least, terrorize anti-slavery residents.216
Price and his army neither established a pro-Confederate, pro-slave government in
Missouri, nor attracted men to join them. Part of the reason that they didn’t get the groundswell of
the support they hoped for was the rapid nature of the campaign. At most, the Rebel army spent a
month in the slave-holding region of the state. The Union forces in the state received
reinforcements, and then confidently chased the Rebel army. Slaveholders and Confederate
sympathizers needed Price and his army to prove they had staying power. Hoping to land damaging
blows in western Missouri and eastern Kansas, Price attempted to capture Kansas City, but Union
troops soundly defeated him and forced him to retreat South into Arkansas.
Union successes during the late summer of 1864 raised Lincoln’s electoral hopes. Union
Admiral David Farragut took Mobile’s harbor forts, effectively shutting the port to Confederate
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use. It seemed that the Union winning streak would continue, as they turned back Confederate
raids and captured strategic Rebel cities. While the victories at Mobile and in rural Georgia were
good news, Lincoln needed more significant wins to combat the perception that the war effort was
a futile endeavor.
The Atlanta Campaign, as both Union and Confederate commanders quickly understood,
would be a turning point in the war. For the Rebels, they could not afford to lose the vital railroad
hub and war-necessary industries in the city. Moreover, Atlanta was the last major point before
Union forces reached the Deep South. Davis removed General Johnston from command because
he retreated too often and did not seem to want to fight Sherman. Davis, with great urgency, dashed
off a message to a trusted general William Hardee, a corps commander. The president ordered
confederate forces to flank Sherman with the purpose of threatening or taking the Union army’s
vital railway supply lines. Davis also hoped Rebel generals would employ their cavalry brigades
for a similar purpose.217 Attacking Union supply lines, rather than Union forces directly, became
Davis’ constant orders to his field army commanders, repeated until the end of the war. While the
strategy seemed simple, Confederate generals were not as confident. In reply to Davis’ orders,
Hardee begged the Rebel president to send more troops, noting that Union abolitionist forces were
poised to overrun Georgia and Alabama. The president replied there were no more troops to be
spared; Davis ordered Hardee to collect “absentees” to fill the ranks. 218 Disagreements over what
strategies, given Confederate manpower, would be feasible bedeviled Davis and his generals. All
agreed on the importance of holding the city. James Chestnut, a close friend of the Davis, believed
the Rebels could turn the tide, though he criticized the Georgian soldiers that made up the forces
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defending the city, claiming they were weak-willed and gave up at the slightest reversal. They
were ceding ground to Sherman’s force, which he estimated to be half the size it actually was.219
Despite such harsh criticisms, the South’s generals, politicians, and observers alike believed that
they were just one victorious campaign away from hurling back the Union army outside Atlanta.
New Confederate Army of Tennessee commander John Bell Hood led his army to furiously attack
Sherman’s Yankees. During three battles fought on the outskirts of Atlanta, Hood failed to
dislodge Union forces and lost more men in two weeks than Johnston had in two months.
For all the Rebel efforts and Davis’ plans, Atlanta fell on September 2nd, 1864, after
suffering a month-and-a-half-long siege. The recently-installed commander of Confederate forces
in the region, Hood, argued that Union forces compelled him to leave the city because they were
close to surrounding the city and cutting off supplies. Losing the city was the great disaster Davis
feared, and he reacted with uncharacteristic urgency to salvage the bleak situation. By train, he
went to confer directly with the commanders there and make his orders clear. Davis told Hood to
attack the railroad behind Sherman, and then entrench to ensure that they could win a battle against
superior numbers. When Rebel soldiers who had deserted saw Hood’s success, they would return
to their ranks. 220
On that same trip, Davis reassured the people of Georgia that it was possible to win the
war. However, the Georgia governor had been an outspoken critic for most of the war, and
Confederate morale looked to be at its lowest point. Rebel troops were fleeing the army, and
impoverished southern citizens begged for government aid. In a series of speeches, Davis outlined
what he and the generals strategized. In short, every terrible defeat was, according to the president,
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an opportunity for great success. At Macon and Palmetto, Davis optimistically stated that
Sherman’s lines and communications were stretched to breaking. Confederate forces would then
attack the Union army like the Russians assailed Napoleon. Southern cavalry and civilians would
harass Yankee invaders constantly. Absentees, once gathered, would add to the Rebel’s strength.
The president boasted that they would make Atlanta “a perfect Moscow, the grand crowning stroke
of our independence and the conclusion of the war.” To prove to his audience that this reversal
was possible and that the Confederate army would do its part, Davis reported on his meeting with
the generals. He told Hood to attack Sherman’s supply lines and sweep the northerners back to
Chattanooga. The president also reassured his audience that Sherman’s presence was a mere
“raid.” Much like Jubal Early’s raiders that attacked Washington, Sherman’s raiders would soon
retreat as well.221 The president reiterated his rosy outlook in a November 7th message to Congress.
Davis claimed that significant victories had marked the year. Confederate armies stymied Union
columns in Virginia, Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri. While the naval battle at Mobile
and the loss of Atlanta were harsh defeats, the Union did not gain any significant advantage after
those battles.222
All these grand pronouncements, however, fall flat when considering the Confederacy’s
military realities, and the precarious situation slavery now existed in. Guerilla harassment and
scorched-earth tactics, like those during Napoleon’s ill-fated Russian marches, worked when there
was enough time, space, and resources to exhaust and whittle away the invader. The Confederacy
had none of these, nor could slaveholders afford such a strategy. Slaves were already running to
Union lines, or masters were moving slaves away from Federal troops. Either option drained the
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South of labor, and put pressure on the remaining slaves and farms to produce for the war effort.
Refugee slave masters and slaves placed an increasing burden on the places where the Union army
had not yet reached. Moreover, the Russian example was not congruent with the Confederacy’s
climate and geography. Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina could hardly employ “Generals
January and February” to the same effect the Russians had.
While the Rebels scrambled and dreamed of a “perfect Moscow” during the fall of 1864,
Sherman pondered his next moves. While his army was not as small or as ill-provisioned as Davis
and other Confederates believed it to be, he and his troops were in a precarious situation. The
Union Army of Tennessee did rely on a long and exposed train line to feed and supply itself.
Sherman posted troops all along the railroad to protect it, and he was growing worried that he was
so dependent on it. He and his troops stayed in Atlanta for two months while they stared down the
Rebel forces outside the city. This gave time for Hood to consider the Confederate forces’ next
move. Instead of attacking Sherman’s communications through flanking movements, Hood
decided to rely on a now standard Confederate strategy, invade northward and hope Union forces
would follow him, abandoning their gains. As with other invasions, potential Union threats to
slavery would, at the very least, be delayed. The aggressive Texan general moved his troops out
of Sherman’s sight towards northern Alabama, not for a flanking attack, but as preparation to
invade Middle Tennessee.
If Atlanta was a disaster, Hood’s campaign was a catastrophe. Military historians often try
to identify a decisive battle or campaign that turned the war for the Union. Hood’s choice to invade
Tennessee was decisive; its consequences caused the Confederacy’s defeat. The campaign’s
purpose stunned Davis from the beginning. His confusion was apparent in the letters and messages
he sent to Hood and anyone who would listen. The anxious president grumbled. Hood did not
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listen to his orders: attack or threaten Sherman’s rear supply lines. Sherman, Davis noted, divided
his army to defend the Union forces’ communications. Davis instructed Hood to defeat the spreadout Yankee units in detail. 223
The headstrong general defied Davis’ wishes and continued his march to northern Alabama
and then into middle Tennessee. For a while, Sherman sent his columns to chase Hood through
Georgia, but he stopped when the Confederate army slipped into Alabama. The Union general
refused to cede the initiative to his Confederate counterpart. The usually successful drawing-out
of Union armies failed because the federal forces were large enough to defend against Hood’s
invasion or cavalry raids while attacking at the same time. Sherman, moreover, decided to do the
risky and unexpected; he planned to cut his supply lines and forage supplies and food from the
Georgia countryside. There was little risk involved after Hood no longer opposed him; the state
militia forces were meager, untrained, and poorly armed. The Rebel cavalrymen who stood in the
Yankees’ way were far too few and timid to stop them.
Confederate commanders criticized Hood, wondering why he allowed Sherman free reign
in Georgia. Beauregard, commanding C.S.A. forces in Georgia and South Carolina, observed that
an invasion into Tennessee would not matter to the Union unless it directly threatened northern
soil. He agreed with Davis that Sherman should not be allowed to reach the Atlantic coast. From
there, the Union army could access a secure supply line via ocean ports and continue the hard war
on southern civilians. Beauregard envisioned Sherman moving North after reaching the coast to
link up with Grant. Together, they could box in and defeat Lee.224
Rebel commanders and politicians panicked as Sherman marched through Georgia. The
Union general advanced through the most fruitful and slave-populated counties of the state. The
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destruction that the Yankees wrought on the region hurt the southern war effort, crashed Rebel
morale, and drew Confederate soldiers out of the army to protect their families and homes. Tens
of thousands of slaves soon trailed the northern troops. Davis knew the ramifications, and
demanded extreme measures to trip up Sherman’s columns and “bummers” (foragers). The
president ordered Southerners to dismantle bridges, block roads, plant land mines, and destroy
fields.225
Nothing the Rebels tried stopped the Union men; the Confederates’ only means of defense
had wandered into Tennessee in the vain hope of capturing Nashville. While Davis did not receive
word about how Hood nearly destroyed the entirety of his army, he still understood what a blunder
the campaign was. Writing to a close relative, Hugh Davis, the president could not fathom how
Hood “misunderstood” his orders. Without Hood, Sherman was free to march unopposed; if he
had faced the diminished Confederate army, it was not likely that the Union men would have
confiscated slaves and property as freely as they did. Davis further carped that the few Confederate
forces in the region did not do enough to stop the Yankees. They should have deployed their
cavalry brigades to harass and scare off Sherman’s foragers.226
Sherman’s march through the Carolinas portended to be worse than that in Georgia, and
the Confederate armies struggled to prevent a repeat. General Hardy warned that his decision to
divide his command in order to protect multiple cities in Georgia had been a mistake, and allowed
Sherman to take Savannah. This defeat had compelled Hardy to abandon the front, taking what
supplies he could with him. Sherman’s next feat represented the beginning of the end for the South
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and slavery, especially as the Union army swelled with 180,000 black troops, and many more
joined as laborers. Their aid was crucial; black troops guarded Federal communications, and
African American laborers laid down roads.
As for Hood, the one-armed general wrecked the Rebel Army of Tennessee on his
Northward raid. Hood, with the aid of Nathaniel Bedford Forrest, reached middle Tennessee and
swept aside several Union garrisons. But when they faced the strong defensive Union entrenched
positions at Franklin on November 30, 1864, the overaggressive Rebel sent his units on suicidal
frontal assaults. His army suffered devastating casualties, but continued marching to Nashville.
There, on December 14 and 15, 1864, Hood and his remaining forces met equally formidable
defensive positions outside the city manned by George Thomas’ Army of the Cumberland. Instead
of directly attacking the city, Hood ordered his troops to dig trenches, with the hope that Thomas
would order direct assaults on the dug-in Rebel lines. Thomas did not oblige; instead, in a twostage flanking attack, the Union army nearly surrounded and almost destroyed the Rebel forces.
Hood beat a hasty retreat to northern Mississippi, where he resigned his command. The remainder
of his troops deserted. In this campaign, the Confederacy lost one of its major field armies and,
with it, its hope of defending the Deep South.
The Confederate prioritization of offensive campaigns was a failure, in both military and
political terms. Union forces did not scramble to chase Rebels on those occasions that the
Southerners marched north. The federal army was large enough that it could both respond to Rebel
offensives and maintain garrisons along a huge front. Other Yankee units continued their
occupations and invasions of the South. Politically, Rebel invasions never shook the Union
population’s faith in the war effort. Nor did they shorten the war. Lincoln’s reelection ensured that
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the war would continue on the terms that the President and the Republicans wanted: Union and
emancipation.
The strategies of 1865 reflected the meager options left open to the Confederate leadership.
Priority was given to the preservation of the army, even if it meant abandoning cities and territory.
Davis came to believe that to lose the army was to lose the war, and that the nation survived so
long as the troops did. The defense of the Carolinas was an instructive example of the strategic
dilemmas Rebel leaders faced. In response to Sherman’s advance into South Carolina, Davis
ordered that Beauregard concentrate all troops in the state. Thus strengthened, the general should
launch attacks on Sherman’s supply train.227 Embedded in this order is an acceptance of the fact
that territory would be lost and, therefore, that the protection of slavery was no longer a priority.
At this stage, what was the point of expending men and dwindling resources protecting slavery?
The Rebel armies could not afford to defend slave populations for no reason other than slaves
being there. Instead, buying time and winning battles would be crucial. The desperate gambit was
a conclusion to the cruel logic of using slaves to till the land – losing land meant losing slavery.
While they started the war believing slavery was a strength, it proved to be a weakness when slaves
turned against them and destabilized southern society, and the Rebels knew it.
Therefore, by the end of 1864, some Confederates, agreeing with Davis, Lee, and Seddon,
deemphasized the centrality of preserving slavery in strategic decisions and military policies.
According to the new doctrine, the Confederacy collapsed when the armies collapsed. As such, the
Confederacy attempt to adopt a Fabian strategy which included defense-in-depth and
maneuverability as key characteristics. Defense-in-depth meant Rebel forces would be dispersed
along multiple lines of defense to exhaust and harass large Yankee columns. Lines of defense
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included fortified positions or favorable terrain. Small southern units could then fall back to other
positions or concentrate with a larger Confederate field army. Maneuverability meant that Rebels
forces needed to continue to march and avoid battle. Battle avoidance kept Confederate armies
intact and allowed their commanders to bide their time and choose to fight battles when the position
of the enemy and geography gave them the best tactical and operational advantages.
There were limits, however, to employing the principles of defense-in-depth and
maneuverability. For one, Sherman disguised his intentions. Hardee and Beauregard misread
where Sherman was going to attack during February of 1865. Both commanders thought he would
attack Charleston, and the Union commander turned instead to Columbia.228 With no clear idea
where their foes were going, it was challenging to concentrate forces together. Second, the
Confederate armies were collapsing internally due to continuous waves of desertions; while
desertion had bedeviled them throughout the war, the rate at the end of 1864 eclipsed anything
seen earlier. Absentees shrunk the armies but also created a mirage for Rebel leaders and
commanders that there were, out there somewhere, enough men to fight the Yankees. Beauregard,
on February 21, 1865, reasoned that if he and Hardee could gather 30,000 men from the Carolinas,
then southern armies would be large enough to defeat Sherman.229 The men were never found, and
Confederate units diminished.
Davis held out hope that Johnston, who now led the meager, reconstituted remnants of the
Army of Tennessee and tried to stop Sherman, could “destroy” the marauding Union forces by
sacrificing ground and launching surprise attacks. His faith in this outcome stemmed from the
Union’s supposed dearth of knowledge about the region and lack of supplies. He instructed Lee,
and other generals, that furloughed troops in Mississippi would be their reinforcements. Davis
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knew, though, there were drawbacks. While their forces could grow if they retreated and collected
men into the armies, they were sacrificing territory to the Union. And once Yankee forces occupied
a region, they destroyed infrastructure the Confederates could not replace if they returned. While
Davis did not explicitly mention slaves, the Rebels no doubt lost African American labor for their
cause once the Union gained ground.230 He believed it was a sacrifice worth making if they could
stop Sherman and Grant from joining together and dictating Confederate military policy.231
The exhaustion and maneuver strategy failed, and their sacrifice of slavery soon amounted
to nothing. With Confederate field armies in the western theatre all but spent, Union columns could
march through the heart of slavery in Alabama, and its principal city, Mobile, at the beginning of
1865 nearly unopposed. For most of the war, the Union did not invade or occupy large parts of the
state. Davis and Lee agreed that the C.S.A. could not afford to lose the state’s supplies, ports, and
markets. Two Union columns moved against General Taylor’s garrison in Mobile. Davis and Lee
ordered Taylor to defeat the Yankee units before they met. They prescribed the now standard
strategy of defeat in detail, and using cavalry (Forrest’s units, in this case) to cut supply lines. Both
the president and the general-in-chief, however, feared that losing the garrison would be worse
than losing the city.232 They believed that victory, conversely, would mean a revitalization of the
war effort that would convince absentee troops to return to arms. Confederate resistance in
Alabama, instead, collapsed. Union General Edward Canby marched troops from the coast and
surrounded the city of Mobile beginning March 27, 1865. Yankee general James R. Wilson
embarked on raid of northern and central Alabama, through the heart of the state’s slaveholding
region, beginning on March 22, 1865. Rebel troops and partisans offered no resistance.
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Lee abandoned Richmond on April 3rd, 1865. Davis realized that the C.S.A. would have to
be a government on the run. Characteristically, the president spun a tantalizing, delusional vision
of victory emerging from defeat. Evacuating Richmond relieved the Confederacy of the necessities
of defending “certain points” not vital to their defense. Instead, Davis proclaimed the army was
free to move about the South and, “strike in detail the detachments and garrisons of the enemy
operating in the interior of our country where supplies are more accessible and where the foe will
be far removed from his base and cut off from all succor in case of reverse nothing is more needed
to render our triumph certain.” 233 In practice, Davis’ plan meant reestablishing a base of operations
and linking up the armies of Lee and Johnston to fight a manageable opponent, Sherman. With the
tide presumably turned against Sherman, more troops would join, and they would have enough
supplies to attack or defend against Grant’s forces.
Despite the overall strategic issues with retreat, by the later stages of the war, from late fall
1864 until the end of the conflict in April 1865, Confederate armies were forced to retreat and
sacrifice territory and slaves. It was a choice made from desperation, but Davis and Lee hoped that
the depleted Army of Northern Virginia could link up with the Army of Tennessee and together
defeat Sherman’s army in North Carolina. Both armies would have to outmaneuver their respective
foe and keep the troops supplied and fed, which were no easy tasks because the South could barely
organize enough logistical support to keep the army together.
In defending itself, the Confederacy had a potential last resort: guerilla operations. There
was no doubt interest in such tactics among southern leaders for the entirety of the war. In early
1862, Confederate congress passed the Partisan Ranger Act, that granted small groups of men the
ability to operate as local and maneuverable defense units. At the time, Davis and other leaders
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thought that having swarms of guerilla or partisan-ranger units would aid the main Rebel field
armies. These small units could be stationed in counties that had significant slave populations,
where they could police African Americans and work in tandem with local militias to put down
any potential servile insurrection.
Partisan-ranger units effectively harassed and distracted small Union formations
throughout the South. By way of example, Sherman became so concerned about the effect that
Confederate guerillas had on his supply lines that he used thousands of troops to guard railroads,
crossings, and depots. Partisan-ranger units also fulfilled the need to uphold slavery. They could
police slave populations, but also could terrorize emancipated African Americans. One former
slave in a post-war autobiography reported that Confederate partisan-rangers captured him when
he attempted to run to Union lines.234 These guerrilla units, by undertaking raids, could also shake
confidence among emancipated African American communities that the Union could protect them.
If these raids were damaging enough, some Confederate leaders hoped that slaves would become
more reluctant to run towards Union lines.
As to the leadership’s other expectation—that partisan-ranger units would aid the main
field armies—the reality was different; coordination was spotty between the two types of forces.
The inability or unwillingness of partisan-ranger units to take orders was understandably a
problem. Further exacerbating the Confederates’ issues was that these units drew men away from
the field armies, so much so that Davis and the Rebel Congress repealed the Partisan Ranger Act
in 1864. Guerilla activity also faced similar issues that a “Fabian strategy” encountered; the units
could not count on a universally supportive civilian population. African Americans, when and
where they could, quickly offered their services to the Union. Federal forces used African
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American troops as garrison forces, solidifying the Union’s control over the area and denying the
Confederate guerillas material support.235
Davis’ final strategy, a Fabian strategy, was impossible to implement. The Union forces
were not weakened, lost, or lacked ample provisions as Confederate commanders optimistically
wished. Davis misread the morale of Rebel forces. On the one hand, he understood how the last
six months of defeat kept men from rejoining the army. He griped to his wife on April 23, 1865,
that Lee’s surrender and Johnston and Beauregard’s retreat encouraged men to desert a losing
cause.236 On the other hand, Davis did not understand that the abandonment of defending slavery
as a principal war aim hollowed out Rebel armies and encouraged men to remain home. Southern
soldiers worried about their families and how emancipation potentially threatened their families’
security. In their unfortunate situation, Rebel leaders had some clarity that there were no other
viable strategies. As John C. Breckinridge, the last Confederate Secretary of War, observed, there
were not enough troops willing to defeat the Yankees. Partisan (guerilla) warfare was not a real
option because it would have been more damaging to the South than the North.237
Davis’ and the Confederacy’s offensive-defensive strategy grew out of a recognition that
the earlier cordon defense was not sustainable. Yet the offensive-defensive strategy failed, too,
because of a persistent, flawed perception. They believed that taking the war to the North would
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allow them to bend Union public opinion towards a negotiated peace and separation between the
two sections, and end the war quickly. The Rebel leaders’ preference for offensive warfare blinded
them to the fact that Rebel invasions of the Border states and the North hardened the Union public’s
resolve to fight and win the war. Rebel armies sacrificed too much of their limited supply of
soldiers, resources, and territory, only to discover that they had not shaped Union sentiment in the
way they wanted. Time and again, southern leaders thought they were just one successful
campaign, just one glorious victory away from shaking Lincoln and the North to the core. Instead,
their overreliance on aggressive maneuvers blinded them to what affected northern opinion the
most: when Federal armies lost tens of thousands of troops on southern soil.
Confederate military strategy during the war was tied at the hip to slavery. Both aspects,
the offensive and the defensive, served the goal of preserving the institution of slavery.
Confederate invasions from 1862 until mid-1864 at times drew Union columns northward, out of
the South. They took pressure off beleaguered slaveholders trying to escape the federal armed
forces’ military emancipation policies. Offensive campaigns opened the possibility of recapturing
occupied territories and asserting slaveholders’ rights in Confederate and Union territories.
Defensive postures helped to secure slavery where it was strongest; along the South’s coasts and
major rivers. The constellation of local defense forces enforced control over slaves in the
Rebellious states, preventing servile insurrections and slaves from running away.
And yet, each of these elements carried within them the seeds of military failure. The
opportunistic offensive campaigns, especially those that carried the fight to the North, failed to
defeat Union armies or to change the fortunes of Lincoln and the Republicans. The defensive
postures, which prioritized the protection of slave-dense regions, left the enemy too many potential
avenues of advance. And the inability of partisan-ranger units to coordinate with field armies
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meant that their impact in crucial battles was minimal. In the last year of the war, Rebel leaders
abandoned the offensive-defensive—and with it, the “Peculiar Institution”—in an act of
desperation. In their place, they prioritized the preservation of their armies through the strategies
of defense in depth and maneuverability, but it was too late. Davis, Lee, and the Confederate
armies, unwilling for three years to sacrifice slavery in exchange for independence, had lost both.
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CHAPTER FOUR
REBEL RESISTANCE TO THE IMPRESSMENT OF LABOR AND PROPERTY

The Confederacy faced serious hurdles in its efforts to man its armies, feed its troops and
civilians, and work on its vital defensive and infrastructure projects. In comparison to the North,
the South had fewer men for military service and labor, and less of an emphasis on food production.
To overcome these disadvantages, President Jefferson Davis and Confederate Congress granted
the military the power to take property, and later passed a law which allowed Confederate officials
to acquire food, materials, and labor (usually slaves) at low or no cost, through impressment.
Despite Davis’ intentions, impressment became the go-to method of acquiring supplies. By war’s
end, Confederate high command looked back on impressment as an unmitigated failure: soldiers
and civilians starved, slaveholders withheld material support for the cause, and local leaders openly
feuded with Richmond over the control of labor and property.
A September 1862 letter from the citizens from Bertie County, North Carolina to Governor
Zebulon B. Vance lays out what war threatened to do to ordinary citizens’ control over their
property and labor. The timing of the letter made sense; the Union army and navy had been
conducting military operations in and around the North Carolina Outer Banks. Though the Outer
Banks are not close to Bertie County, the citizens of Bertie County wrote to their new governor
about protecting their slaves and their economy. At the heart of it, they were worried that the
national and state governments had abandoned them, allowing federal forces to threaten the
institution of slavery. Impressing the slaves would only worsen the potential problems, they
reasoned; if some were taken, many more might run away in the confusion, and property holders
would potentially lose even more slaves.
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These citizens unwittingly revealed the central truth of fighting and winning the conflict
between the North and the South; the Civil War was a contest for control over labor. The South
fought to protect a system of labor that enshrined the right of white Americans to hold workers as
human property. The North understood how important it was to take that labor away from the
South, according to Bertie’s citizens; the federal army would not hesitate to take their slaves away
given any opportunity, especially if the Confederates had already done so.238
The letter from Bertie County demonstrated that the Rebels’ supposed greatest advantage,
an agricultural economy based on slave-produced cotton, was its most glaring weakness.
Impressment of property indicated no honoring of property rights. The most valuable property,
slaves, if taken by the Rebel military, were liable to be lost. Moreover, citizens lost control of the
very labor which allowed the slave-society to function.
The impressment policy evolved out of difficulties in pursuing the Rebels’ strategy. Their
strategy depended on leveraging their agricultural strength. There were two goals: provide food
for the hundreds of thousands of troops in the field, and grow cotton as a diplomatic bargaining
chip. These goals were undermined by unfortunate timing and geography. Farmers across the
Rebel states needed to plant corn and wheat, but when the war started, the cotton crop had already
been planted. Larger planters and smaller farmers preferred to keep growing cotton anyway; they
believed that the Upper South could produce enough food crops while the Deep South could
continue growing cotton, tobacco, and sugar.239 However, the regions which the Rebels counted
on to produce their wheat, corn, and livestock—Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee and northern and
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western Virginia—were the first to be disrupted by the war. As a consequence, state politicians
encouraged planters and farmers in the Deep South to focus on mass foodstuff production, but to
no avail.240 Richmond, for its part, was loathe to interfere and tell farmers what to plant, or to
intervene in local economies at all. Supply problems worsened by 1863, because the U.S. Navy
blockade grew tighter and the Union army disrupted transportation and agricultural infrastructure
in the Confederacy.241
The inability to feed the armies, and skyrocketing prices for other goods, forced the
Confederate government’s hand toward the impressment of property. Impressment, at first, was
not an official policy of the War Department or a law. Rather, it was a contingency-based
patchwork of time- and region-bound requests for food, fuel, and labor. There were, however,
basic guidelines that the War department suggested to regional commanders. On November 10,
1861, Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin wrote to the Department of the West’s commanding
general, Albert Sydney Johnston, stating that it was the government’s guiding principle not to
intervene in the local economy. The Secretary instructed him to pay a high price for food rather
than take property without compensation.242 Benjamin elaborated on this principle when he
ordered the Virginian theater commander, General Joseph E. Johnston, to impress grain only if the
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vendors refused to sell it. Clearly, the Confederacy was willing to pay exorbitant prices for its war
necessities, but unwilling to go away empty-handed, even if it meant squeezing local economies.243
Slaves had the potential to be a huge strategic advantage. Their work allowed as many
white men as possible to serve in the army without having to worry about planting and harvesting.
Enslaved African Americans could work as laborers attached to the armies. Slaves could do the
backbreaking work of trenching, constructing gun batteries and forts, and laying railroad track.
Further, slaves could be cheaply rented out to work in gun foundries and munitions factories. With
these advantages in mind, only eight months into the war, Confederate leaders hoped an
impressment act drawing slaves off plantations would soon go into effect.244 Before Confederate
Congress regulate slave impressment, some slaveholders “volunteered” the use of their slaves or
hired them out to work on vital military projects, under army supervision.
From 1861 to 1863, the national Confederate government preferred state governments to
execute impressments, and military commanders were directed to take property without
compensation as a last resort. The state governments, however, were unreliable and inefficient.
John Finney reported to the War Department that Louisiana Governor T.O Moore seized all the
pork he could, and that he would not release it to the military.245 Later the Governor detained
property when a vendor refused to take Confederate money; he then telegrammed the Secretary of
War to ask how he should proceed.246 Keen Confederate observers argued that the Rebels should
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avoid seizing goods and slaves from Unionist territories in southeast Tennessee. 247 In 1861, the
citizens of Shenandoah County petitioned Virginia Governor John Letcher; they complained of
not having enough men (and slaves) to effectively harvest their farms because they already had
almost 2,000 men and slaves in rebel service. They asked the government to refrain from
impressing more men and slaves into service.248 Avoiding impressment also extended to allies,
notably the Indian Nations in present-day Oklahoma. General Hindman condemned an
impressment in Oklahoma “…because the offense happened in the Indian Territory and it was the
property of an ally that was seized.”249
Military commanders across the South, with encouragement from local politicians and
Confederate high command, clarified the steps they would take to limit the damage impressment
could do to property rights. Rebel Secretary of War Judah Benjamin wrote to General John
Magruder, stationed on the Yorktown peninsula, ordering that he could not impress slaves outside
of his military jurisdiction. If he did so, he would interfere with another general’s orders and
exercise an “odious power” over civilians.250 General Joseph E. Johnston, then commander of the
Army of Northern Virginia, advised General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, stationed in the
Shenandoah Valley, to impress grain from distilleries before taking from small family farms or
individuals.251 The Commander of the Department of the Trans-Mississippi issued General Orders,
No. 5 on June 2, 1862. The first part of the order directed, “Private property within this district
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must not in any case whatever be taken or impressed by any person, whether officer, soldier, or
citizen, without special authority in writing from these headquarters...” Only headquarters could
legally impress, not officers or enlisted soldiers. The second half of the order stated that all living
in the department, both military and civilian, should resist impressment without official orders.
Those who illegally impressed property or slaves were “…robbers and marauders, and will be put
to death without hesitation.”252
Yet even commanders and supervisors of crucial infrastructure projects faced limitations
on their power to impress slaves. They had to exhaust their options for hiring slaves from
slaveholders. In July 1862, the President of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, Thomas Jordan,
supposed that military necessity justified impressing enslaved blacks to complete the MeridianSelma Railroad. Jordan advised that taking slaves should be avoided if possible, but used as a last
resort if no other labor was available.253 Assistant Adjutant General S.S. Anderson of the TransMississippi Department suggested to the commanding officer of the Arkansas district, Lieutenant
General T.H. Holmes, that he should hire slaves to replace soldiers acting as their units’ teamsters.
If the slaves’ owners refused, he continued, the slaves could be impressed to reach the requisite
number. Anderson cautioned, however, that, “…this should be done with great precaution… [to]
keep those at home loyal and zealous in support of our cause and efforts.”254
As Davis declared to Confederate Congress on January 12, 1863, impressment by the
military and national government was designed to be a “military exigency;” it was no way intended
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to be a long-term plan for supplying the armies.255 The Rebel Congress, in March 1863, passed the
Impressment Act and, three weeks later, passed a farming tax-in-kind bill. Both laws gave
impressment commissioners appointed by the President and state governors the power to buy food
well below market prices so long as they negotiated the price and published what they were willing
to pay on a regular basis. Commissioners were often military officers. If merchants and farmers
were unwilling to pay the established price, then an assessor and an umpire would mediate to solve
the dispute. Assessors and umpires were chosen from among local lawyers or government officials.
If arbitration did not work, then the property was taken at the original price that the impressment
agent offered, or with the promise of payment later. In practice, especially when Confederate
forces were desperate, impressment officers often skipped the formalized process of price
assessing and took the food, fuel, or slaves with a promise of payment to come later, or no promise
of payment at all. To combat potential theft, the Impressment Act forced government agents to
present identification which gave them the right to impress property.256
For his part, President Davis advocated for strict limits and controls on the process of
impressment to prevent its overuse or abuse. Two interchanges with concerned citizens
demonstrated his commitment to restraint. John S. Carnys of Texas wrote a letter alerting Davis
that impressment agents detained cattle drivers while they were on the way to Louisiana. They
then seized the cattle for the use of the Confederate army without paying the market price for the
cattle. Davis replied that this was clearly an abuse of impressment; the army could and should pay
for the cattle. The president explained that difficulties in communications, distance, and Union
interruptions made it difficult for Confederate authorities to supervise impressment
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commissioners.257 A second letter, again from Texas, pointed to other forms of abuse. The agents
impressed cotton without any justification. Davis agreed; he concurred that impressing cotton at
this time in Texas represented an unnecessary intervention into the local economy.258
Careful execution of impressment did little to ease Southerners’ concerns or temper their
discontent. As Rebel war department clerk John B. Jones noted in his dairy on March 11th, 1863,
“Last night one of the government warehouses in this city was burnt …perhaps in retaliation for
the recent impressment of flour. Yesterday the lower house of Congress passed a resolution
restricting impressments. This has a bad aspect.”259 From the beginning, Southern citizens chafed
against impressment of property and slaves. Influential General A.S. Johnston wrote to Secretary
J.P. Benjamin arguing that impressment was a terrible policy: “…I beg leave to represent that the
good policy of impressing supplies is not sustained by custom or experience. Whether among
friends of foes is has always resulted prejudicially to the public interests.” He elaborated, believing
that, “Whenever the raising of supplies among our friends by impressment has been attempted, it
has always resulted in indiscriminate robbery by pretended agents of the Government…”260
Impressment became unpopular because it was bedeviled by unfair practices, and because
it deprived slaveholders of their property for little perceived gain. As had become clear to Southern
leaders by 1863, the measures they took to solve their food, manpower, and labor problems spurred
resistance. Farmers in the rebellious states complained loudly that their property was taken from
them without proper compensation. Slaveholders distrusted and resisted impressment of their
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slaves. All parties claimed that the government and military tyrannically threatened invaluable
property rights.
The commanding general stationed at Mobile, Alabama received a note from Acting
Secretary of War J.A. Campbell. Campbell forwarded a report about citizen complaints that the
military took property without care or concern. For the inhabitants of Mobile, “…This habit of
seizing private property for the common uses of the Government is unquestionably a great
grievance…There is no better evidence of a feeble and incompetent administration than is
exhibited by a habitual resort to impressment as a source of supply…” What rankled the citizens
the most, however, was the consistent military interference into the economy; the letter complained
that the military had mismanaged the steamboat and railroad services. Ultimately, the Acting
Secretary instructed that,
This Department has no authority to regulate commerce on the highways or
agencies of commerce...But the Department does not desire impressment as a
means of supply to be used at all except under the condition before stated. It claims
no power to control trade, and in the permissions that have been issued to
individuals it has not designed to discriminate in their favor. The principle of its
interference with private property of any kind, whether railroads, steamboats, or
supplies, has been explained...261
Similar behavior had brought about a change in slaveholder attitudes toward impressment
as well. Very early on, planters offered their slaves as laborers. On July 8, 1861, the Secretary of
War received a telegram stating the platers near New Orleans voluntarily offered their slaves for
military labor.262 Yet, as early as winter 1862, the Confederate Secretary of War received telegrams
from complaining slaveholders, stating that their slaves were being taken by Confederate officers
and officials for use in the war effort. General John C. Pemberton complained during March 1862
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that slaveholders were “…pulling black laborers from projects, seemingly with support of the
governor and the state government.” For Pemberton, the advantage of using slaves as laborers was
clear; “…I am of the opinion that in a country where slave labor ought to be so abundant the
soldiers can be more appropriately and profitably employed in attaining proficiency in drill…”263
On August 15 and on August 29, 1862, the Secretary received telegrams from concerned citizens
asking whether Confederate officers had the authority to impress slaves.264 The Secretary of War
received a telegram from the President of the Mississippi and Alabama Railroad that slave owners
were pulling their slaves from the vital project and there was no amount of cajoling and monetary
offers which could persuade them to allow the company to continue to use the slaves.265 The War
office received an angry telegram stating that the mayor and sheriff of Petersburg, Virginia were
taking back slaves who were operating the railroads near the city, disrupting service.266 At every
turn, slaveholders questioned the government’s intentions, especially when their slaves were taken
without compensation and the slaveholders’ consent. For planters and slaveholders, the military
advantages meant little in comparison to the interruptions that impressment caused.
Slaveholders had reasons to doubt the benefits of the military’s use of their property.
Military command mismanaged slaves and the projects they worked on. Slaveholders complained
that slaves were kept beyond the term originally agreed upon. Slaves impressed into service were
at greater risk of being “confiscated” by Union forces, running away, suffering injury, or dying.
Davis provided one major reason why slaveholders were so wary; he forwarded to the House of
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Representatives a letter from Attorney General Thomas Watts, which stated that the Confederate
government assumed no liability for runaway slaves, unless it could be proven that military forces
were negligent when supervising the slaves. There was little guarantee that slaveholders would
retain their slaves as property after impressment.267
In recognition of slavery’s privileged status, Confederate Congress and state assemblies
passed regulations that gave special protection to slaveholders. Politicians ensured that military
commanders did not overstep their authority to use slave labor. Slave owners, like other property
holders, were supposed to be compensated for use of their slaves. The Impressment Act, obviously,
also affected how and when slaves could be impressed. And again, there were stringent regulations
which overwhelmingly favored slaveholders, setting a limit on the number of slaves that could be
impressed. The Confederate government made several attempts to catalogue and track where
slaves were within the Confederate army, again responding to a fear that they were being taken or
used illegally. Slaves were to serve military commands for a limited duration, usually 30 days.
Confederate forces supplied slaves with rations, work tools, and housing. The War Department
reminded military department commanders to avoid impressing slaves that were working in the
cotton fields. The Department of the West was instructed that “…there is no general order on the
subject of impressment of negro labor. In some special cases, where the public exigencies
demanded it, Negro labor has been impressed, discriminating, however, against all hands
employed in the production of cotton.”268
After the passage the Impressment Act, which was designed to address the many civilian
complaints, citizens lamented that the law was applied unevenly. According to Lousa Stone of
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Cumberland County, Virginia, impressment commissioners ignored the slaves that were the
property of the rich and powerful planters, fearing backlash or their jobs becoming more difficult.
Instead, they seized property and food from poorer members of southern society, including
Stone.269 On March 24th, 1863, Jones reported that a Judge Lyons issued an injunction preventing
the War department from impressing flour.270
Some governors and state assemblies were amenable to impressment of slaves and made
the process easier. These cases were aided by politically savvy generals who understood how
Southerners could easily become irritated with impressment. Magruder, whom Confederate
command transferred from the east to the Department of the Trans-Mississippi, explained to
Governor Francis Lubbock why and how he would impress property. Magruder bluntly stated,
“Impressment, when necessary, is, therefore, the law of the land.” The general explained that he
needed 1,500 slaves to build badly needed fortifications along the Texas coast; he promised that
he would use his power responsibly.271
The governor of Texas, with some convincing, accepted the rationale for impressing slave
labor, food, materials, and cotton so long as the military was careful. Assistant Adjutant General
S.S. Anderson instructed Magruder to encourage slaveholders to hire out their slaves and, failing
that, to impress African Americans to act as laborers and teamsters. Anderson noted, however, that
tampering with slavery was a delicate proposition “…with in a State where there are so many nonslaveholders, and where the production is so varied that free labor is very profitable.” He cautioned
not to take the impressed slaves to the Rio Grande, advising they go no farther south than San
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Antonio, fearing that the slaves would slip over the border and into freedom in Mexico. Anderson
also advised Magruder that he should do everything in his power to not offend the loyal population
over the issues of slavery and impressment. In a telling quote, Anderson further counselled,
It is suggested, in view of the State election coming off on the first Monday in
August, and as much importance may be attached to the results of that election, it
is desirable that no additional exciting cause should be presented that may influence
the minds of voters; consequently it would be advisable not to use the impressment
law prior to the election.272
Governor Joseph Brown of Georgia and the state legislature routinely questioned orders
and demanded protections for Georgian citizens’ property, especially when it came to slavery.
Military officers found it easy to blame the obstacles to impressment on Brown, but they did not
appreciate the contentious political atmosphere the Governor faced at home. On March 19th, 1863,
H.W. Mercer forwarded a letter from a General Wayne to his superior officer, G.T. Beauregard.
Wayne advised “…not to run counter to any of the crotchets of our disputatious? Governor who
perhaps finds that a second negro impressment might not improve his chance for re-election to the
gubernatorial chair.” This was not Brown’s only problem, however. He still needed workers: “Our
laborers are fast leaving us, and if the details are not renewed anything like a complete system of
defense for Savannah must go by the board.” The General Mercer added sarcastically, “The
Abolition programme for the day is not being carried out, I suppose….”273
A month later, April 19th, 1863, the shortage of enslaved laborers had not abated. Chief
Engineer Officer D.B. Harris wrote to Beauregard reporting “…that Captain McCrady (chief
engineer of Georgia) has but 132 negroes engaged upon the earthworks near Savannah. Of these
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102 will be discharged this week. The remain 30 are Mr. Spratt’s hands working by contract.” He
elaborated on the shortage’s cause; he did not blame the Governor, but rather identified the Georgia
legislature as the main source of opposition. The legislature wanted the military to impress slaves;
state politicians did not want that responsibility or the blame that would come with it. Impressment
through regional commanders was far more cumbersome and too slow when slaves were urgently
needed to build defensive works. Harris’ and McCrady’s solution was to appeal directly to the
legislature for the 1,500 slaves they needed; it is clear that they did not want to use their power to
impress either.274
In a letter to Brigadier General H.W. Mercer, Governor Brown noted that Mercer’s request
for impressed slaves, 1,500 of them to build defenses around Savannah for 90 days, would not be
executed by the state. On the surface, Brown directed the general to obey the law and use his
officers to impress the slaves. The governor then followed with a long list of complaints from
himself and the state assembly. While the Confederate military officers had the power to impress,
Brown and the state legislature perceived it as a seizure of power from state officials. Furthermore,
Brown and other Georgia politicians believed that there was not enough time to have the slaves
build the works before “…the enemy will be forced by the heat of the climate to abandon further
offensive operations against Savannah this spring…” Taking these slaves off the plantations would
also interfere with growing and harvesting grain, and would be in violation of “…the 10th section
of the act of Congress…which forbids such taking without the consent of the owner except in case
of urgent necessity, which in that case could not be justly said to exist.” Brown argued that slaves
were better and more properly kept on their plantations to work during that time of year, early
spring. Even if they were only taken for 2 to 3 months, it would have been as if they were gone for
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the year because they were requested during the growing season. Brown suggested that they pay
soldiers already stationed near Savannah to construct the works; it would not burden the
slaveholders, it would respect the growing season, and it would save the government money.
Rather passive-aggressively, Brown then advised Mercer to use his best judgement when
impressing slaves, and assured him that the people of Georgia would acquiesce to his orders.275
McCrady continued to have problem with Brown, the Georgia government, and the South
Carolina government. General Mercer wrote to Secretary of War Seddon, complaining that his
subordinate could not hire slaves for labor. Mercer noted that another contractor had searched far
for slaves to “collect”: “One contractor, whose proposal for earth work had been accepted, after in
vain endeavoring to procure labor in this State and in South Carolina, went so far as to send agents
to Mississippi with a large amount of money to make cash purchases of negroes. These agents
have just returned unsuccessful.” One of the reasons that slaveholders were reluctant was security.
Mercer confirmed that after Union raids and military operations along the coast, owners broke
contracts, fearing they could lose their slaves to the federal forces. They pulled hundreds of slaves
from a work project. The general, however, was willing to compromise with planters in return for
impressment. He described his plan to the secretary:
The planters are now laying by their crops, and, before the impressment could be
carried out, planting operations will have been brought to a close until harvest.
Could I obtain as many Negroes as I desire for the month of August only, much,
though not all, could be effected. And it appears to me that the State of Georgia and
the Confederacy would purchase the safety of Savannah (one of the principal
guaranties of the possession of Augusta) at a cheap rate even if it cost them the
labor of a thousand slaves yearly as long as the war may last.
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Failing that, Mercer wanted to simply impress the slaves immediately, but he believed that this
would “…fall heavily upon the planting interest at this time.”276
The Georgia state legislature requested that the Secretary of War, during November of
1863, revoke his appointments of impressing agents in the state, and instead allow the state to
appoint its own citizens.277 Jones observed that, “Governor Brown…is opposed to impressments,
and that the government should pay the market price—whatever that is.”278 In an angry letter to
Davis, Brown passed on a petition from the citizens of Floyd County who were fed up with
impressment. The petition informed the president and the governor that “…the lawless seizure of
property by government agents and their abrupt and insulting manner alienates the citizenry.”279
Governor Milledge L. Bonham of South Carolina, like Brown, dragged his feet to provide
impressed slaves to work on military defense for the state’s coast. A series of letters from April
1863 illustrates Governor Bonham’s many issues. In the first letter, South Carolina’s agent,
William M. Shannon, noted there were many available slave laborers, but plantation owners
believed their slaves were not being fed, clothed, or housed properly. The owners were also
hesitant to send their slaves to the coast where the Union Army and Navy lurked nearby. Shannon
cautioned that the slaveholders were not unpatriotic, just suspicious. For his part, the agent
grumbled that the planters’ suspicions were compounded by the legal difficulty of having two
assessors agree on a fair price for impressing the slaves.280
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The slaveholders’ perspective was made abundantly clear in the next letter to Bonham from
State Senator Alexander Mazyck just ten days later, April 21st, 1863. Mazyck observed that it
“…will be generally known in this part of the country…that the labor is not really wanted and that
the planters are harassed, and their business interrupted for nothing.” He protested that though
many of the slaves had been taken, he and other plantation owners worried that trying to plant a
crop could become impossible if the army took more slaves. Further irritating the state senator and
his neighboring planters was that the slaves’ labor seemed to have been wasted. During the winter,
their slaves built a fortified gun battery, but no cannons or their crews had yet been stationed there.
As a result, Mazyck believed there was “gross mismanagement” (for which he had no solutions)
and that slaveholders were totally unwilling to allow their slaves to leave again.281
From Bonham’s perspective, he was caught in an ugly predicament between military
officers, alarmed that they could not build works in time, and slaveholders who were angry that
they were bereft of their property during critical moments of the growing season. In this context,
Governor Bonham wrote to Beauregard noting that “…I have been keenly alive to the importance
of this labor [slave labor] from the first moment which interest was enhanced by my recent visit to
Morris Island.” The trouble was that, as in Georgia, the South Carolina legislature passed an act to
prevent Bonham from providing slaves or to allow impressment to continue. Instead, he intended
to call on two divisions of infantry to finish the works. Slaves needed to remain on the plantation
“…as the cultivation of the provision crop at this juncture is growing daily more important and
there is great unwillingness on the part of the planters to send their hands to the coast at this
particular period…” Furthermore, the planters were unhappy that their slaves were kept beyond
the allotted 30 days (they were kept for 90 days), insufficiently supplied, and detained while on
281
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the way back.282 Ultimately, Bonham and South Carolina sided with the planters. As Beauregard
complained to Robert Rhett, a representative to Confederate Congress from the state, his laborers
were leaving daily. Worse, there were no replacements coming. For the general, “The system of
impressment is a complete failure, and if the State authorities will not furnish the negroes called
for, we must be prepared for the worst consequences here as well as elsewhere.”283
Mississippi was a hotbed of resistance to military impressment. Governor of Mississippi
Charles Clark wrote to President Davis, calling for an immediate response to crises involving
impressed slaves. War Department clerk Jones recorded on September 29th, 1863 that “Someone
has written a flaming article on the injurious manner in which impressments have been conducted
in Mississippi—the President’s State—and sent it to him.”284 Later, according to Clark, members
of the Mississippi legislature reported that Confederate troops attempted to impress slaves in the
north and northwestern counties of the state. Their attempt led to a stampede of slaves into the
woods, where presumably, many ran away. The legislature passed two resolutions which requested
the Governor to protect the people of the state from “illegal” impressments of property and slaves.
Clark and the legislature worried that the incident near the state’s border would allow slaves “…to
go almost en masse to the lines of the enemy.” Davis, hoping to appease the governor and
legislature of his home state, ordered department commander General J.E. Johnston to seek out
the slaves and prevent them from falling into the federal army’s hands.285
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Complaints about impressing slaves grew louder in Alabama, according to a petition
forwarded to General Kirby Smith. Governor Watts wrote Smith that he had received a petition
from “our best citizens” in Talladega County. The committee’s focus was the call for slave labor
and potential impressment of slaves for the fortifications around Mobile. They reminded the
governor about the contributions Talladega made to the war effort. According to the petitioners,
many in the country held no slaves and, with most white men under the age of 45 serving in the
army, poor families became dependent on slave labor to produce food. The Union invasion and
occupation of northern Alabama sent hundreds of refugees south, compounding their inability to
feed themselves and the Confederate military. The petitioners begged that the county be permitted
to keep slaves to plant a sufficient harvest. Driving their point home, the citizens enumerated the
increasing burden that the impressment of slaves, horses and, wagons placed on them and the
county:
On the 22d of December, 1862, there were impressed 90 Negroes in this county.
On the 29th of January, 1863, 120 Negroes were impressed. On the 7th of March,
1863, 150 more and 5 wagons and teams. In the fall of 1863, 150 to 160 more. In
February, 1864, 160 more, who are now at Mobile. In August, 1863, about-wagons
and teams were impressed and sent to Montevallo to haul coal and iron. In August,
1863, under an order, it was said, from General Wheeler, about 175 horses were
impressed. Within a few days past Captain Graham, under an order from
Lieutenant-General Polk, it is said, has been here and impressed about-horses and
about-mules, claiming and exercising the right to take every seventh mule, whether
the same was actually necessary “to carry on the agricultural employments of the
owner” or not…The season thus far has been very backward, and what corn has
been planted will probably have to be planted over again. As before stated, 160 of
these negroes are now in Mobile at work on the public defenses, and on the 2d
instant a new order arrived calling on the impressing agent for this county to
impress 160 more and have them ready to leave by the 17th of this month. The
premises considered, the undersigned respectfully request Your Excellency to aid
them in procuring an order from Lieutenant-General Polk exempting this county
from further impressment this season, if possible, or at least from this recent
order…
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The petitioners stated their requests bluntly; they asked the governor to prevent any new round of
impressment before the next fall and stop the slaves from leaving the county. Watts added his
concern that the planting season was being interrupted, potentially impoverishing women and
children while their men were away. He asked Smith “…to suspend the call recently made on that
county until such time as the necessities of the planters in that county are less pressing.” 286
Confederate leaders attempted to “fix” impressment, especially when planters and civilians
complained. Secretary of War Seddon, during November 1863, wrote to Davis that impressment
caused all types of evils: price fixing, inflation, official abuses, and citizen discontent.287
Lee and the Assistant Commissary General argued that impressment agents should be
spread throughout the states so that farmers in combat zones did not repeatedly bear too much of
the burden.288 Secretary James Seddon squashed the plan; he reiterated that impressment was
designed to only take from a surplus. Seizing goods and labor “indiscriminately” was counter to
the spirit of the law: “…The impressment law, as you may have observed…limits it merely to the
surplus of production, requiring that a sufficiency for the reasonable support of the holder, his
family, or employees should be exempted…” Seddon criticized the assistant commissary general’s
interpretation of the law, which Lee relayed in a previous letter. Northrop wanted commanders to
justify impressment in terms of military necessity. Seddon disagreed, and explained that he had
suggested that Congress modify aspects of the law; “...Impressment as a mode of supply for the
army, even with the restrictions imposed upon the Department, is unequal and odious, and I shall
286
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earnestly urge at the approaching session of Congress the expediency of adopting other modes of
supply, or of so tempering and regulating this as to make it less harsh and more equal in its
operation.”289
North Carolina Governor Zebulon B. Vance’s critiques of the system were representative
of the widespread public hatred of impressment. One of his primary complaints was that the
military overstepped its authority to the detriment of southern people. For example, Brigadier
General A.G. Jenkins wrote to the governor in 1863 carping that North Carolinians refused to
accept Confederate money. He requested Vance to order an impressment to take the good without
payment.290 Jenkins must have been surprised to learn that Vance believed Jenkins and other
Confederates were unnecessarily harassing civilians. The governor thought the military had no
right to intervene in the economy at all and the impressment was tantamount to tyranny. He
claimed that citizens simply did not have food to sell at all. He relayed to the secretary that a staterun impressment promised to bring much food due to a good harvest and the presence of “…many
hoards that the fear of famine kept out of the market…” The state procurement and buying methods
were more effective than military-run impressment because the food was “…purchased under
authority of an act of our Legislature to prevent suffering in the families of soldiers and consequent
disquiet and desertion in the army.”291 Davis had a difficult time responding to Vance because the
governor, according to the president, had not communicated the state’s problems.292

289

Ibid., 383-9. Letter from Secretary of War J.A. Seddon to General R. E. Lee,
November 20, 1863.
290
Ibid., series 1, vol. 18, ch. 30, 863-4.
291
Ibid., series 1, vol. 18, ch. 30, 1026. State of North Carolina, Executive Department,
Raleigh, N.C., April 27, 1863, to Hon. James A. Seddon, Secretary of War, Richmond, VA.
292
Papers of Jefferson Davis, vol. 10, 266-7. Letter from Jefferson Davis to Z.B. Vance,
February 29, 1864.

135

In January 1864, Confederate Congress passed a second impressment act; this law
protected the property value of any slave lost when the government pressed them into service and
paid the owners for supplying their “property” to the government. Impressment remained
unpopular despite these changes. Confederate Congress, responding to pressure from Confederate
citizens and angry state legislatures, nearly overturned the act.293 Part of the reason that
impressment remained unpopular was that illegal impressments continued, because the
Confederacy had no incentive to stop them. Robert E. Lee acknowledged to Seddon during January
of 1864 that impressment, despite being unfair and poorly managed, was necessary. Confederate
forces had to continue impressing goods because “…there is a great amount of subsistence in the
hands of the people, many having laid in stores to serve them for a long period. This is in part
owing to the condition of the currency, as the people prefer to hoard supplies rather than money,
which fluctuates so rapidly that they cannot depend upon it for purchasing to meet future
necessities.” Lee then asked if the European reserves the Confederate cabinet established could be
tapped to supply property owners with some form of capital in the way of “coin.” 294 Though it
sounded plausible, the general’s suggestion was anything but. The blockade would likely prevent
the hard currency from reaching rebel shores safely and thus, Lee and the Confederates would still
be stuck with impressment.
Letters from civilians like Preston Pond of Louisiana illustrated how southerners viewed
the “improved” impressment law; it was still “…a system of violent and unlawful despossesion as
officers and privates seize property at will.”295 Impressment officers often left ranks and went into
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the surrounding countryside, outside of their jurisdiction, to take food and supplies. Jones noted
on April 22nd, 1864 that “Gov. Watts writes to the Secretary that commissary agents, who ought
to be in the ranks, are making unnecessary impressments, leaving to each negro only four ounces
of bacon per day.”296 An investigation conducted in Confederate-held Tennessee during the spring
of 1864 concluded “…that the limitations of the impressment law have not been uniformly
observed.” The inspector enumerated the many problems:
Supplies needed for the support of the household have been taken; disputed
questions have not been referred to the board of arbitrators required by law.
Agricultural operations have been interfered with, and in a great number of cases
payment has not been made on the spot, but receipts of the most informal character
have been left, signed by forage-masters, commissary sergeants, officers of the line,
and sometimes without any indication of the command for which, the supplies were
taken. In addition to these abuses, robberies by soldiers in small parties have been
frequent…297
So, if impressment was so unpopular, caused deep political rifts between the states and the national
government and between civilians and the military, why did the Confederate forces continue to
seize property and labor? Impressment was the least poor choice out of a set of limited options. As
the war continued, the blockade tightened and fewer European war materials reached Confederate
hands. Though the Rebel governments had attempted to develop a robust internal industrial sector,
these attempts failed miserably. With supplies tightening, the only resort to feed, clothe, and arm
the rebel forces was impressment.
Impressment of southern property, including slaves, exposed the political and economic
rights at stake for southern white citizens across the South: control over property and labor.
Jefferson Davis himself noted the very real threat to the institution of slavery that impressment
posed. In a speech to Confederate Congress on November 7, 1864, Davis wondered how
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impressment effected the slaves’ status as property; “…as they are used by the army, the relation
of the person predominates so far as to render it doubtful whether the private right of property can
consistently and beneficially be continued and it would seem proper to acquire for public service
the entire property in the labor of the slave.”298 He perceived what many others across the South
saw. Control of property and labor, necessary for the success of the South’s political economy,
were united in the institution of slavery. The war put into question the absolute right to control
property, especially as the government took property or did little to prevent others from taking it.
Davis implied that the war had revealed how the course of the conflict would bend; the war would
be shaped by who controlled the labor of slaves.
The last Confederate Secretary of War, John C. Breckinridge, received a letter, dated
March 5th, 1865, from his Assistant Secretary of War, John A. Campbell. It detailed the Rebels’
dire condition. Campbell argued that impressment, specifically pressing slaves into service for the
Confederate cause, created political, social, and economic instability. The assistant secretary
observed that using slaves as teamsters and laborers would have been more successful if they had
been used from the beginning of the war, potentially maximizing their usefulness and dulling
slaveholders’ objections. But, as Campbell noted, state governments obstructed military
commanders attempts to collect slaves. The chaos reached a crescendo as the war concluded in
1865.299
Campbell scapegoated impressment, but it was part of a systemic issue of a slave society
fighting a war. Southerners resisted impressment because it undermined the property rights and
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control of labor so central to the slaveholding South’s economy, politics, and society. The Rebels
started the war and founded the Confederacy to protect those rights, especially as it related to
slavery. The war, however, exposed how tenuous property rights and control of labor were.
Military necessity demanded that slaves work on public projects, their property and labor taken
without fair compensation. With backing from state governments, slaveholders fought
impressment because they feared Union forces would emancipate slaves, or that slaves would run
away while under the military’s supervision. The Southern planters’ wealth of slaves meant that
slave-owning was afforded a privileged place in the Confederacy—one that state governments
protected above other types of property, and at the expense of winning the war.
As the war was ending, Jones complained that, “They [the rich men] abuse the government
for its impressments, and yet repose in fancied security, holding the President responsible for the
defense of the country, without sufficient men and adequate means.”300 Clearly, the wealthy
planters of the Confederacy, the same class which overwhelmingly dominated Southern politics,
proved to be a major stumbling block for Confederate strategy; when the necessities of war
required that they give up some of their control of property and labor, they balked.
State governments, planters, and citizens fought impressment to the detriment of having
adequate manpower, supplies, and labor for the army because the war threatened both property
rights and the control of labor—which had their nexus in the ownership of slaves. They, unlike
Davis and some in the military, did not believe that the labor of slaves could shape the Civil War.
Rather, they felt it was crucial to continue defending the property rights that secessionists promised
independence would secure.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONFEDERATE CONSCRIPTION
James Phelan, a Confederate senator from Mississippi, wrote to fellow Mississippian
Jefferson Davis about the “unhappy conditions of affairs” in their home state on December 9th,
1862. The letter’s beginning focused on the Union invasion of the state, but then shifted to an
extended critique of conscription. Though conscription had only begun eight months prior, it
seemed that the system was teetering on the edge of collapse. The spirit of enlistment, the senator
worried, was dead. Enrolling officers were inefficient, and ineffectively enforced the conscript
law. No one in Mississippi or the neighboring state, Alabama, seemed to respect the authority of
these “young” and “unprepared” officers.
Why, though, were enrolling officers disrespected and Mississippians openly flouting the
draft? Senator Phelan believed he had some insight; non-slaveholders were angry at the protections
that the Conscription Act carved out for slaveholders and the institution of slavery. Enrolling
officers abused their power to exempt men from the draft. Phelan implied that wealthy men and
planters unduly received protection from conscription. In order to counter the widespread
resistance to Confederate authority, “the prominent, rich, and influential men” had to lead by
example and be swept into the ranks. To get the influential segments of society into the army,
Richmond should end substitutions, which gave the wealthy an avenue to dodge service.
Phelan reserved most of his ire for the Twenty Negro Law, which he claimed he opposed
“violently and predicted the consequences.” The law exempted from the draft men who owned 20
or more slaves, or who worked as overseers on plantations with 20 or more slaves. He argued that
the law was a gross injustice and “is denounced even by men whose position enables them to take
advantage of its privileges.” The senator turned his attention to the law’s impact on the poor; “it
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has aroused a spirit of rebellion in some places, I am informed, and bodies of men have banded
together to resist, whilst in the army, it is said, it only needs some daring man to raise the standard
to develop a revolt.”301
Conscripting southern men into the service of the Confederate Army had an enormous
impact, despite its eventual failings. The act was hailed, at first, as a tool to save the fledgling
nation. The Conscription Act required men from the ages of 18 to 35 enlist; it also reorganized
Confederate regiments and ensured that one-year recruits remained in military service longer. The
law centralized how the CSA recruited, but it allowed the states considerable latitude in how many
men they sent into frontline combat regiments.
Within the law, there were the seeds of confusion, dissent, and outright resistance. As the
war dragged on, however, this once-acclaimed system saw diminishing returns. The conscription
system was bled dry by the state-organized local defense or partisan-ranger companies, and by a
system riddled with loopholes like substitution and exemptions. Local defense companies and
partisan-ranger units tended to be small, regional, and, in areas densely populated with slaves, an
option preferable to service in the regular army. Exemptions and substitution provisions ensured
that slaveholders and their managers could remain on the plantations and oversee their property.
Most infamous among them was the Twenty Negro Law, which exempted slaveholders and
overseers who owned or supervised 20 or more slaves.
Historians have studied Confederate conscription using several approaches—social,
gender-based, political, and military—though there are only a few full monograph-length
treatments of the subject. A fundamental failing of most efforts to understand the South’s defeat
is that these efforts misjudge which socioeconomic class was unwilling to make great sacrifices,
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and why. Often, historians have focused on the southern poor and white yeomanry’s reluctance to
keep fighting a “rich man’s war, a poor man’s fight.” However, in the eyes of the planters, the
fortunes of both masters and yeomen were grounded in the survival of slavery. Conscription that
included slaveowners threatened the slave society’s continued functioning. Conscription was one
of several fault lines that revealed how divided southerners were on protecting slavery at the
expense of independence, and how inadequately prepared southern slave society was to fight an
extended war.
One of the earliest comprehensive studies was Conscription and Conflict in the
Confederacy by Albert Burton Moore, published in 1924. He uses the Official Records, the
journals of the US and Confederate congresses, and regional newspapers to build his case. Moore
assumes that the war started as a war over state’s rights, and that conscription began because the
Confederacy became “embarrassed by the lack of volunteer troops after the war” started in 1861.
Ultimately, Moore concludes that “Conscription was not only contrary to the spirit of the people
but the genius of the Confederate political system.” In other words, the relationship between the
state and national governments made it more difficult to enlist men effectively; therefore, it
conscription “failed,” according to Moore. Instead of a national draft, Moore postulates that a stateby-state draft could have been more effective. 302
William L. Shaw’s 1962 article “The Confederate Conscription and Exemption Acts” and
subsequent monographs focus on carefully reconstructing the legal, political, and military basis
for conscription. Of these three areas, he was most interested in legal precedents for Rebel
conscription, and believes that it was a forerunner of the universal selective service acts of the First
and Second World Wars. Shaw believes that the act and the subsequent Confederate and federal
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rulings about the act were crucial to laying the legal foundation for the 20th century’s conscription
laws of men and property. He does not detail at length how conscription encountered troubles or
fell short, at times, of its intended goals; however, he does identify some bureaucratic mistakes
and errors as the source of inefficiencies in conscription. His analysis is detached, for the most
part, from questions about the Twenty Negro Law, except to say that tradesmen and small farmers
disliked it.303
Walter C. Hilderman III’s They Went into the Fight Cheering!: Confederate Conscription
in North Carolina analyzes how the Bureau of Conscription operated in Raleigh, North Carolina
from 1862 to 1865. Hilderman chose to study this state because it sent the most men to the Rebel
armies. After Confederate Congress and President Davis passed the 1862 Conscription Act, state
officials rushed to establish recruitment and instruction camps to muster the recruits, though the
Bureau had some difficulty dealing with desertions, and with transporting and equipping the
conscripts. Veteran battalions chased down deserters and maintained local order. Ultimately, North
Carolina’s success in conscripting its population was due in large part to its local leadership.
Hilderman implies that desertion and draft-dodging were mostly due to news from the battlefront
rather than political or social issues raised by states and local people. He examines, briefly, slavery
and the Twenty Negro Law in the broader perspective of exemptions.304
Conscription became a necessity by the end of 1861 because it was apparent to Confederate
military and political leaders that the war was going to continue. The initial fervor for the
secessionists’ war had worn out, and the flood of volunteers had trickled to a halt. H.G. Richardson
of Haymarket, Virginia pleaded with President Davis to call a draft of 800,000 men because “the
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very best fighting men” were not in arms as of July 1861.305 Citizens of Bedford County, Virginia
complained that Governor Letcher was inefficient in commanding the states’ war effort. They
presented Davis a list of men who refused to serve until the government pressed them into service;
in short, they were “able-bodied loafers.” The petitioners added that the county had enough slaves
to “take care of the cropping interest.”306
By early 1862, as one observer noted on January 5th, the general public believed and
expected that a draft was to come soon.307 Davis and Secretary of War George Randolph drafted
the model legislation that the rebel Confederate Congress passed on April 11th, 1862. The
Conscription Act ordered that men from the ages of 18 to 35 were liable to be drafted into state
regiments. Conscripts were to fill up the original one-year regiments first, and then the states could
organize new units. Confederate Congress enacted a series of laws five days after the first passage
of the Conscription Act on April 11th, 1862, designed to standardize details and exemptions from
military service based on occupation (a “detail” was a temporary leave to go home for harvest or
work). Protecting industries vital to supplying the war effort was a sound military decision. Once
passed, Congress exempted from military service public servants, judges, elected politicians,
government office workers, postmen, ferrymen, boat pilots, telegraph operators, iron miners, forge
and foundry workers, newspaper printers, academics, senior medical professionals, “practical
druggists,” and wool factory bosses and laborers. There were some gaps that Confederate
governors feared the exemptions did not cover. To cover this gap, the president and state governors
could exempt men if the men or a representative petitioned on their behalf. Governor John Pettus
of Mississippi relayed that “persons engaged in tanneries, foundries, gun shops, cloth factories, &
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R.R employees, [they] are volunteering to escape conscription.” Richmond should exempt these
men. Pettus explicitly stated that he wanted to grant exemptions to overseers and those vital to
public service; they were “essential to the safety and interest of the state.”308
Soldiers and civilians debated the act’s constitutionality throughout the war. Though some
recognized the necessity of filling the ranks, opponents of the bill claimed that it violated states’
rights as enshrined in the Constitution. They claimed the law was an act of tyranny. In response,
Davis and the Rebel attorney general argued that, with the lack of recruits coming from the states,
Congress was forced to pass the Conscription Act. Congress, the attorney general opined, had the
constitutional right to raise troops through the draft and supervise it.309 Davis specifically argued
that the Constitution charged the national government to “raise and support armies” and “provide
for the common defence.” The conscription law derived from Congress’ power, the president
reasoned, to make laws “necessary and proper into the execution the foregoing powers.” The
president concluded that the Confederacy’s very existence depended on Congress building the
army through conscription.310
While the national government may have taken the lead in enrolling men into the armies,
Richmond still relied heavily on the states for conscription. Some states were at odds with
Richmond over conscription, especially about how many men they were to provide to armies
operating out of state. The state governments had different standards for conscription, and defied
Confederate attempts to recruit and organize enlistees systematically. Governors and legislatures
often rejected Richmond’s directives because they believed that these interfered with the defense
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of their states and their ability to protect slaveholders’ rights. The states’ reluctance to conscript
and send soldiers had a severe knock-on effect on the South’s ability to fill the ranks. During the
1862 Union invasion of northern Mississippi, Davis received a letter from William Preston
Johnston, who visited troops in the theatre. He informed Davis that conscription was in total
disarray due to the invasion. The state wanted to use its citizens to defend its territory. When
conscription officers attempted to enroll Mississippians at this time, the law had “…engendered a
spirit of bitter discontent, which in many instances was fanned by designing men.”311 Control over
who recruited, organized, and ordered state troops mattered a great deal to state governments,
because it represented their power to defend the state borders and protect the rights of the state and
its citizens. P.O Herbert, a Rebel general stationed in Texas, wrote to Governor F.E. Lubbock that
the Conscription Act took the best military-aged men (18 to 35), leaving those older and younger
behind. Herbert wanted to form ranger units composed of men older than 35 to serve in the state
exclusively.312
In the Border States and contested western territories, conscription sometimes failed to
bring men into rebel ranks, even angering the local populace. Support for the pro-slavery Rebel
government was decidedly mixed in these regions. Confederate Colonel J.M. Chivington wrote to
his superior officer that the appointed rebel governor of Arizona, Colonel Baylor, published the
Conscription Act immediately upon taking office. The results were poor; many men ran away, and
some of the men pressed into service were not expected to be loyal or useful to the Confederacy.313
Rebel General Kirby Smith wrote to Davis during the summer of 1862 that he believed that the
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Conscription Act would be a great success in the Border States; it could add as many as 10,000
men to the armies. If there were Union supporters who refused to serve in the Confederate armed
forces, they would leave and be “…a happy riddance…”314
Nowhere was this more apparent than in Eastern Tennessee and Kentucky. In the fall of
1862, , the new Department of East Tennessee commander, General Samuel Jones, requested that
the Secretary of War Randolph recommend to the President that he suspend the act within the
boundaries of his command. Jones stated that the South had received all the men it probably could
from the region through volunteering alone, and conscription was causing “dissatisfaction.” Jones
elaborated:
There are, as you know, comparatively few slaves in East Tennessee. Agricultural
and mechanical labor is performed chiefly by whites. Many men have deserted their
homes and gone to the mountains; some simply to avoid conscription, others
because of obstinate and bitter hostility to the Government. I must think that men
who are so averse to entering the military service as to flee from their homes and
conceal themselves in the mountains to avoid it would be far more serviceable to
the Government in the corn and wheat fields and iron mines than in the ranks315
Richmond was not persuaded; written in the letter’s endorsement to Davis, Secretary of War
Randolph doubted that suspension of the act would assuage unrest and attract more men into the
service. Randolph claimed that “The issue must be made with these people whether they will
submit to the laws or not, and I cannot see what we shall gain by further postponement.” In the
secretary’s view, any tampering with the act would affect both voluntary and involuntary military
recruitment.316
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Confederate Congress responded to these problems by granting the Office of the President
the power to suspended or modify the application of the Conscription Act when and where he
deemed appropriate, as he did on occasion in Tennessee. Davis and the War Department operated
in a hamstrung administrative environment; they were confused about the nuances of executing
the law and addressing state governments’ anxieties.
General Braxton Bragg questioned the law’s effectiveness and how, where, and why
Richmond chose to enforce conscription. Bragg wanted clarity—was the government going to
enforce the law or not? More pressingly, the General grumbled that conscription had not brought
men into ranks, even as his forces “melted away” during his 1862 campaign in Kentucky. He
requested that Richmond take a more active role in enforcing the Conscription Act and ensure that
the men raised into regiments from this region be sent far away from home to discourage them
from deserting. Secretary of War Seddon and the assistant adjutant-general agreed and promised
to send a young and energetic officer to execute the act, though not much came of conscripting
troops in the region.317
Though constitutional and administrative issues were important to the Confederate public,
the war’s impact on families, property, slaveholding, and the economy dominated their concerns.
The Conscription Act spawned thousands of petitions because conscription placed an incredible
strain both on the institution of slavery, potentially drawing away overseers and owners, and on
communities, as they lost members who performed essential roles. Slavery, the very institution
they sought to protect, impeded Southern society’s economic and political stability. Nonslaveholders resented the privileged place that slavery and slaveholders occupied when the
Confederate government carved out protections. Almira P. Alcors of Thornburg, Virginia, when
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pleading for her husband’s discharge and return from the army, rhetorically asked, “…why o why
if widow ladies overseers are released who have servants working for them, why not release a poor
man to his suffering family?”318
It fell on the secretaries of war and the president to decide if these petitions had merit. In
many instances, the war department filed the petitions—in other words, put them away without
answering them, essentially denying the petitions. Others merited a response or investigation, even
if denied. When the petition mentioned that the soldier or officer was a slaveholder or slave
overseer, the Secretary usually responded, even if they rejected the request for their return. During
the year 1862 alone, Davis and the secretary of war personally received more than 400 requests
for exemption from military service, and many of them were from slaveholders.319
One method that slaveholders had to avoid conscription, beyond exemptions, was to
purchase a substitute—pay a stand-in—to fight in their stead. Most Confederates did not perceive
exemptions or buying substitutes to be a problem at first; there seemed to be more than enough
men to enlist, after deducting those in the exempt categories. War Department clerk Jones was
suspicious, however, thinking any reduction was “A great mistake.”320 As George McClellan’s
army marched up the Peninsula and fought the Confederate Army around Richmond, the clerk
worried that “A great many skulkers from the army are seen daily in the streets, and it is said there
are 3000 men here subject to conscript duty, who have not been enrolled. The business of
purchasing substitutes is prevailing alarmingly.”321

318

National Archives, Letters Received, RG 109, M-437, roll 29, 168-9. Letter from
Almira P. Acors to Secretary of War, March 23, 1862.
319
More, Conscription and the Confederacy, 53.
320
Jones, Diary, vol. 1, 174-5. Entry October 22nd, 1862.
321
Ibid., vol. 1, 144. Entry July 17, 1862.

149

Jones was not alone in attacking substitution. Alexander Fitzpatrick, an attorney from
Nelson County, Virginia, questioned the wisdom of allowing substitution in a November 1862
letter. The North, he pointed out, was soon to enact the Emancipation Proclamation; the South he
needed all available men to counter the threat. Buying substitutes, according to Fitzpatrick,
demoralized the army and angered the poor, making the conflict “a rich man’s war and a poor
man’s fight.” 322
Congress expanded the list of occupations exempted from military service in September
and October of 1862 for two reasons. The first was that Congress extended the draft age
requirements. There were more older men liable to be drafted after October, and many of these
men might have been needed to run important parts of the war effort. The second was that Lincoln
released the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. Fearing a general slave revolt, the Rebel
Congress passed the Second Conscription Act, which later became known as the Twenty Negro
Law. It stated that men not already in military service, who owned or oversaw 20 slaves, and who
lived in states that had not already required their presence on plantations, were exempt from further
military drafts. The real effects in terms of the number of men exempted were small; according to
Colin Woodward, who studied slaveholders and the place of slavery in the Confederate armies,
stated that of the 38,000 overseers who lived in the South, only 821 earned exemptions.323
The justifications for the Twenty Negro Law seemed to roll in daily as the Secretary of
War and the President read the pleas of slaveholders for aid. Mary Jane B. Lipscomb, of Forkland,
Green County, Alabama, wrote to Davis and the secretary of war on November 15, 1862, asking
that her husband, Joel, end his service, come home, and manage their forty slaves. She described
322
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the plantation’s situation; the slaves were running “…at large, with the usual confusion and
destruction in such cases, and your Excellency must be aware of the fact, that through the agency
of the Conscription Act, the male population of the country has been taken away, hence the utter
impossibility of procuring an overseer or superintendent at all reliable.”324 She reiterated that
without supervision, a slave plantation was “…like a ship without sail or rudder, that a general
wreck and destruction must ensue without relief.” Ultimately, Davis advised Seddon not to grant
the exemption because the law did not allow discharges to those serving in the army.325 In another
letter, a planter named Newton Perkins of Burke County, Georgia, asked for an exemption because
his wife had been committed to an insane asylum, leaving him in charge of his children. Burke
County had many slaves and a few white families; he wanted to remain to protect his family and
his property. Davis ordered that an enrolling officer investigate his claims and see if he was
eligible; the officer did not exempt Perkins.326
Anger about the law flooded in just as quickly. Charles W. Martin of Pontotoc, Mississippi
believed that the law might have inspired soldiers to desert and stated that there was no need to
have exemptions for overseers and owners in the first place. Old and disabled men, he suggested,
could serve in plantation management roles.327 M.M. Hunnicutt of Rabun County, Georgia
described that the area had “…generally what is called a poor class of people we have no slaves to
labor.” Many of their men were already in the army, and their county was under threat from the
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Union army. They needed exemptions for farmers. Confederate leaders understood this. The draft
perhaps disproportionately taxed these regions. North Carolina Governor Zebulon Vance passed
along to Davis a memorial from state legislators who represented the mountainous eastern districts
of the state. Vance wished that the region could be exempted from conscription because they had
few slaves and were “robbed of their laborers.” The draft, if it continued, would drive families into
destitution and force men to desert. For his part, Davis agreed; in the endorsement, he suggested
that the men enroll but serve as a reserve force, not to leave the affected districts unless called into
active duty.328
Davis offered his full-throated support for the Second Conscription Act. Davis countered
critiques of the law in an 1862 Christmastime speech in Jackson, Mississippi to the state’s
legislature:
I am told that this act has excited some discontent and that it has provoked censure,
far more severe, I believe than it deserves. It has been said that it exempts the rich
from military service, and forces the poor to fight the battles of the country…But
is it true that in this war the men of property have shrunk from the ordeal of the
battlefield? Look through the army; cast your eyes upon the maimed heroes of the
war whom you meet in the streets and in the hospitals…I am sure you will find
among them more than a fair proportion drawn from the ranks of property. The
object of that portion of the act which exempts those having charge of twenty or
more negroes does not draw any distinction of classes, but to simply provide a
force, in the nature of a police force, sufficient to keep our negroes in control. This
was the sole object of the clause. Had it been otherwise, it would never have
received my signature.329
The president did not believe that the government sharpened class distinctions or provided
preferential treatment to planters and masters through the exemptions laws. Davis took the
idealistic stance that all members of southern society were sacrificing equally. He seemed not to
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understand why non-slaveholders were upset. Davis came from the ranks of wealthy Mississippi
planters and perhaps believed that planters like himself sacrificed a great deal and served selflessly.
However, petitioners and critics never claimed that slaveholders in the army did not contribute or
risk their lives. Instead, critics were angered that the state and the Confederate government
institutionalized protections for those with wealth and power in southern society.
While slaveholders received protections, non-slaveholders in the Confederacy were
expected to bear the burdens of maintaining the slave-based economy. While exemptions for
slaveholders and overseers may not have had a drastic numerical impact on Rebel units, exemption
requests from non-slaveholders may have had a more significant effect as the war continued.
Among the tens of thousands of letters written to the Confederate secretary of war, hundreds of
them were petitions from towns and communities across the South asking that a member of the
Rebel army be temporarily released from service to perform their job. Often the petitions noted
that these men served vital roles in their communities and were necessary for their wellbeing.
Communities asked for the return of their butchers, bakers, lawyers, mechanics, artificers, and
blacksmiths. Many towns and counties were economically underdeveloped, in that they did not
have a large class of technically skilled and educated people. When conscription became a reality,
many localities were unable to absorb the absence of key members of their society because they
only had one doctor or one lawyer or one blacksmith. The solutions to this problem – the Twenty
Negro Law, the hiring of substitutes, and other measures – created new problems. Exemptions,
details, and substitutes, in general, exposed and deepened social class tensions rooted in the
South’s slave society.
These petitions, among many, indicate how conscription impacted a slave-based economy.
There were a limited number of skilled workers, and while slaves could fill some of their roles,
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southern communities still relied heavily on these men to do their jobs. Conscription deprived
communities of a limited pool of specialized labor. There were fewer such skilled workers than
there were in the North because slaveholders dominated the economy and had access to enslaved
labor. As Gavin Wight concludes, owning slaves allowed planters to rule over a “bifurcated society
in which economic elites did not identify with or internalize the well-being of the majority of the
population.”330 Skilled and educated laborers, however, were not the only category of workers that
communities requested to be returned to them through exemptions or details. Unskilled free
agricultural workers and farm owners were also in demand, especially in regions where there were
not many slaves.
The cumulative effect of requests and details of exemptions for slaveholders and nonslaveholders was to create a vision of the war in which southerners every Southerner had to look
out for their own interests first. The slaveholders protected their property rights, while some nonslaveholders did not want to fight for slaveholders’ interests at the expense of their own.
Exemptions for farmers certainly complicated defensive efforts as Union armies marched further
into the interior. The citizens of Butler County, Alabama petitioned the war department to
discharge from service James Wallace, whom they reported had a large family and was the only
sley (sleigh) maker “for miles around.”331 Residents of Cleveland County, North Carolina
complained, “there are no slaves in our part of the country…” and they asked that two men from
the country return home. Otherwise, their children faced starvation, and the county faced ruin.332
Petitioners of Milford, South Carolina (Greensville District, Sumter County) asked that the War
330
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Department excuse a cooper, George Bruce, so that he could continue to ply his trade. He was the
only cooper and craftsman of wooden vessels. The region, the citizens reported, depended on his
work for the cultivation and storage of sugar cane products.333
While exemptions, the practice of buying substitutes, and details bled unit rosters,
conscription’s relationship with the institution of slavery encouraged the mobilization of irregular
units called partisan ranger units. These units further hampered conscription. They were created
by state governments to secure their territory and police their slaves, though service in these units
meant that men were unavailable to serve in the regular Confederate armies. The counties and
localities that asked the Confederate secretary of war for permission to form partisan and ranger
companies were often ones with large slave populations, or ones next to counties that had high
percentages of slaves as a portion of the overall population. Sometimes, petitioners explicitly
mentioned the number or proportion of slaves in their region. The units defended an area from
both the depredations of the Federal Army and the ever-present threat of servile insurrection.
Petitions for such units began as early as mid-April of 1861. William Miles Hazzard of
Glynn County, Georgia requested that the government provide horses and arms for an independent
cavalry force of 75 men. In his letter, Hazzard breathlessly observed that the county’s seaboard
was populated by at least “…three thousand Negros unprotected…” and in one place, there were
“…over six hundred Negroes and but eight white men capable of bearing arms…” Glynn County’s
enslaved population made up 73% of the total population.334 The real and present danger, Hazzard
quickly pointed out, was that the county was on the coast and had “…numerous inlets where light
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draught vessels can enter…” Northerners, he informed the Secretary, according to his northern
friends’ reporting, were fitting out privateer vessels to carry away their slaves or perhaps instigate
“depredations.” The cavalry force he planned to muster was designed explicitly to respond to the
threat of raids quickly and cover as much of the “unprotected” Glynn County’s population of slaves
as possible.335
The men of Botetourt County, Virginia, in April of 1861 wrote to the Secretary of War
asking permission to muster and provide material support for an independent company of 100 men
in the mold of “Marion’s Corps.”336 Unlike Glynn County, Botetourt County is in the Blue Ridge
Mountains, and its population was 24.7% enslaved, far below the significant majority of slaves
making up Glynn’s population. Botetourt County was not on the frontlines of the early stage of
the war; the county was landlocked and far from the concentrations of Union troops in Ohio and
Washington D.C. There was no immediate danger of Union troops stealing away slaves. While
this is a low percentage comparatively, Botetourt County was bordered by two counties to the
south and southwest that had nearly double the percentage of the population in slavery. Whites in
Bedford County held 41.4% of the county’s population in bondage, and in Amherst County, 46.7%
of the total population was enslaved.337
Partisan and “ranger” units were different from conventional units. They could be
independent of regular military command and oversight. They obeyed the directives of regional
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commanders—when it suited them. These units did not have to use standardized weapons,
munitions, or uniforms; in some cases, they were without uniforms. A lack of standardization made
it difficult for these units to integrate their operations with larger Confederate military forces when
they attempted to do so. They were inherently local institutions; they were founded for the express
purpose of defending their localities. In other words, if a Southern man wanted to serve and to
know that he was defending his home, a partisan company was his best option. Unlike conventional
infantry, cavalry, or artillery companies, partisan companies usually remained in one locality.
Their munitions, supplies, horses, and rations would stay local as well. Moreover, partisan-ranger
units typically served “lighter” duties. They were not expected to dig defensive positions, clear
roads, or establish encampments; these were backbreaking chores that few soldiers looked forward
to doing.
For their part, the secretaries and President Davis initially disliked partisan and ranger
units. They disliked that these units were independent of Confederate military command and that,
though small, they drew manpower away from the main armies.338 Moreover, the secretaries and
the president worried for most of the war that these units veered onto legally murky ground. 19th
century military thinkers usually considered non-uniformed paramilitaries to be a type of “illegal
combatant.” Over time, however, the Confederate high command became more accepting and
tolerant of partisan and ranger units, desperate to fill the ranks of its forces any way possible.
Indeed, there were practical incentives for allowing these groups to form. For one, forming such
units would circumvent bureaucracy and provide men almost immediately for military service. For
another, partisan-ranger commanders could recruit men not already liable for the draft. When the
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states or the Confederate government struggled to raise regular combat regiments, they turned
towards ranger units—with their more lenient requirements—to fill the manpower gaps.
Confederate Congress passed the Partisan Ranger Act on April 21st, 1862. It granted the
President the power to determine who could form independent units, how units were armed, and
how they fit in the military hierarchy. They were expected to adhere to the rebel Articles of War
and respect military authority of departmental commanders. Initial results seemed to be positive;
there were thousands more men in arms and they were protecting areas the field armies were unable
to cover. The problems lay in accurately counting the number of men and units active in the
Confederacy, the impossibility of regulating partisans, and the ability of men in partisan ranger
units to skirt Conscription Act requirements.339
When trying to regroup the Rebel Department of the West after the disastrous summer
campaigns of 1863, Joseph Johnston tried to leverage the governors into forcing partisan-ranger
units into regular Confederate army service. When he first contacted Mississippi governor Charles
Clark on this issue, the governor rejected the general’s plan because the men rode on impressed
horses for state service rather than national service. To place them into nationally controlled units,
the state legislature had to discern the legal status of the impressed property. Clark also wanted to
organize the men into new regiments instead of placing them in existing ones. President Davis had
to step in and resolve the issue; Mississippi would transfer the men to Confederate service, and the
national government would reimburse the state for the impressed horses. The fact that Mississippi
had impressed the horses only for in-state use underscores the fact that the rangers were envisioned
as a local defense force.340 Despite such efforts to “mainstream” these partisans, the flow of
manpower went in both directions. An internal Confederate War Department communication
339
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indicated that partisan ranger units were encouraging men of conscription age to desert infantry
regiments. They suggested that the “liberal manner” in which these units organized tended to invite
deserters into their ranks and allow those men to avoid punishment, regular military service, or
being forced to leave their home counties.341
Before these issues with partisan ranger units came to a head, however, the larger problems
with conscription—exemptions, substitution, and details—were sparking some attempts to solve
them. During January of 1863, the influential Military Committee drafted a bill to repeal the
exemption law, eliminating broad classes of exemptions but leaving the president and secretary of
war the right to grant exemptions on a case-by-case basis. The committee tried, but failed, to
include a provision in the bill that would end state-granted exemptions. This bill also raised the
maximum legal age for conscription from 35 to 45. These efforts confirmed the irascible clerk
Jones in his suspicions that conscription was “not adding many to the army,” even while the
assistant secretary of war granted “a fearful number of exemptions.” 342 These reform efforts
ultimately fizzled, and gave birth to a pernicious rumor. W.D. Pender, a brigade commander in
Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, complained that his men heard that a judge had ruled the
Conscription Act unconstitutional. He wrote, “…our men think that he held that the conscript law
was unconstitutional, and hence they draw the conclusion that enrolled conscripts will not only be
justified in resisting the law but that those who have been held in service by the law will not be
arrested when they desert…I have heard from a reliable gentleman that the conscripts and deserters
go unmolested in Yadkin County, North Carolina”343
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When slaveholders received exemptions, non-slaveholders tried to appeal to the War
Department’s and Davis’ sense of justice for similar exemptions. As a group, the letters
demonstrated how non-slaveholders communicated their displeasure and anger with slaveholders
who protected their interests instead of sacrificing for the war. Inhabitants of Augusta County,
Virginia transmitted a petition from their own county, as well as neighboring Albemarle and
Nelson Counties. The residents of the three counties asked for the release from military service of
a cabinet maker named William B. Alexander. Though he was not needed because of his ability to
make cabinets, he was also an undertaker, and many communities in the region no longer had
access to his services in handling the dead.344
Southern citizens and politicians begged that the president and Congress end substitutions
and the practice of sending military officers to carry out conscription. Governor John Shorter of
Alabama explained to the commanding general of the Department of the West, Joseph E. Johnson,
why the state could not send recruits during the summer 1863 campaign season. Shorter informed
the general that the militia of Alabama only recruited men from 28 to 45; these classes were taken
up in the most recent version of the draft law. The problem was made worse, the governor
explained, by the fact that the national draft absorbed the officers as well as enlisted men, making
it impossible for him to raise troops when Union forces threatened the state. The only men left to
recruit were those who had previously hired substitutes or were otherwise exempted from service.
As Union forces threatened the state, Shorter stated that he had called the legislature to reconvene
in order to eliminate these exemptions.345 However, the exemptions’ repeal would not necessarily
force those men into service right away. Governor Shorter enclosed a letter from a Congressional
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representative, Robert H. Smith. Smith asked Davis for the end of substitution, and that he stop
abusive conscription officers.346
The Rebels’ desperation forced Congress and Davis to take radical measures to man the
armies, including dismantling the various “fetters” on conscription. Richmond, during late 1863
and early 1864, acted swiftly to fix conscription at the expense of slavery’s stability. In a December
7th, 1863 message to Congress, Davis supported the repeal of the substitute provision. Confederate
Congress acted shortly after that. After the repeal of the substitute law, commanders hoped more
troops would fill the ranks; Lee believed that ending the law could bring in as many as 1,400 men
from two counties in Virginia alone.347 Davis and several of various secretaries of war tried to
ferret out inconsistencies in granting exemptions and conscription. Congress then further closed
the substitute loophole during January 1864, when the body required those who had previously
hired substitutes to report voluntarily or face the draft. As Lazarus H. Davis noted to Davis, those
who bought substitutes used other avenues to stay out of service, usually by claiming exemptions
as well. Instead of pursuing these people, Lazarus Davis suggested impressing and conscripting
slaves and overseers into military service.348 On February 17, 1864, Congress, after Lee cajoled
the body, repealed the Partisan Ranger Act because it drew men away from the major armies, led
to unrestrained warfare and reprisals in the Border States, and created units that regional
commanders could not control.349
Even as Congress and Davis clamped down to make conscription efficient and effective,
slaveholders still demanded special protections. Archibald W. Berrey requested an exemption
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because his hired substitute deserted; he needed to remain at home because there were no overseers
for the 1,200 slaves on his and a nearby plantation. Twenty-seven of his neighbors endorsed his
letter.350 An irate planter, Stephen Pettus, asked that Davis and the War Department investigate a
military officer who imprisoned him, even though Pettus claimed he filed the paperwork for a legal
substitute.351
State governments also proved to be hostile to Richmond’s attempts to fix conscription.
Governor Pendleton Murrah of Texas admonished General John B. Magruder during April of 1864
about his resistance to the states taking the lead to organize conscripts. He accused Magruder of
causing confusion and dissension by strictly enforcing the 1864 revision of the Conscription Act.
The Texas governor counseled that “Co-operation with me under the State laws would have placed
at your disposal by this time at least 3,000 or 4,000 men; the State laws would have been respected;
her authority respected; more strength secured; the conscript act, or the execution of it, merely
suspended for a time until the Legislature could meet and adjust and conform its military
regulations to those of Congress.”352 The governor relented and stated that he would support
Magruder in conforming state laws to the national law. The incident is nonetheless instructive.
Texas demanded time to follow Richmond’s directives fully, but this delay was not merely
organizational or out of constitutional respect for Confederate “federalism.” Control was vital for
Murrah, as it was for other governors coordinating with the military and Richmond. A lack of
control meant there was no assurance that they could protect states’ and citizens’ rights. Though
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the national government was able to encourage or to force the states into compliance, they still had
to negotiate with the states from time to time. For example, several months later, in October of
1864, Governor Murrah learned that Richmond agreed with Texas’ practice of setting aside men
to protect the frontiers, even though this made them unavailable to draft.353
Governor Joseph Brown of Georgia was alarmed that, when northern General William T.
Sherman invaded, Confederate enrolling officers refused to draft farmers and agricultural laborers.
He made no distinction as to whether wealthy or poor farmers were avoiding service, and it seems
both slaveholders and non-slaveholders did not join companies raised to defend the state.354
Seddon defended his decisions, claiming that “…he has striven to make the conscription officers
do their duty and was not aware that so many farmers had gotten exemptions. He promises to do
all in his power to obtain recruits and will so use the strictly local troops as to render the Reserves
more active.”355
John Echols, commander of Confederate Department of Western Virginia and East
Tennessee, complained that conscription officials and enrolling officers were not doing their jobs.
They did not arrest deserters and were not tracking down those who were avoiding the draft. He
promised to be more diligent, but the report’s tone implied that it would be a monumental task to
accomplish. Why? East Tennessee and western Virginia were regions of the South that were hostile
to the Confederate cause, and many locals were resentful of the slaveholders and planters that
controlled state-level politics. When the war began and conscription was signed into law, the
people of these regions had resisted. This hostility, as the war continued, spread to areas of the
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South that were not directly threatened by the Union army or navy, including southwest Virginia,
as Echols’ letter indicated.356
When Confederate armies became more desperate for men as 1864 ended, commanders
identified how conscription had failed to fill the ranks. Lee was critical of how the states ferreted
away men to ensure that they remained in the state or state service. The general wrote to the
superintendent of the Bureau of Conscription that “Very few conscripts are being received in this
army at present. I fear that the privilege of volunteer is being abused.” He relayed accounts that
claimed that South Carolina men volunteered into companies and regiments that would stay in the
state. In the case of North Carolina, men volunteered to serve in heavy artillery batteries, which
were useless to armies serving on the front, and in independent cavalry units on the state’s coast.
Lee offered to send his officers to “collect” these men because the armies desperately needed men
to replenish units for the next campaign.357
By the end of the war, protecting slavery had contributed significantly to the failures of
conscription, through exemptions, details, and the permitting of local units. The stresses of war
revealed the costs of fostering a slave economy over a diversified economy. It was a political
economy that favored masters and planters and neglected educated and skilled professionals. And,
in turn, it was the Confederate politicians’ instinct to protect their investments in slaves that sapped
the effectiveness of the Conscription Act.
As Confederate forces suffered reverses during 1865, the long-serving assistant secretary
of war, J.A. Campbell, wrote to his new superior, former General John Breckinridge, about the
War Department’s status. Campbell was brutally honest about the Confederacy’s dire military and
political condition. One major area the assistant secretary explored was “…the revolutionary
356
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measure of conscription…” He was not exaggerating; conscription had been revolutionary, and
hundreds of thousands of southern men served in the Confederate armies during those four years.
In explaining how conscription changed the war, Campbell built a case proving why there
were so few men in arms (comparatively) at the beginning of 1865. August 1862, July 1863, and
February 1864 saw successive expansions in who was eligible to be drafted; the enlistment age,
which had been 18 to 35 at the beginning of the War, had broadened to 17 to 55 by late 1864. The
Conscription Act became stricter over time, ending the practice of details, prohibiting the hiring
of substitutes, and closing some exemption categories. Despite these changes, pressures external
to the draft—taxation, wartime casualties, and currency devaluation—strained the Confederacy’s
ability to draw in men. Campbell ended his letter on a sour but honest note: “There is anarchy in
the opinions of men here, and few are willing to give counsel.”358
Slavery’s impact on conscription was conspicuously absent. While Campbell may have
papered over how maintaining the Peculiar Institution hamstrung one of the most crucial tools the
Confederacy had to fight and win, the interplay between slavery and conscription did not go
unnoticed by clearsighted Rebels. As the proprietor of the Asa Snyder Stove Works relayed to
Davis and Secretary of War Breckenridge, while exempting foreign and disabled mechanics was
sound, “The southern-born mechanic is hostile to slave labor, because he regards it…as in
competition with his interests and also as degrading…These men will labor for the Confederacy,
but they will not fight for it.”359 One letter from a Virginian civilian demonstrated how a slave
society struggled under the demands of war, including conscription. H.L. Giltner from Lee County,
Virginia wrote to General John Echols, commander of the district of southwest Virginia. Giltner
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advised Echols that while the people were patriotic and still willing to sacrifice their “sons” and
“substance” to the cause, they were destitute. Strict enforcement of conscription would be
catastrophic. There were only a few “mechanics and artisans” and even fewer slaves. As Giltner
noted, “This being so, it will almost be indispensable to the public economy of this country to
make a detail of a few of the most useful tanners, shoemakers, blacksmiths, millers, &c. If such
details are not admissible by the War Department, I would think it advisable to give these people
advantage of the exemption to this extent...”360
As Jones recorded in his diary that, “The law allowing exemptions to owners of a certain
number of slaves is creating an antislavery party. The non-slaveholders will not long fight for the
benefit of such a “privileged class.”361 Conscription in the South reached its success and met its
failures for many reasons: institutional organization, wartime realities, regional differences, and
personal leadership. Protecting the interests of slaveholders, however, also played a significant
role in determining the viability of conscription in some states across the South. Requests for
exemptions, details, and partisan-ranger units were, in some ways, grounded in the difficulties of
fighting a war as a slave society. Masters felt the need to ensure that their property, slaves, were
well managed and did not run away. Fears about servile insurrection further contributed to their
interest in maintaining their presence at home. Non-slaveholders responded to the pressures of
conscription in ways that demonstrated the potentially critical weakness of fighting a war as a slave
society. Like masters, they too worried about slave revolts while they served on the front. Yet
when they or their communities asked for details and exemptions, their concerns were different.
Some petitions for detail and exemption noted that the soldier in question was the only skilled or
educated worker from the locality, and they were needed at home to resume their occupation. The
360
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petitions indicated that the dynamics of the southern economy, so heavily oriented to a slave-cotton
economy, precluded having a surplus of skilled or educated professionals. When they left, there
was no one else to fill the void. Others, who were not skilled or educated, also requested to return,
though in their case, they made explicit mention that their region had few or no slaves and their
farms needed workers. Though conscription was a military and political necessity, it exposed deep
socio-economic fault lines in the South. For most of the war, many slaveholders and Rebel
politicians worked to shield slaveholders and their rights from the privations and demands of war.
Prioritizing slaveholders’ rights ended when they were running low on men and resources,
increasingly pressured by Union invasions during 1864. Nonetheless, their interests in slavery
helped to subvert the conscription system to the point that it was rendered ineffective and beyond
the power of the Confederate Congress or the Rebel War Department to fix.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE MIRAGE OF CONFEDERATE “MILITARY EMANCIPATION”
Warren Akin was homesick and stressed while he served as a Rebel congressman in the
House of Representatives representing northern Georgia during the Second Confederate Congress.
Akin, a lawyer and slaveholder from Cassville, Georgia, previously served as a Georgia state
legislator during the 1850s, and then speaker of the house in his native state from 1861 to 1863.
By autumn of 1863, the impending Union invasion of northwest Georgia forced Akin and his
family to flee with their slaves to Elberton, Georgia, where they settled for the rest of the war, far
away from marauding Yankees.362
When he wasn’t tending to his duties in Congress, struggling to find affordable food in
war-torn Richmond, or darning his socks, Akin wrote letters to friends and especially his wife,
Mary Akin. His correspondence provides insight into the contentious issues that beset the faltering
rebellion, especially the “hot-button” issue of potentially arming free blacks and slaves. As a
slaveholder, Akin tried mightily to hold onto his slaves, using Confederate propaganda to cow his
“property” into not running away, and moving them out of reach of the Union armies’ invading
columns.363 The prospect of a slave-soldier bill soon confronted him and other politicians in
Richmond. Davis, during a message to Congress in November of 1864, broached the possibility
of arming slaves. By February 10th, 1865, Davis administration congressional ally Ethelbert
Bell Irvin Wiley, “The Letters of Warren Akin, Confederate Congressman, Part 1,”
The Georgia Historical Quarterly, vol. 42, no. 1 (March 1958): 73, 75-8. Based on congressional
records, Akin did not stay in Richmond for the entirety of the Second Congress. He went home
during the summer of 1864 to move his family and slaves to Elberton and be present for his
daughter’s birth. He returned to Richmond well after the Second Congress’ second session began
on November 28th, 1864, and served in the body until February 27th, 1865, when he left for
home. He did not return to the doomed Rebel capitol. Bell Irvin Wiley, who collected, edited,
and commented on his letters, supposes that Akin knew “the Confederacy’s collapse was
imminent and his further participation in Congressional proceedings was futile.”
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Barksdale introduced the Rebel president’s desired plan to enlist slaves. The President wanted to
the power to ask slaveholders to volunteer slaves for military service. Akin was a staunch ally of
the President (a “pro-Administration man”) and agreed with Davis’ request for slave soldiers,
though with one caveat; he wanted the states to be in charge of enrolling black troops, not
Richmond.
Writing to a close friend while he was visiting Georgia, Akin mulled over the possibility
of slaves and African Americans fighting for the Confederacy. The congressman weighed the
options; the topic provoked a set of questions he mused:
Can we prevent subjugation, confiscation, degradation, and slavery without it? If
not, will our condition or that of the Negro, be any worse by calling them into
service? On the other hand: Can we feed our soldiers and their families if the Negro
men are taken from plantations? Will our soldiers submit to having our Negroes
along side them in the ditches or in line of battle? When the Negro returns…can we
live in safety with them afterwards?... To call forth Negroes into the army, with the
promise of freedom, will it not be giving up the great question involved by doing
the very thing Lincoln is now doing?364

Barksdale, Akin, and other Davis supporters made critical compromises to satisfy those in the
House of Representatives who worried about the subversion of the slave system. On February 20th,
Akin and 39 other representatives voted in favor of and passed the slave soldier bill.
In the decades following the war, supporters of the Lost Cause mythology claimed
thousands of slaves loyally fought alongside their masters during the war.365 The truth is that free
African Americans and slaves, by law and by the preferences of white southerners, were not
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allowed to bear arms, let alone serve in combat roles—with exceedingly rare or historically
dubious exceptions.366 Not until 1864 did Confederate leaders consider arming and recruiting
blacks as soldiers, and it was not until February of 1865 that it became legal to do so. Slavery, and
the white supremacist beliefs that upheld the masters’ “right” to own people, impaired the
Confederate military’s and political leaderships’ ability to accept African Americans in any
combat role in either the Union army or their own.
Consequently, the Rebels closed themselves off from strategic avenues that could have
prolonged the war. Their differential treatment of black and white Union prisoners of war disrupted
prisoner exchanges Black Union troops captured by the South were subjected to worse conditions,
enslavement, and execution. Confederate armies struggled to replace lost soldiers, even as the U.S.
Army grew larger, while the Confederacy left the male African American population untouched
by conscription. Rebel leaders and citizens miscalculated the pivotal role that African Americans,
both free and unfree, played in helping the Union achieve victory.
The institution of slavery and the beliefs underlying it came first in the eyes of many
Confederate military and political leaders, even when those priorities were at odds with the real
military needs of the South. When encountering black military personnel, the Confederacy enacted
an enslavement policy. The policy was a series of national and state laws and executive
proclamations, which governed how Confederate forces were supposed to act when they captured
black Union military personnel. The rules instructed Confederate military personnel to treat black
Union POWs differently than white soldiers. The policy broadly demanded that Confederate forces
treat captured black troops as runaway slaves or as slaves in the midst of a servile insurrection.
Black POWs were then liable to be enslaved, re-enslaved, or executed. In response to this policy,
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the Union ended prisoner exchange cartels, preventing southern units from receiving returned
POWs; the Confederacy’s policy backfired.
It was against this backdrop—their vicious POW policy—that enlisting slaves as soldiers
became law in 1865. The cause of enlisting African American troops in the Confederate armies in
exchange for their potential freedom was, likewise, a failure because the South maintained the
aforementioned enslavement policy through the entirety of the war. Desperation overrode their
concern for the institution, but the ultimate passage of a slave soldier law did not mean it portended
a social or political revolution that would change the way southerners thought about the purpose
of the war or the nature of slavery. The Rebels’ leadership half-heartedly offered freedom to a
portion of slaves under southern masters’ control, and never intended the eventual slave soldier
bill to lead to the general abolition of slavery. When passed, the Slave-Soldier Law failed because
it was too late in the war to muster, arm, train, and send to the front the tens of thousands of black
troops they hoped could turn the tide of the war.367 Confederate military emancipation
demonstrated how deeply the principle of slaveholding was woven into the very fabric of the
Confederate war effort. Granting any portion of the enslaved population rights and privileges of
citizenship in return for military service undercut one of the central tenets of the C.S.A.—
specifically, the right to maintain a racial and class hierarchy through slavery. Public resistance
and the horrors of the POW policy showed military emancipation to be a mirage created by
desperate people.
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Prior to this failed effort, the Rebels did find “suitable” roles within the system of slavery
for blacks to be part of the war effort. From the war’s earliest days, some masters brought their
slaves with them on the march to act as servants, cooks, teamsters, and laborers. Also, the
Confederate government and military systematically impressed thousands of slaves to work on
military projects, with the state governments’ approval. Rebel politicians and military commanders
generally understood the importance of African American labor in supporting the South
logistically. Impressment, carefully managed and scheduled, maximized the potential pool of
available white men to serve in combat roles, and ensured agricultural workers need not worry
about planting and harvesting.368
Prior to 1865, only whites were allowed to serve in the southern armies as soldiers, but this
shrunk the Confederacy’s pool of available men, which was already dwarfed by the Union’s
manpower.369 To keep their armies’ ranks filled after exhausting the initial pool of 18 to 35-yearold men, the CSA relied on a prisoner exchange cartel to returned captured Confederates to the
southern units. The system worked smoothly until 1863. Though both belligerents created the
cartel to ensure each side treated prisoners humanely, the Rebels benefited more from receiving
their men back, because there were fewer Confederate troops in the field.
368
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Hints that the North was going in a very different direction regarding African Americans
came early. The first was Benjamin Butler’s contraband principle, which Congress later approved
through the First and Second Confiscation Acts. These acts ensured runaway slaves would not be
returned to their masters, and could work for the Union army as paid laborers. The North began
organizing and arming ex-slaves in late 1862. During the summer of 1862, Union General David
Hunter recruited “contraband” (runaway slaves) into a military unit named the Corps d’Afrique
without congressional approval or orders from the War Department. Hunter was not the only Union
general to recruit former slaves; General Rufus Saxton raised infantry units of runaway slaves
along the South Carolina coast. The Republican-controlled Congress and the Lincoln
Administration passed and signed the Militia Act and the Naval Service Act during 1862, which
formally allowed African Americans, free and former slaves, to serve in the federal army and navy.
The Emancipation Proclamation, issued January of 1863, cemented this policy of raising African
American military units to fight.370 The Union’s efforts forced the C.S.A. to reconsider the role
African Americans had in the war.
Even as the Rebels saw evidence of black men joining federal ranks, some didn’t believe
that their slaves would run away and join the Union forces or become capable soldiers. As
Confederate war department clerk J.B. Jones elaborated in his journal on December 25th, 1862, “It
is said the Federal Congress is about to provide for the organization of 100 regiments of Negroes.
This does not occasion anxiety here. The slaves, once armed, would cut their way back to their
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masters.”371 Nonetheless, the realization that the Union was arming and organizing former slaves
(and free blacks) into combat regiments enraged Confederates.
The Richmond War Department’s first reaction to Union organization of escaped slaves
was harsh. When the War Department received word that Union General David Hunter organized
regiments made up of runaway slaves, the office ordered Confederate forces that captured officers
and enlisted men of black regiments to treat them as illegal combatants not entitled to the
protections accorded to soldiers and prisoners of war.372 Confederate congressmen, on four
occasions, called for similar status for captured enlisted and commissioned men serving in the
United States Colored Troop (USCT) regiments.373 During the October 1862 session of the
Confederate Congress, the legislative body passed a law requiring the Secretary of War to establish
depots for slaves captured from Union forces. Recaptured slaves were to be held in the depots until
their masters arrived to collect them, and then Confederate authorities were to return the slaves to
masters presenting proof of ownership.
There was some confusion, because Davis did not believe that this act of Congress applied
to combatants, and he ignored it. Instead, using his powers as president, and in coordination with
the Rebel states, he approved executing captured Union black troops. One of his Generals stationed
in South Carolina, Hugh W. Mercer, reported his forces captured four African Americans wearing
Union uniforms and carrying weapons. Mercer suggested, “Some swift and terrible punishment
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should be inflicted that their fellows be deterred from following their example.”374 Secretary of
War Seddon and the President agreed with Mercer’s request for permission to execute the POWs.
Together, they stated, “slaves in flagrant rebellion” were subject to execution according to the laws
of the slave states. Crucially, the Secretary argued the Confederacy would never recognize black
Union military personnel as legitimate combatants because of the threat of general servile
insurrection. The president and secretary cautioned Mercer’s superior, Beauregard, however, that
the district commander alone could execute captured black troops, to guard against abuses of the
system.375 Two reasons explained the Richmond government’s initial decision to execute captured
black troops and their officers. First, they believed that armed blacks, even those in Union service,
represented a real threat of servile insurrection. While Jones and others claimed the South did not
fear slave revolts during the war, their preoccupation with rumors about how their supposedly
loyal and happy slaves would turn against them was painfully evident.376 The congressional joint
resolution that guided Confederate policy on the treatment of African American soldiers explicitly
identified the prevention of slave rebellions as the reason black POWs were given harsh
punishments instead of typical combatant protections.377
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Second, some in the Confederacy doubted the North’s commitment to arming former
slaves. They questioned whether former slaves could be capable soldiers, and they thought the
experiment would fail and end. War Department Clerk Jones recounted that, after Lincoln formally
issued the Emancipation Proclamation, “Our military men apprehend no serious consequences
from the army of negroes in process of organization by the Abolitionists at Washington. Gen.
Rains says the Negro cannot fight, and will always run away.”378 Punishing black troops and their
officers as criminals made sense as a way of hastening the end of this experiment. It would
discourage further organization of United States Colored Troops regiments. In a December 1862
proclamation, Davis solidified this cautious position, and ordered any “negro slave” captured
bearing arms must be “…delivered to the executive authorities [governors] of the respective States
to which they belong to be dealt with according to the laws of said State.”379
There was a problem, nonetheless; if they were a free black born in the North, which state
would then be responsible for “dealing” with them? Congress attempted to solve this issue. Both
houses passed an 1863 resolution that specified all African Americans, whether they were slaves
or free blacks, whom the Rebels captured bearing arms were to be sent to the state authorities in
the state they were caught and dealt with according to the laws of that state.380 Ultimately,
Confederate national and state officials decided to send captured soldiers who were once slaves
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back to their masters. In the cases when they seized free blacks from the North, the Confederate
authorities imprisoned them and forced them into hard labor.381
However, even after Richmond backtracked on its POW execution policy, Confederate
soldiers continued the practice, without orders from civilian or military authorities. Further
exacerbating the Confederacy’s troubles was the tendency of Rebel forces to offer “no quarter” to
black troops; that is, to execute them on the battlefield. “No quarter” was never an official policy
of the Richmond government. Davis had initially agreed that captured black soldiers should be
executed—in 1863, only with the approval of district commanders, and in 1864, only after a
military trial. He disavowed summary executions, in part, because the Union eventually brought
tens of thousands of black troops to the front. He understood that such behavior could lead to
official and unofficial retaliation on Confederate military personnel.
Nonetheless, the president’s orders seemed to mean little to Confederate armies in the field,
and to Union forces and politicians alike. There were numerous cases in which southern troops in
the heat of battle killed African American soldiers who tried to surrender. The Fort Pillow massacre
was the most infamous example, followed by the Battle of the Crater. At Fort Pillow, Confederate
General Nathaniel Bedford Forrest and his command killed a Union garrison of three hundred
black troops who offered their surrender. At the Battle of the Crater, which was part of the siege
of Petersburg, Confederate soldiers killed black troops who were captured in the Union assault on
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the trenches.382 Northern newspapers, and later historians and scholars, reported dozens of
incidents in which Rebel troops murdered Union soldiers belong to USCT regiments.383
Confederates did not kill all captured black troops; if they were former slaves, they could
be sent back to their masters or used as military laborers. The fear of reprisals perhaps constrained
the Confederates from pursuing a “de facto no quarter policy.” Despite widespread disregard for
prisoner-of-war protections for black troops, the Richmond administration and some Confederate
army commanders sought to prosecute or punish officers whose men were responsible for
murdering captured African American soldiers. Take, for example, the Saltville massacre; though
the original reports indicated Confederate troops killed over 100 African Americans, more accurate
reports noted that the murdered numbered 12 to 15. Despite these small numbers, Secretary of War
Breckinridge and General Lee took an interest in trying and punishing those officers commanding
the soldiers responsible for the massacre.384
Examining how Rebels treated black Union soldiers alongside the Confederacy’s
subsequent debates about creating their own black troops reveals how incompatible their dual war
aims were. Slaveholders and the South’s political elite promised that the Rebels could win the war
while maintaining the institution of slavery. The Union strategy of arming African Americans was
but one development that challenged that promise. The Union’s strategy of attacking both the
Confederate Army and slavery made it impossible for the South to succeed in both of its goals.
Confederates had to make a hard choice: either they protected slavery, shrinking their already thin
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margin for error; or dismantle parts of “the Peculiar Institution” in order to win. In terms of
handling the influx of black Union troops, the enslavement policy indicated a firm commitment to
securing slavery. Confederate leaders in Richmond and in the states would repeat this choice when
they debated arming slaves for the struggling Rebel armies.
The Emancipation Proclamation intensified this practice, hardening southern attitudes that
African American soldiers were armed “slaves.” This led to federal policy changes that were
potentially catastrophic for the Confederacy. The Lincoln government demanded the Confederate
military treat black and white Union POWs equally, and demonstrated a commitment to military
emancipation that was unlikely to end quickly. In the summer of 1863, having seen no significant
change in southern behavior, the Lincoln administration ordered the end of the exchange cartel;
they reiterated their demand that the Confederates restore combatant protections to African
American soldiers. They were not to be executed or mistreated; all Federal soldiers, regardless of
race, were to be given the same legal protections afford legitimate combatants.385 In the case of
the four African American Union soldiers captured by Mercer’s men, whose fate was still
undecided Union exchange cartel agents notified their counterparts that black troops must be
exchanged as other soldiers were, and if they were killed, the Union would retaliate in kind. At
first, the threat fell on deaf ears. Governor Bonham of South Carolina insisted the army execute
the POWs, but Richmond was cautious. Davis and the War Department had every reason to be
concerned because they received word, according to Jones, “Lincoln has marked for close
confinement and hostages three of our men for three free Negroes taken on Morris Island.” On
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August 27th, Davis backtracked, and declared that the three black Union soldiers and their officers
would not “suffer death;” instead, they would be held indefinitely without trial.386
Compromise became necessary for the C.S.A. for reasons that went beyond the fate of
three “hostages.” The Rebels needed the prisoner exchanges to continue, though the South’s
commanders reached a compromise position slowly. Confederate observers were very much aware
of what exchanges meant to the army’s manpower.387 Davis initially displayed significant hostility
to any attempt to negotiate on or adjust the enslavement policy. When Lincoln discovered that the
Confederate government allowed black Union troops to be re-enslaved or executed, he sent an
intermediary, Alexander M. Ross, to secretly negotiate with Richmond. Lincoln instructed Ross
to request the South treat “colored soldiers…as prisoners of war subject to exchange.” Confederate
Secretary of State Benjamin and Davis rejected the proposal and, according to Ross, Davis
instructed him to tell Lincoln, “…we will not accord the right of exchange to our fugitive slaves
whom he has armed and sent out to assassinate us. We will treat every colored soldier we capture
as a fugitive slave. It is useless to discuss the matter.”388
General Butler, who had become the Rebels’ arch-nemesis, ordered captured Confederates
to hard labor after learning captured black troops were enslaved. Butler, who had innovated the
“contraband” policy in 1861, and who rose to the position of federal commissioner for prisoner
exchanges, denied that the Confederates had a right to enslave or execute black Union troops.
Butler argued that once in the Union army, slaves were forever free. To re-enslave them was to
contravene the laws of nations and the laws of war. He rhetorically asked if the Confederates
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intended to reduce freedmen to a state of slavery. The southerners retorted they had the right to
restore the captured property to original owners because black Union troops were fugitive
property. The relationship between slave and master could not be changed, and it was incumbent
on the Confederate national government to protect the master-slave relationship and protect the
states’ right to protect the institution of slavery.389
While negotiating, Confederate representatives continued to maintain the enslavement
policy, though it was contrary to military necessity. Part of the Rebels’ troubles was the
complicated system of laws regarding the treatment of black Union troops; the tangled
arrangements were difficult to parse through, and the national government still wanted to respect
state laws on the issue. Trying to balance the demands of state governments, which saw themselves
as guarantors of slaveholders’ rights, and military demands proved fruitless. In at least one case,
Secretary of War Seddon may have lied. Responding to South Carolina Governor Bonham's
concerns about captured black troops, Seddon stated in an August 31st, 1864 letter “…free Negroes
were not as of yet formally recognized in any official dealings with the enemy as prisoners of
war.”390 A month and a half later, however, Seddon told General Lee “…colored soldiers of the
United States when captured have not, by the direction of the Department, been treated otherwise
than prisoners of war, unless identified or claimed to be recaptured, slaves.”391 If this was not a lie,
it perhaps points to the confusion, lack of coherence, and serious consequences Rebel high
command faced on the issue. Confusion gave way to frustration by late 1864; Seddon complained
in the 1864 semi-annual report to the president that the North insisted on man-for-man exchanges,
hinting that the Union commissioners wanted to trade blacks and whites, officers and enlisted,
389
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equally. Seddon believed the North was trying to slow down exchanges to prevent men from
returning to the South’s armies.392
The Secretary, believing he was out of options, suggested Lee negotiate with Grant to
restart the exchanges. Lee and Grant traded retaliatory threats, but no promise of exchanges. Each
side stated they would press into hard service or kill prisoners if the other side mistreated their
POWs.393 Despite outward hostility, Lee had been negotiating and trying to solve the
Confederacy’s problem since the summer. He wrote to Grant that the South was willing to
exchange black troops, so long as they were not former slaves.394 The proposal was nonetheless
insufficient because they did not stop sending Union soldiers who had been slaves back to their
former masters.
Davis tried to make the South’s position clear about the lack of prisoner exchanges, and
who was to blame, during a September 23rd, 1864 speech at Macon, Georgia. The Confederate
president claimed the North held southern soldiers as “Yankee capital.” He assured his audience
that if the North exchanged or released all of the POWs, the South would have enough men to
“crush” Sherman’s army, which was at that time menacing Georgia. Davis claimed that he had
made every possible concession. But Butler, “the Beast,” insisted that the South exchange captured
black soldiers, which Davis said might not be possible. Nonetheless, he claimed he would try his
best to meet the Union on its terms.395 In the absence of regular exchanges, civilians and soldiers
attempted to ask for special treatment; Davis and his generals ignored or rejected them on the basis
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that such exceptions were “injurious.” If exchanges were to be made, they had to be for specific
officers, and had to be hammered out at the general-to-general level.396
The exchanges began again after the Hampton Roads conference. The 1865 conference
was a series of peace talks between Union representatives Lincoln and Secretary of State William
Seward and Confederate representatives, Vice President Alexander Stephens, Senator Robert T.M.
Hunter, and Assistant Secretary of War J.A. Campbell. Though no peace plan resulted from the
negotiations, Lincoln and the Rebels worked out a deal to restart prisoner swaps as an act of
humanitarianism. The problem for the Confederacy, however, was that the soldiers, once released,
returned to their homes instead of to their units.397
By 1864, the most practical Confederate military officers and civilians realized that the
South would have to directly sacrifice the stability of slavery in order to win. Many southern
civilians, politicians, and military men remarked that the Confederacy’s enslaved African
American population was an untapped military resource, though there was much dispute as to how
the Rebel forces and government should use them. A small and quiet minority of southern citizens
advocated recruiting blacks, including slaves, into the armies. One government bureaucrat from
Marion, North Carolina, begged the government to arm free blacks to defend the state. He claimed
his sons could call upon fifty free blacks if needed, and wondered if there was a law or authority
that could collect these African Americans and force them to fight. If it was against the
constitution, he urged Davis and the secretary of war to lead a change in the constitution to make
it legal.398
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The calls for black Confederate troops grew louder later in the war. Scholars have typically
identified 1864 as a turning point for Jefferson Davis and the Confederate congress as they began
negotiating to use slaves as soldiers. In 1972, Robert Durden published The Gray and the Black:
The Confederate Debate on Emancipation. Through carefully presenting and commenting on the
documents, Durden demonstrates that some southerners considered emancipation as a wartime
necessity, though one that was fiercely disputed. He argues that, in the end, the Confederacy was
unwilling to hurt the institution, even if it meant defeat. His narrowly focused book neglects to
connect the dispute over slave-soldiers to the broader themes of a challenged southern society and
Rebel nationalism.
Clarence Mohr’s On the Threshold of Freedom: Masters and Slaves in Civil War Georgia
studies how the war challenged whites’ assumptions about slavery and the places of slaves in their
war effort. Mohr argues that, in attempting to reform slavery and use slaves to win the war, whites
began to debate the “moral value” of the institution. Arming the slaves was an outgrowth of a new
southern interest in “voluntary emancipation.” His instinct to study how slavery and the question
of arming slaves reflected social discord is insightful. He also does well in showing how the war’s
progress made slavery more difficult to defend and maintain. Mohr’s bold claim makes too much
of a small group of southern whites—clergymen—who questioned slavery. Moreover, the nature
of his state-focused study deemphasizes the national perspective.
During the 1990s, Ervin L. Jordan’s Black Confederates and Afro-Yankees in Civil War
Virginia boldly argues that a significant portion of southern blacks supported the Rebel cause. An
important part of Jordan’s argument is the 1865 decision to arm slaves. This, according to Jordan,
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allowed “indigenous allies” (African Americans) to take up arms for the cause. Despite this
misleading claim, most of the monograph is devoted to studying the daily life of free and enslaved
blacks during the war. Here Jordan claims that southern blacks cheerfully contributed to the
Confederate war effort. Ultimately, Jordan exaggerates the slaves’ willingness to serve the cause.
Only a few hundred slaves were hastily organized into Rebel combat units. These companies never
saw battle, and they were forced to serve the South. Despite a flawed argument and conclusion,
Jordan is correct that “African Americans shaped the birth and fleeting existence of the Southern
Confederacy.”
Bruce Levine’s Confederate Emancipation: Southern Plans to Free and Arm Slaves
During the Civil War is the most comprehensive study of rebel attempts to use slaves as soldiers.
Levine argues that Davis considered arming slaves because he wanted to “reform” the slave-master
system; specifically, the president wanted to use slaves as soldiers while preserving some of the
power and status of slaveholders. Confederate Emancipation further contends that planters and
rebel leaders never wanted to offer emancipation, and wanted to maintain slavery.
Philip D. Dillard’s Jefferson Davis's Final Campaign: Confederate Nationalism and the
Fight to Arm the Slaves (2017) surveys this debate among the political elite and common people
through newspapers in Virginia, Georgia, and Texas. Dillard argues that areas which were invaded
by Federal forces were more willing to allow arming black men than areas that had not yet been
part of the war. He contends that common people were more willing than local planter elites to
accept black troops. Once it was legal, Virginians and Georgians moved to incorporate African
Americans into the army as soldiers, though some complained that the bill did not guarantee future
emancipation. He is careful to note, however, that this did not represent an interest in racial equality
but rather a logical appraisal of wartime necessities. Nonetheless, the demand for emancipation,
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Dillard argues, reflected an emboldened and newfound nationalism which deemphasized
slaveholding as central to Confederate identity.
Reflecting a continued interest in dispelling the myth of black Confederate troops, Kevin
Levine’s Searching for Black Confederates: The Civil War’s Most Persistent Myth asserts that
pension records, Confederate social and cultural attitudes, and policies prove there were no black
Confederate troops. This book represents a refutation of those who claim blacks did fight alongside
their masters for the Confederacy.399
However, 1863, when Rebel forces started to encounter African American enemy
combatants, should be considered the starting point of the discussion about whether or not blacks
should participate as soldiers in the war. The South was at a disadvantage; the North had decided,
in 1862, that African Americans should fully participate in the war. This caused tens of thousands
of slaves to leave their masters and throw their support to the North. African American men and
women aided Union armies as cooks, teamsters, laborers and, most crucially, soldiers. As the
Federal columns marched farther into the Confederacy, the Union army continued to grow,
bolstered by the support of free and enslaved African Americans. Many in the Confederacy were
aghast at the notion that slaves would fight for the northern cause. Increasingly prominent voices
in the Confederacy started to advocate for slave-soldiers to serve in their armies.
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Confederate General Patrick Cleburne, an Irish immigrant and famous division commander
in the Confederate Army of Tennessee, argued in a document to Confederate Congress it was in
the South’s best interests to use slaves to fight for the rebellion. Cleburne’s grandest and most
important claim was eye-opening. He stated the South should grant “…freedom within a
reasonable time to every slave in the South who shall remain true to the Confederacy in this war.”
He then enumerated the benefits of emancipation. It would boost the Confederacy’s manpower
reserves. It would also undercut the Union’s ability to recruit slaves themselves and demonstrate
to the world the Confederacy was willing to accept emancipation as a condition for international
recognition and intervention. No longer could the federal forces claim they alone could offer
freedom to slaves and that they alone were “fighting for liberty.” The general claimed true southern
patriots would willingly give up slavery as a price for independence.
Some historians view Cleburne’s one that could have succeeded in using slaves as soldiers.
However, though he was a highly regarded division commander, only about half of his subordinate
officers supported his memorial (a 19th century term for a petition.) Those who opposed the letter
declared Cleburne to be an abolitionist and a traitor.400 His peers in the army did not support it,
and some likewise doubted his support for the cause.401 As an Irish immigrant, he was already an
outsider in the realm of southern military and political power.
President Davis learned of the letter through Cleburne’s abject opponent, William H.T.
Walker. Walker wrote to Davis on January 12th, 1864, decrying the plan, which had been presented
ten days earlier on the 2nd. He argued that the proposed emancipation of slaves for wartime service
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“…would ruin the efficacy of our Army and involve our cause in ruin and disgrace.”402 At this
stage, Davis believed that broaching the topic of even limited “military emancipation” would be
ruinous. The President ordered the plan to be shelved, as both Cleburne’s party and his opponents
tried to advance their positions in the press and Congress. Replying to Walker, Davis stated his
reasons for suppressing it, “Deeming it to be injurious to the public service that such a subject
should be moved, or even known to be entertained by persons possessed of the confidence and
respect of the people, I have concluded that the best policy…will be to avoid all publicity…If it
be kept out of the public journals, its ill effect will be much lessened.”403 Cleburne complied and
destroyed most of the copies of the memorial.404
The military and political context is important in understanding Davis’ decision; the early
winter of 1863-1864 was an uncertain time for both belligerents in the war. The previous year had
seen a see-saw conflict, with the Confederacy winning engagements in the beginning, only for the
fighting season to culminate with significant but not decisive Union victories. From the Union’s
perspective, 1864 was a crucial year to turn the war’s tide in the Union’s favor and secure Lincoln’s
reelection and, by extension, continue the military emancipation project. Lincoln, with Congress’
approval, retooled the command structure, placing Grant in charge of all Federal forces. With a
new commander came a new mandate: all Northern armies were to move in concert to put
maximum pressure on the Rebel forces, not allowing them to support or reinforce each other. Grant
planned that each of the armies under his command would seek out and defeat Confederate forces
when the fighting season began. Lincoln needed Grant and his subordinates to be successful; the
victories won during 1863 appeared to be incomplete. Meade had not aggressively pursued Lee’s
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beaten army after Gettysburg. Sherman, who took command of western Union forces after helping
to break the siege of Chattanooga, was reorganizing them for an invasion of Georgia. Though
capturing Vicksburg and Port Hudson gave Union forces unimpeded control of the Mississippi,
Confederate armies still operated and maneuvered freely on each side of the river.
Like the Union, the Confederacy believed that 1864 would be the most critical year in the
war. They aimed to win a negotiated peace during a politically sensitive time for the Union.
Lincoln was in the midst of a potentially tricky reelection campaign. Davis and other Confederate
leaders reasoned if their armies could inflict severe casualties on Union forces and could conduct
campaigns in Northern territory, then they would sufficiently demoralize the voting public and
cause Lincoln to lose the election. With a Democratic president, Davis and others expected they
could negotiate peace to ensure the South’s independence and the institution of slavery’s survival.
According to the Confederate secretary of war’s end of year report for 1863, the
Confederate army was in solid fighting shape. Seddon claimed that the armies in the Eastern and
Tennessee theatres achieved decent successes. The loss of the Mississippi River was not a
devastating defeat because Rebel armies could still operate without long supply lines along the
river, able to strike Union forces with minimal risks. Seddon also claimed that the rank-and-file
troops were in good condition, and the officers were efficient and capable. The armies’ effective
strength was about half, and he assumed the absentees would quickly return to service.
Conscription was providing enough men to counter the Union army, but Congress should eliminate
details, exemptions, and substitutes. Logistical, organizational, and chain of command issues
plagued the army, but the Secretary recommended achievable reforms. The Union armed forces’
assault on slavery through military emancipation was one of the major concerns for Seddon, for
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which he had no solutions other than removing slaves from danger or employing them in service
roles in the armies.405
In this light, Davis and other leaders had little reason to consider using African American
slaves as soldiers; they could win without arming the slaves and potentially upsetting the planters
or soldiers. Davis and other southern leaders did support the inclusion of slaves into the support
capacities of the Rebel armies as cooks, teamsters, hospital attendants, and manual laborers. By
February of 1864, Confederate Congress approved the use of blacks in support roles to
“…encourage our gallant soldiers by adding to their number every man that a negro could
relieve.”406
Early in the 1864 campaign season, Confederate forces successfully stymied the concerted
Union military campaigns across the South. Most significantly, the defensive maneuvers of Robert
E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia against Grant and Meade’s Army of the Potomac paid political
dividends. Grant’s army took severe losses, as did Lee’s, but the potential political ramifications
were far more significant for the Union. Rebel forces defeated federal troops in the Shenandoah
Valley, trapped a Union army on the peninsula between the James and York Rivers, stalled
Sherman’s army outside of Atlanta, harassed Union supply lines in Tennessee, and pushed back
northern troops in the Trans-Mississippi theatre. The elections of 1864 were coming during the
fall, and Lincoln’s Republican party looked vulnerable; Union operations had proved mostly
unsuccessful and extraordinarily costly. The Democratic Party promised a negotiated peace as part
of its presidential platform; if the losses continued to mount and the war did not seem to be
anywhere near an end, it was the opposition party that could win the presidency and Congress.
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By early July, success seemed within reach for the South, but two problems remained. One
was manpower. Desertions, disease, battlefield losses, and an inefficient conscription system
sapped the strength of all Confederate armies. The staggering number of troops whom the southern
armies could not replace caused the idea of arming slaves to become mainstream. The other
problem lay in the pressure Union forces exerted on the institution of slavery. By the beginning of
1864, Union armies had marched deeper into Confederate territory, especially into regions were
many slaves lived and labored. Federal law mandated that Union forces free slaves and, when
appropriate, welcome them into the Union army’s ranks. Yankee soldiers and officers were not to
return runaway slaves to their masters in the rebellious states. Union commanders, with only very
few exceptions, complied with these orders.407
Apparent Confederate successes well into the late summer of 1864 tamped down serious
discussion of arming slaves, but then the Union began to win significant victories. Federal Admiral
David Farragut led a naval assault on Mobile, Alabama, and captured the city. Soon after, Sherman
defeated the Army of Tennessee and captured Atlanta. Union forces defended Washington, D.C.
from Jubal Early’s attack. Northern general Phillip Sheridan followed up Early’s defeat with a
devastating campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, clearing the region of Confederate forces and
destroying property and farms along the way. Grant and Meade, though bogged down in a siege
of Richmond and Petersburg, slowly encircled the city and trapped Lee’s army.
The reversals of the late summer and early fall of 1864 renewed calls to use slaves and free
African Americans as soldiers, though leaders probed the idea only hesitantly. In a September
1864 speech at Columbia, S.C., Davis reiterated the Confederacy’s commitment to a slaveholders’
republic. Echoing Alexander Stephens’ “Cornerstone” speech, the Rebel president framed the
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cause the South fought for as “constitutional liberty” and the state-by-state maintenance of the
slave system, which ensured liberty for all white men. The speech demonstrated no indication that
he supported dismantling the slave system in any way. Even partially emancipating the South’s
enslaved population threatened the institution. Davis, additionally, believed it was still possible to
win the war so long as southerners rejoined the ranks of their armies.408
Davis and his cabinet shifted their position on this topic by November. Secretary of War
James Seddon cautiously supported a slave-soldier bill. Seddon sent Davis his annual War
Department report on November 3rd, 1864, only a few days before the North’s presidential
elections. The Confederate war department’s annual review, despite the precarious military
situation, painted a very rosy picture of the war. The losses in the western theatre, most notably
the capture of Atlanta, were not as bad for Confederate morale, or as good for Lincoln, as Seddon,
Davis, and the North had thought, according to the document. The Union’s strategic attempt to
overwhelm and outmaneuver the Rebels had “failed” to break them.
Nonetheless, the secretary claimed in his November 3rd report there should be no shame in
using slaves as soldiers. Seddon also assumed it would be challenging to get approved, and he
deemed the benefits dubious. Congress had to pass legislation granting freedom in exchange for
military service, then receive approval from the Confederate states—a task the secretary of war
implied would be difficult. As for using slaves in combat roles, he believed African Americans
would be inferior in every way to whites. Therefore, Seddon advised, “For the present, it seems
best to leave the subordinate labors of society to the Negro, and to impose the highest, as now
existing, on the superior class.”409 Robert E. Lee recommended a similar idea: that all Confederate
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armies should recruit “…a certain percent of negroes, free and slaves, as teamsters, laborers, etc.…
as a permanently attached corps.”410
In November, on the North’s election day, Davis, in a message to Confederate congress,
suggested the possibility of the Richmond government drafting free and enslaved African
Americans into permanent combat-support roles. He recommended an attachment of 40,000
Negroes for this purpose. Davis assured the members of Congress that the army would not use
slaves as soldiers, but only as manservants and laborers. Ultimately, Davis reassured them,
“Beyond these limits and these employments, it does not seem desirable, under existing
circumstances to go [further]…When so regarded, I might dissent from those who advise a general
levy and arming of the slaves for the duty of soldiers.” He did, however, suggest a caveat; they
could resort to arming slaves if the white population was exhausted and only then.411
Davis’ suggestion appears to be an attempt on his part to introduce the topic of slave
soldiers and build support for a slave-soldier bill. Rebel War Department clerk Jones noted that
some papers rejected the plan outright on the basis that these slaves could serve in combat.
However, one influential newspaper, the Richmond Enquirer, on November 11th, 1864 advocated
the recruitment of 250,000 African Americans into the armies on a full-time basis, far over the
40,000 the President suggested.412 Davis’, Lee’s, and the Enquirer’s suggestions represented an
evolution of attitudes toward Negro impressment. Instead of regionally deployed and timerestricted slaves attached to local units, the national government would permanently attach slaves
and free blacks to the armies without time restrictions.
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Such ideas gained currency as military setbacks were compounded with political defeats.
Union successes buoyed Lincoln’s presidential campaign, and on November 8th, 1864, the
President won reelection. Davis and Confederate leaders in Richmond learned of Lincoln’s victory
on November 11th, 1864, and this forced them to weigh their options, especially given the Union
siege of the Rebel capital.413
Confederate citizens weighed in and voiced their opinion in hundreds of letters to the Rebel
secretary of war and president. Letters during the fall of 1864 and winter of 1865 voiced their
perspectives on arming blacks. A Greenville, Georgia farmer wrote to Davis, stating that he had
supported arming slaves for Confederate armies from the beginning of the war. He suggested
slaves between the ages of 16 and 65 should be conscripted into the military “upon the condition,
if necessary, of freedom after the war.” He further postulated that even an attempt to arm slaves
could have “a good effect upon the election at the North if nothing more…” indicating that once
the Union lost its monopoly on slave soldiers, Lincoln could lose political support. The alternative
was becoming clear to him: Sherman’s army was attracting thousands of slaves, and soon there
may be an army of 50,000 blacks.414 William E. Mills of Mayesville, South Carolina, another
farmer, based his support for enlisting blacks on feelings of desperation, and the cowardice of
white deserters. He reasoned to Davis, “If the Enemy can make our slaves available to them, why
cannot we who have complete control of them make them available to us?” Mills conceded the
Rebels could not afford to take many slaves off farms and plantations, but every slave who ran
away was “a tax to our country.”415
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Other letters and petitions feared how arming blacks could change the South’s social fabric.
The Citizens of Sussex County, Virginia, in a petition, pleaded that the president defeat any effort
to recruit slaves. “Any attempt of the Government to enforce a draft of negroes in this county,”
they explained, “will affect, [in] our deliberate opinion, a stampede” to Union forces in nearby
Prince George County. Such an act would ultimately be self-defeating; for every slave the
Confederates put into arms, another would run away.416 David. L. Yulee of Greenville, Florida, an
acquaintance of Davis, argued there was a great danger in even discussing the use of slaves as
soldiers because it would lead to a social revolution if they recognized slaves as anything other
than property. Yulee elaborated further, arguing, “But when arms are placed in their hands, and
they are called upon to stake their lives in protecting the Commonwealth…their relation
changes…they must claim the prerogatives of the citizen…This is a Whiteman’s government. To
associate the colors in the camp is to unsettle the castes…And if the Confederate government once
assumes jurisdiction over the slave population of the States, as persons and citizens, abolitionism
is at once embedded in our future.”417 A Grimes County, Texas farmer and merchant, George W.
Behn, voiced his concerns about a coming “Negro Soldier bill.” Farmers, he argued, would be
short on slave laborers if the government conscripted their slaves. The army should instead end
exemptions for those who owned more than 15 slaves and for those who did office work for the
state and national government. The government should then take a census of all slaves and only
take a third of those between the ages of 16 and 30 for military service.418
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As Union armies marched through and ravaged the Carolinas, a planter from Grahamville,
South Carolina, William F. Robert, wrote to the president about how Sherman’s army was
unopposed and threatened every major city in the South. Nonetheless, even as the South’s armies
“melted away,” the very notion of armed slaves disturbed him; “nothing could be more suicidal,”
he wrote, and said that he feared “uncontrollable Anarchy” to follow if the Negro soldier bill
passed.419
The desperate military situation, in part, encouraged some writers to compromise between
their belief in a “Whiteman’s government” and the need to win the war. Theodore Nunn of
Autaugaville, Alabama recommended that the South introduce blacks into its military forces in
segregated regiments. Nunn demanded all enslaved men between 18 and 45 should be impressed
without compensation, and masters be allowed to retain only one slave each. He then fused his
idea to another socially altering proposal; “…give to each soldier in the Confederacy a Negro man
to be his property…and it would interest many of our soldiers in slavery, and they too would feel
better and fight better and stop deserting…”420 A Chester County, South Carolina man, L. Cassels,
reported to Davis that women and children were overburdened to provide for themselves and
slaves. Large plantations, moreover, were in danger of holding unsupervised slaves. The better
option was to have blacks fight for the South because the Union was taking them off the
plantations.421
Southerners looked to slave-soldiers as a cure-all for many problems on the battle and home
fronts. A Geneva, Georgia physician, Charles B. Letiner, enumerated the second-order effects of
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enlisting blacks: the arrival of reinforcements would hearten soldiers, anti-Lincoln elements in the
North would be encouraged, and the greenback would depreciate. This, of course, was in addition
to having 150,000 to 200,000 more troops in the army, and he supported the idea they should earn
their freedom so long as they were “colonized” in Africa after the war.422
By December 31st, 1864, Davis’ views made a public shift. In a letter to John Forsyth Jr.,
a newspaper editor for the Mobile Register, Davis frankly stated, “It is now becoming daily more
evident to all reflecting persons that we are reduced to choosing whether the negroes shall fight
for or against us and that all arguments as to the positive advantages or disadvantages of employing
them are beside the question, which is simply one of relative advantage between having their
fighting element in our ranks or those of our enemy.”423
Davis public advocacy of soldier slaves—supported by Lee—now had to run a gauntlet of
angry politicians, skeptical generals, and slaveholders worried about compensation. Secretary of
War Seddon reported to Davis that General Cobb declared, “I think that the proposition to make
soldiers of our slaves-the most pernicious idea that has ever been suggested since the war
began…You cannot make good soldiers of slaves- nor slaves of soldiers. The moment you resort
to negro soldiers- your white soldiers will be lost to you…If slaves will make good soldiers- our
whole theory of slavery is wrong.”424 Such resistance stalled Davis’ and Lee’s efforts. Jones noted
in mid-December of 1864,

422

Papers of Jefferson Davis, vol. 11, 266. Letter from Charles B. Letiner, December
31 , 1864. Letiner also asserted that, with black troops, they could win independence in 12
months. If they had been in the army from the beginning of the war, they would have already
defeated the western Union armies. There is no indication that he understood the logistics of
drilling, arming, and feeding an additional 200,000 troops, let alone that he could guarantee
victory.
423
The Papers of Jefferson Davis, vol. 11, 412-13. Letter to John Forsyth, Jr. Davis
hoped that Forsyth would use the newspaper to spread and support the government’s message.
424
OR, series 4, vol. 3, 1009-10.
st

197

…the rich men are generally indignant at the President and Gov. Smith for
proposing to bring a portion of the negroes into the army. They have not yet
awakened to a consciousness that there is danger of losing all, and of their being
made to fight against us. They do not even remove them beyond the reach of the
enemy, and hundreds are daily lost, but still, they slumber on. They abuse the
government for its impressments, and yet repose in fancied security, holding the
President responsible for the defense of the country, without sufficient men and
adequate means.425
When Davis broached the issue again in January of 1865, it caused widespread fear, despite the
support of one of the most popular men in the South, Lee.426 To mollify the critics, Davis adopted
a halfway position between those who wanted the slaves the fight and those who did not. Davis
again recommended a bill that employed 40,000 blacks, for this time describing their role as a
more amorphous “army purposes;” it only passed one House of Congress, even though the
president agreed to sign the bill with the promise the drafted blacks would not fight.427
This was but the latest demonstration of the South’s profoundly ineffective and halfhearted commitment to military emancipation. Most schemes started from the position that if
slaves were to be soldiers in the Confederacy’s armies, they would be freed only after they fought
for the South and served their full time of enlistment. Rebel black troops would be slave-soldiers,
straddling several legal statuses; combatants, people, and property. There was no guarantee that
slaves who fought for the masters’ cause would win their freedom. As Jones jotted down in his
journal, Governor Smith, who advocated for black troops, recommended it “…even if it results in
their emancipation.”428 It seems Smith thought it was possible to arm slaves and have them fight
without the guarantee of freedom.
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Delusional hopes encouraged some Rebels to look at slave-soldiers as an instrument of
revenge and reckoning for the North, conveniently glossing over their own long history of
enslaving African Americans. Jacob Mohler of Balcony Falls, Virginia, a farmer, begged the
president to consider using black troops as an instrument of vengeance; he believed several
hundred thousand blacks would fight for the South, and pillage and burn northern towns and cities
in retaliation for Union armies destroying property in the Shenandoah Valley.429
Finally, on February 8th, 1865, Senator Brown of Mississippi introduced a resolution to
enlist 200,000 blacks and then give them their freedom after their military service.430 Two days
later, the debates in Richmond began in earnest, and suggestions became more concrete. When
discussing the slave-soldier bill, Rebel leaders consistently preferred to talk among themselves in
closed session. They knew it was a divisive issue and did not want to anger the public during a
war. Members of Davis’ cabinet and Lee supported the resolution but, adding to the confusion,
opined that only the states had the right to hire slaves as soldiers. Confederate Congress delayed
and procrastinated, focusing on issues the members of Congress could agree on; impressment rules
and compensation for slaveholders who lost slaves. They bogged down on whether slave-soldiers
should be freed before or after military service or even gain freedom at all.431
After a few days, those who supported Brown’s resolution came to a consensus that the
slaves who did “volunteer” would be emancipated. But the opposition soon crystallized. Senator
David Hunter of Virginia was the first to argue forcefully against the resolution.432 Senators
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Wigfall of Texas, Graham of North Carolina, Orr of South Carolina, and Miles of South Carolina
joined Senator Hunter.433
Almost a week later, February 18, 1865, both Houses of Congress deliberated “the Negro
bill”; according to Jones, all signs pointed to the bill’s passage. However, the failure to secure a
negotiated peace at the Hampton Roads Conference, which ended on February 3 rd, 1865, was a
significant turning. When communicating to Congress that the peace talks failed, Davis stated that
the Union terms were unacceptable because they would have freed the slaves and allowed the
Federal Congress to “legislate” race relations. With this failure, it became abundantly clear to the
southerners that the Union would continue to fight to end slavery. Also, as Davis repeatedly stated,
southerners should have used some slaves as soldiers rather than the North impose drastic social
and political change through force of arms and black troops.434 Jones made an extraordinary, and
delusional, statement in his diary,
A letter from Gen. Lee to Gen. Wise is published, thanking the latter’s brigade for
resolutions recently adopted, declaring that they would consent to gradual
emancipation for the sake of independence and peace. This is a strong indication
(confirmatory) that Gen. Lee is an emancipationist. From all the signs, slavery is
doomed! But if 200,000 negro recruits can be made to fight and can be enlisted,
Gen. Lee may maintain the war very easily and successfully; and the powers at
Washington may soon become disposed to abate the hard terms of peace now
exacted.435
Those who discussed the Negro soldier bill, for the most part, agreed that freeing slaves
after their military service did not mean the Confederacy was going to enact a general abolition of
slavery. For one, only a portion of able-bodied male slaves of military age would be considered
for service. The percentages discussed ranged from 10% to 33%. Other slaves, including women,
children, and men not in service, would retain their status as property of slaveholders.
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Additionally, most plans included the role of slaveholders in recruiting black troops. All
proposals assumed masters had the right to withhold slaves who “wanted” to fight for their
freedom. Some recommendations granted higher authority to masters; slaveholders could outright
deny any of their slaves to enlist as soldiers. Other suggestions indicated masters would only lose
up to a certain number or percentage of the slaves. Many pitches included compensation for
slaveholders losing their property. A fundamental part of all the “emancipation” versions of the
bill was that Congress and the states could cap the number of slaves taken for soldiering.
All the proposals contained two assumptions. First, these plans guessed there would be
enough slaves available to serve in combat units who were not already acting as laborers,
teamsters, or servants. This appeared to be a small issue, as those men might be the first to transfer
to combat roles because they were already in the army. However, plantations and farms still needed
those slaves; they had been impressed in the first place because it would free up white men to join
battle-worn regiments. Moreover, slave masters had specifically allowed their slaves to be
impressed on the understanding that their “property” was secure and was going to be returned to
them. Allowing their impressed property to fight was another matter. Given that slave masters
complained about and hampered the impressment of any property or slaves, this was unlikely.
The second assumption behind the “military emancipation” idea was that African
Americans would willingly fight for the Rebels. Some slaves might, but it is hard to imagine why
many would. As the black troop bill was debated in Confederate Congress, Jones recorded,
“Governor Clarke (Mississippi) telegraphs the President that nothing keeps the negroes from going
to the enemy, but the fear of being put in the Federal army; and that if it be attempted to put them
in ours, all will run away, etc.”436 Other Rebels doubted African Americans would fight at all on
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their behalf without getting paid to do so. Robert S. Hudson, a circuit court judge from Edinburg,
Mississippi in a “strictly, private, and confidential” letter to President Davis, laid out in stark terms
the conflicted thoughts southerners had about solving their desperate situation. In general, Hudson
painted a picture of a splintered southern society, distrustful of authority, and struggling under
heavy tax burdens. The proposal to emancipate slaves after military service, “…finds great and
general opposition- If a soldiers life is the price of their liberty, they [the slaves] do not want
freedom- but if put into service and permitted to have all the fruits of their captures in kind and
money, then they might face fire and remain true- Most of them have concluded the Yankees are
their worst foes and they prefer to keep out of the service on either side.” 437 In reality, there was
no competition between the Union’s military emancipation and the potential Confederate designs
because the Union would free them before military service, instead of after or not at all.
The debates in the Confederate Congress abruptly ended because of deep division in the
Senate. On February 22nd, the Senate postponed all discussion on the bill. Two days later, the
Senate voted it down. Senator Hunter’s predictable choice was the swing vote that defeated the
measure. Jones mused, “He has many negroes, and will probably lose them, but the loss of
popularity, and fear of forfeiting all chance of the succession, may have operated on him as a
politician.”438
The Negro soldier bill’s opponents in Congress and the general public had alternatives in
mind. One such plan sought to entice foreign-born POWs to join the Confederate army
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voluntarily.439 Another was voiced by John H. Wilkins, a farmer, who demanded the government
put “Cowards and Speculators” into service. He believed the legislation was an excuse for cowards
not to fight.440 More typical proposals, in letters sent to the Confederate president, suggested
inducements to deserters and immigrants—usually in the form of slaves and land—to serve in the
southern armies. By offering them slaves and land, the letter writers hoped, Rebel and federal
deserters and European immigrants would flock to the southern cause. An additional benefit was
that this type of proposal strengthened the Peculiar Institution by increasing the number of
slaveholders which, some of the writers noted, had dwindled during the previous decades. Thus
the war, instead of leading to the emancipation of slaves and the upheaval of the social order,
would reinvest southerners in slavery. The slaves that the Rebels offered as bounties would come
from a “tax-in-kind” law. The C.S.A. already had “tax-in-kind” acts on farmers’ produce to feed
the armies.
The slaves-as-bounty proposals also reflected the underlying assumption that many
southerners held for most of the war: that Northerners were unwilling to fight to free slaves. this
assumption was correct, then, Southerners reasoned, it would be easy to sway Union men to stop
fighting through armed resistance or by offering slaves. Thomas M. Muldrow, a farmer from
Bishopville, South Carolina, suggested such a plan; he wanted to provide 50 acres and four slaves
to Union deserters to fill Confederate ranks. His proposal, apparently supported by local
slaveholders, would transfer a fourth of the total enslaved population of the southern states to the
soldiers, which would bring 180,000 men into the armies. It would also guarantee the “future
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security [of slavery] by greatly increasing the number of slaveholders…”441 J.W. Ellis of Raleigh,
North Carolina, suggested a plan similar to Muldrow’s, but he wanted the Confederate government
to offer all men (including southerners, deserters, and Europeans) who were not slaveholders
before the war a bounty in the form of slaves. It would also expand the slaveholding class: “Thus
you spread the institution, you make every family in the government interested in it, you do away
with the doctrine that this is a rich man’s war and the poor man’s fight.” Ellis suggested that
captured black Union troops could be used as additional bounties to tempt federal deserters to join
the Rebels.442 There were, of course, nearly insurmountable obstacles to giving slaves as an
inducement to serve. Slaveholders would mightily resist parting with their slaves in the form of a
tax; the Confederate government had already experienced masters’ resistance on the issue of
impressment. Taking their slaves, no doubt, would cause even more significant disruptions and
upheaval.
Davis and Lee now had to refocus, and looked to flip Hunter’s vote. Jones, for his part,
privately mocked Hunter, observing that the slaveholders he sought to please turned on him; some
masters thought Virginia was going to become a “free” state anyway. Recognizing that Hunter had
lost his support at home, Lee, Davis, and Wise asked the Virginia State Assembly to instruct
Hunter to vote for “the Negro Bill” or resign. The assembly did so on February 27th, and on March
9th, the reluctant Hunter voted in favor of the bill under instruction.443 The House version of the
bill required the states to determine a slave-soldiers’ status, while the Senate version of the law
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required that owners free their slaves at the end of their service. Ultimately, both houses passed
the House version, which required the states to decide on a slave-soldiers’ status.444
On March 10th, 1865, Davis signed into law the mundanely titled “An Act to increase the
military force of the Confederate States.” The new law, which opened the ranks of the Confederate
army to recruiting slaves as soldiers, was muddled by compromises. As a result, the act was neither
capable of raising the hundreds of thousands of men needed to win the war, nor was it the harbinger
of a social and political revolution some southerners believed it could be. 445 The Act was only a
hypothetical threat to “the Peculiar Institution.” Though southerners feared the bill’s passage, the
law itself bent over backward to protect slaveholders’ rights.
There were four layers of protection for slaveholders’ property rights included in the law.
The first was how the law framed the process of recruiting slaves. The law’s first section stated
that the president could “ask for and accept from owners of slaves, the services of such number of
able-bodied negro men as he may deem expedient, for and during the war, to perform military
service in whatever capacity he may direct.” According to the law, as written, Davis could not
compel owners to give up their slaves. The recruitment process had to be voluntary on the masters’
part.
The second layer of protection, paradoxically, did not on the surface help slaveholders at
all. It offered a recourse to the president in the event that slaveholders didn’t hand slaves over to
the army—but this clause cut itself off at the knees with concessions to state governments and
masters. The clause stated that, if the Rebel army did not receive enough recruits to make each
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states’ part of the 300,000-man quota, then the President could raise troops “… from such classes
of the population, irrespective of color, in each State, as the proper authorities thereof may
determine.” An undercutting phrase then followed this empowering clause, stating that the
Confederate government could not draw more than twenty-five percent of male slaves between
eighteen and forty-five for service in any State.
The third and most critical layer of protection was in the final section of the bill. The fifth
section stated, “That nothing in this act shall be construed to authorize a change in the relation
which the said slaves shall bear toward their owners, except by consent of the owners and the
States in which they may reside, and in pursuance of the laws thereof.” According to this section,
slaves who served as soldiers in the Rebel army had no guarantee of receiving freedom before or
after military service. Receiving their freedom depended on what owners and State governments
wanted, and those two groups had made their preferences abundantly clear; they did not want
slaves in arms.
Davis and Lee tried to remedy this failing through General Orders Number 14. The order
included additional directives that were not subject to congressional approval. The most
extraordinary of the directives within the order was to ensure recruitment agents would only accept
slaves into ranks if their owner had already given them a “…written instrument conferring, as far
as he may, the rights of a freedman.” If the owners did not free slaves, then they would not be
accepted into service. The president and the general-in-chief hoped this would entice African
Americans to willingly fight for the South. Further orders, that mandated a pay rate equal to whites
and the protection of commanding officers, were intended as further inducements.
The fourth and final layer of protection for the institution of slavery was twofold. The first
aspect was perhaps unintentional. In the same section of the General Order that required masters
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to give slaves their freedom papers before service, the document referred to the recruits as slaves:
“The enlistments will be made for the war, and the effect of the enlistment will be to place the
slave in the military service conformably to this act.” While Davis and Lee wanted to circumvent
the law to give freedom to potential black troops, the law and General Orders Number 14 still
claimed the men were slaves. To be clear, the President and his chief commander tried to confer
freedom not out of any sense of justice, but rather out of desperation for able-bodied men to fill
the ranks. The status of slave soldiers, depending on where they were recruited, could vary. The
second aspect depended on the black troops’ unclear status. Nothing in the law or the Orders
prevented Congress or state governments from taking away their new freedom during or after the
war. In sum, the law and the orders that accompanied it presented a mirage of Confederate military
emancipation.446
Despite the severe flaws in the Act and its execution, from mid to late March the
Confederate War Department received an influx of letters from white men looking to raise units
of black troops. Jones boasted in his journal, “We shall have a negro army… It is the desperate
remedy for the very desperate case—and may be successful. If 300,000 efficient soldiers can be
made of this material, there is no conjecturing where the next campaign may end.” 447 Jones
recorded some disappointing initial results. He called a parade of black Rebel troops in
Richmond’s Capitol Square “…rather a ridiculous affair. The owners are opposed to it.” 448 From
the Union’s perspective, the Confederate attempt to arm slaves did not provoke alarm. Lincoln
went so far as to welcome it privately; he admitted he would have “loaned them [supporters of the
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bill] a vote to carry it…We have to reach the bottom of the insurgent resources and that they
employ or seriously think of employing, slaves as soldiers gives us glimpses of the bottom.”449
The complex nature of the slave-soldiers’ status remained after Davis signed the bill into
law. State governments could and did play an essential role in enrolling black troops; none were
more active than Virginia state Governor William Smith. He took the lead in state-level efforts to
recruit African Americans into the ranks, and was the most proactive in formalizing manumission,
enlistment, training, and arming of black troops.450
There were severe logistical problems in carrying out this scheme; it assumed the South,
in its dire situation, could not only win but also feed and supply its troops adequately. Jefferson
Davis moved slowly, in part because of the supply obstacles. By April 1st, 1865, Davis reported to
Lee he was struggling to enroll blacks. There was confusion about who could assemble regiments
of blacks. It was increasingly difficult to entice owners and slaves to join the army. Davis asked
governors to pressure slaveholders on this issue.451 The truth was that there were not enough
accessible slaves in the southern states to fight the massive Federal armies effectively. The law’s
proponents had not accounted for the African Americans who had run away from their masters.
Davis and the Act’s supporters assumed that military desperation would force southerners to take
drastic action, but the plain fact was that the law was unfeasible.
There are no more explicit examples of how protecting the interests of slavery and
slaveholders divided and subverted the Confederacy’s war effort than the Rebel’s treatment of
black troops, and the failure to recruit blacks for the Cause effectively. At the core of the
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controversies swirling around “no quarter,” re-enslavement, and the possibility of black
Confederate troops was a simple reality. The Confederacy needed to maximize its number of
soldiers to fight an ever-growing Union army; however, the southern nation’s cornerstone, slavery,
prevented it from doing so. Slavery, in terms of military policy and strategy, carried heavy
baggage. Southerners built white supremacy, and a class system that granted power and influence
to a few slaveholders. They became fearful of the Free States controlling the Federal government
and cordoning off slavery to die a long and slow death. When they started the war as a strategic
preemption, they boxed themselves into an extreme ideological and political position. The Civil
War required the South to dismantle typical protections that supported the slave system; the war,
by 1864, demanded that the Confederacy free some slaves to fight on their behalf.
What united the policies of “no quarter” and re-enslavement with the failure to use slavesoldiers was the accurate understanding that to arm a slave, or to free then arm a slave, was to
irrevocably undermine the South’s most sacred institution. It would prove that blacks were capable
of sacrifice, and of meeting the responsibilities of citizenship. Even if the South freed only a part
of the enslaved population to fight, this truth would still be evident, as it was when blacks fought
for the North. Confederate leaders and citizens knew this well, and it explains in part their
commitment to punishing black combatants and POWs, as well as the fierce and prolonged
resistance to the Negro-Soldier Act. Ultimately, as evidenced by how southerners torpedoed any
measure to arm African Americans, the Confederacy never resolved its most basic and significant
strategic paradox.
Though wealthy and ordinary southerners alike doubted northern commitment to ending
slavery, once the North employed African American troops and demanded Confederates treat all
Union military personnel as legal combatants regardless of race, it was clear the Union was

209

committed to slavery’s end. Those who argued that the North would not countenance support for
slavery’s destruction, and that the North’s emancipation of slaves would “backfire,” were forced
by the Hampton Roads conference to confront a grim reality. Slavery was a military weakness that
the North successfully exploited. By contrast, the South’s unwillingness to even discuss arming
and freeing a portion of the enslaved population during 1864 exacerbated their worsening strategic
outlook. Externally, the Union army was growing ever larger, while desertion and battlefield losses
crippled the South; slaves could have been used to fill these gaps. In short, the inability to conceive
of a role for African Americans outside of slavery profoundly shaped and helped to precipitate the
Confederacy’s military failure.
John H. Stringfellow, a Confederate Army surgeon and former pro-slavery Kansas territory
politician, had written to Davis during early February 1865. Amidst all the correspondence that
Davis received, Stringfellow’s words stand out for their prescience and insight. The politicianturned-army surgeon recounted, “the history of war demonstrates the wonderful fact, the
Confederate States mainly subsist both of the immense armies engaged in the conflict and
…contributes about one half of those making the army of its enemies and should the war continue
for another year, the south will probably furnish two-thirds of her foes…a change in relation to the
conduct of the war and a radical one must be adopted or we shall be destroyed.” He abruptly
recommended the South abolish slavery before “We will be absolutely conquered by our own
slaves.” He believed abolition would open the Confederacy to international recognition. He was
not worried about social arrangements, thinking that, if the South won, they could dictate the terms
of labor and control; it was possible to pay back masters for their property through tariffs and taxes.
His most telling remarks reflected the central themes of the war, the Rebel strategy, and
the role of African Americans in the conflict. Stringfellow stated that, though he believed God
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divinely sanctioned the Peculiar Institution, winning the war required a different approach; “…for
we should thus give the lie at once and forever to the charge that we are waging war only for negro
slavery…” He recognized, “this conflict has proven that in a military sense it [slavery] is an
element of weakness…” He demanded immediate action from Congress and the state governors.
His postscript laid out the issues surrounding slavery, African American troops, and Confederate
military strategy: “now we have only to decide between Emancipation for our independence, or
Subjugation and emancipation with negro equality or superiority as our enemies now elect.”452
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CHAPTER SEVEN
SLAVERY, STRATEGY, AND THE LOST CAUSE:
MEMORY AND THE CONFEDERATE WAR

Historians who wrote in the Lost Cause tradition diminished both slavery’s place in
military strategy and African Americans’ role as a pivotal labor and military force during the Civil
War. Those former Confederates who crafted and shaped the military history of the war, including
Robert E. Lee, Jefferson Davis, Alexander Stephens, and Jubal Early, scrubbed slavery and
African Americans out of the war. Their work had a lasting impact; it required several generations
of historians to reassess and understand how slavery played a role in the military struggle, both in
terms of the Union’s military emancipation efforts and how the Confederates used slaves as
laborers and servants in their forces.
Almost immediately after 1865, former Rebels began to downplay slavery’s role in the
starting and the fighting of the war. On the surface, it seems strange that outspoken pro-slavery
Confederate officers and soldiers tried to erase African Americans from the war, given their welldocumented enthusiasm for defending the institution. John Singleton Mosby, the famous guerrilla
leader, was an outlier. He unabashedly stated that he and his men understood that they fought to
uphold slavery. Mosby even castigated former Rebel officers who ignored slavery in their
recounting of the conflict.453 As a group, Rebel chroniclers claimed that slavery and its unique
place in the southern states did not cause the war, nor was it at the heart of why the Rebellion
began in the first place.
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The war’s end and Reconstruction were responsible for the seismic shift in how southerners
(and northerners) understood the war. Specifically, ex-Confederates wrote military histories that
deemphasized slaves’ and the institution’s roles in the war. The writers did so because they focused
on an understanding of the war which was borne out of the desperate months from November 1864
to May 1865. During those months, Rebel soldiers and officers who still fought for the
Confederacy had finally adopted “extreme” measures that endangered the institution of slavery.
Those who wrote the military history of the Lost Cause blurred chronological distinctions; the
unique circumstances and choices of late 1864 through 1865 were superimposed on the secession
crisis and the rest of the Civil War. As the war began and as hundreds of thousands of southern
men participated in the war and suffered, officers and soldiers banded together in the fraternity of
the Rebel armies and that fraternity was tied to “a cause.”454 Scholars of the war have analyzed
this feeling in the southern armies for decades, and the ex-Confederate military cadre refined a
narrative that became “the Lost Cause.”455 Southern postwar propagandist Edward Pollard coined
the term “the Lost Cause,” using it as the title of his book about the justice of the Rebel cause and
how that cause was not attached to the preservation of slavery.456
Historians have tried for many decades to untangle the confusion left behind by Lost Cause
writers. David Blight’s Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory studies how
Americans tried to make sense of the war and put the country back together. He identifies three
groups that contested how the United States would remember the war: the white supremacists
(southern whites who wanted to retain the Antebellum racial and political hierarchy),
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emancipationists (African Americans who sought to expand the rights and protections granted to
former slaves), and reconciliationists (northern whites who wanted to quickly bridge the divide
between the North and South). Blight argues that white supremacists and reconciliationists made
an alliance to recast the war as a struggle between the right of self-government and the upholding
of the Union. Charles Wilson’s Baptized in Blood: The Religion of the Lost Cause, 1865-1920
argues that the Lost Cause was a “civil religion” that was a foundation for a southern nationalism
that survived beyond 1865. Gaines Foster’s Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause
and the Emergence of the New South, 1865-1913 asserts that there was a three-stage process in
which southern whites revived the memory of the Confederacy during the 1880s and 90s, only to
see its memory fade by the 20th century. Nina Silber contends in The Romance of Reunion:
Northerners and the South, 1865-1900 that northern men adopted aspects of an “invigorated white
manhood, which included supposed martial prowess.457 Caroline Janney in Burying the Dead but
Not the Past: Ladies’ Memorial Associations and the Lost Cause claims that associations of
southern women played a vital role in communicating and spreading the Lost Cause ideology
during the latter half of the 19th century.458 Janney furthered explores and critiques the Lost Cause
and reunion in her 2013 book Remembering the Civil War: Reunion and the Limits of
Reconciliation. In it, she makes the case that Northerners and Southerners held onto resentment
and hatred for their former foes, even as they tried to put the country back together. 459 William
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Blair illustrates how Memorial Day and Emancipation Day celebrations in the post-war South
allowed the white and black communities to express their divergent commemorations of the war.
For former Confederate elites, Blair argues, commemorations of the “Lost Cause” were useful
tools to divide working class southerners based on race. 460
There were three factors that motivated Rebel writers of the Confederacy’s military history
to deemphasize slavery’s impact on the South’s war effort. Each factor deserves a detailed look.
The first factor was social class resentment; poorer southern whites who served in the Rebel
armies believed that slaveholders were not willing to sacrifice for the cause. And indeed, though
the war was begun in part to protect slavery, slaveholders themselves had a mixed record of
assisting in the effort. To some in the South, masters and their families seemed to be shielded from
the hardships that poorer southern whites suffered. The conscription exemptions included in the
Twenty Negro Law, and the multitude of restrictions on impressment, were major reasons for this
belief. Some pro-Confederate writers ignored slavery’s importance because they resented the
wealthy slaveholders whom they believed betrayed the cause, saying that they withheld their slaves
and cared more for their property than their fellow citizens.461
Nascent Confederate nationalism during 1860 and 1861 centered on protecting property
and slaveholders’ rights.462 The tenor of that nationalism had subtly shifted by 1864 and 1865.
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Those serving in the Rebel armies were determined to ensure that their suffering, and the deaths
of their fellow soldiers, would accomplish something. They became more willing, for example, to
impress property and potentially arm slaves to fight for the South.463 Moreover, the Rebels,
especially those from states that had been invaded by the Union army, were more willing to
distance themselves from protecting slavery if it meant they could win the war. It was, of course,
too late to alter the war’s outcome, but these shifts in attitude produced an alternative vision of an
independent South less identified with the institution of slavery.
The second factor that caused Rebel writers to deemphasize slavery was ex-Confederates’
resentment of African Americans and the Union armies. Despite post-war romanticizing of the
reconciliation between Union and Confederate belligerents, unpleasant feelings and simmering
hatred remained.464 Early on, the Union had identified slavery as the South’s weakness and
exploited it by freeing African Americans and enlisting them as soldiers. This nexus of Union
force and Negro involvement created a strong antipathy in Rebel writers. Additionally,
Reconstruction was a near-incessant reminder of how slavery was critical to the war, as African
Americans won new rights and challenged the racial and political norms of southern society. These
changes motivated ex-Rebels to work backward in writing about the past, in a concerted effort to
delegitimize African Americans’, and slavery’s, place in the war. Northern Republican violation
of states’ rights, not slavery, caused the war.
The third factor tending to expunge slavery from Confederate histories was a dual emphasis
on valor and victimization. The destruction left behind by the war and the collapse of the C.S.A.
forced southerners to come to grips with how and why they lost. To do so, Confederates shaped
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their military history in a way like that of other groups who fought for morally bankrupt causes.
The post-war remembrances of the Second World War Wehrmacht and Imperial Japanese Armies
follow a path like those of former Confederate soldiers. The histories of those soldiers tend to
overemphasize their valor in battle, how they physically suffered during the war, and how common
soldiers were “victims” of corrupt, inefficient, or malevolent governments.
In Germany’s case, some historians forwarded the notion of a “clean Wermacht”—one that
was not responsible for the atrocities (massacres, the Holocaust). In this myth, the regular German
soldier was brave and honorable, and did not take part in the worst crimes of the Nazi regime.
Scholars and historians successfully challenged the “clean army” myth during the 1990s; it was
evident that many German soldiers outside of SS units were committed Nazis, and engaged in war
crimes and military atrocities.465 Japan, to the present day, has struggled with its Second World
War past, which has at times become a diplomatic issue between Japan, China, and North and
South Korea. A nationalist segment of Japan has consistently honored and commemorated the
valor of imperial forces, deemphasizing their roles in wartime brutalities and the overall goal of
violently expanding the Japanese empire.466 The major difference between post-war Southerners
and post-war Germans and Japanese was that former Confederates have gone so far as to celebrate
their armies and government as representative of their “hope” for independence.
465

Wolfram Wette, The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2006), 90-100 and 195-220; and Jennifer L. Foray, “The ‘Clean Wehrmacht’ in
the German-occupied Netherlands, 1940-5,” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 45, no. 4
(2010): 768-7.
466
Michael Lucken, The Japanese and the War: Expectation, Perception, and the
Shaping of Memory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), xi-xxi; John Nelson, “Social
Memory as Ritual Practice: Commemorating Sprits of the Military Dead at Yasukuni Shinto
Shrine,” The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 62, no. 2 (May 2003): 443-467; Parks M. Coble,
“Writing about Atrocity: Wartime Accounts and their Contemporary Uses,” Modern Asian
Studies, vol. 45, no. 2 (March 2011): 379-398; and Jordan Sand, “Historians and Public Memory
in Japan: ‘The Comfort Women’ Controversy,” History and Memory, vol. 11, no. 2 (Fall/Winter
1999): 116-128.

217

What all these combatants’ histories have in common is a focus on the honor of their
soldiers. Eager to be remembered as “patriots,” wealthy Southerners, former slaveholders and their
families also accepted the white yeomanry’s version of the war’s causes and goals. Instead of
fighting to perpetuate slavery, masters and yeomanry agreed that the southern soldier fought for
personal liberties, state’s rights, and to protect his home against tyranny.
These three factors influenced how influential writers in the Lost Cause narrative “forgot”
slavery’s place in the war. Almost immediately after defeat, Robert E. Lee provided this narrative’s
spiritual core. Lee, like many former Confederates, wrote from a memory shaped by spite and
hatred for the Union that had defeated him, his army, and his state. From his perspective, he had
every reason to despise Federal troops. Northern armies invaded his home state and wreaked havoc
on its economy and society. On a personal level, Lee’s own beloved home in Arlington was
confiscated and turned into Union soldiers’ cemetery. While he was not the most outspoken
supporter of slavery, it seems that the war and Reconstruction hardened his attitude towards
African Americans and former slaves; as a college president, he did little to stop racially motivated
riots led by his students.467
Lee’s public stance about the war was important; many other former Confederates who
wrote about their experiences and their views during the 1870s and 80s followed the lead of their
former commander. Lee’s General Order No. 9, the order to surrender, had spoken of the suffering
and “long odds” that the men of the Army of Northern Virginia faced throughout the war.
Specifically, Lee stated that the Army was “compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and
resources,” and commended them for their valor and devotion to their country. Ostensibly a
farewell to the army, it was also a reframing of the four-year struggle as a defense of home and
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country, not an upholding of slaveholders’ rights. The flight of slaves away from their masters or
the successful Union military emancipation policies that crippled the Confederacy did not factor
into defeat.468
In an interview with Thomas Cook of the New York Herald, published April 21, 1865, the
defeated Confederate explained how he believed that the South fought for states’ rights. Lee
reiterated his assertion that his men fought for their home states. Lee boldly stated that fighting for
“state sovereignty” was a legitimate cause for war. The general cast the South as the victim of
northern aggression; the Confederacy sought peace and reunion from 1863 onward, but the Union
wanted to “impose” its political will on the Rebel states.469
On slavery, Lee the claimed that “The question of slavery did not lie in the way [of causing
the war] at all.” The general stated that the South’s best men wanted to “do away slavery” even
though it was humane, and southerners civilized African American slaves. Lee may have come to
this conclusion in the same way that his soldiers did; he too began to accept a “new vision” of the
war that prioritized winning over the demands of slavery. Lee referred to the failed attempt to use
slaves as soldiers when he mentioned that the best men wanted to be done with slavery.
For Lee, this was proof that Confederates were willing to sacrifice slavery for
independence, a trope that would become common, and expanded to include so-called “Black
Confederates” in the Lost Cause mythos. The General seemed to make veiled criticisms of
slaveholders. Cook, the interviewer, observed, “It was a most singular and remarkable expression
to escape the lips of such a man as General Lee that, ‘the South was never more than half in earnest
in this war.’” Here Lee, perhaps, was criticizing slaveholders for not fully committing their
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resources and “property,”—i.e., slaves—to the war effort. In a subsequent quote, Lee equivocated
on why and how the war started; he indicated that planters and masters got them into the war “…in
a moment of passion and under the excitement of fancied wrongs” but they “… were entering a
struggle for an inalienable right and a fundamental principle of their political creed.” 470 Lee’s
public statements in 1865 belied his wartime understanding of slavery’s role in starting the war
and how it factored into how the war was fought. As just one example, he was incensed when the
Union declared its military emancipation policy.471 Yet, when he died in 1870, ex-Rebels
continued to write and expand on the mythos of “the Lost Cause.”472
Jubal Early was among the most important of Lee’s lieutenants to accept the “task” of
writing the war’s narrative and actively scrubbing slavery from the war. Early was most effective
in marshaling others to the task, as well, despite his continuing pro-slavery stance. The general
began his memoir in 1865, with an eye towards publishing a much larger work. He was in close
contact with Lee. With Lee’s encouragement, Early popularized the view that the southern armies
were worn down and exhausted by numerically superior Union forces. Moreover, slavery, in
Early’s telling, was never part of the war in operational or strategic terms because the Confederacy
did not exist primarily to preserve slavery; the Rebel states fought to protect state and individual
rights.

Ibid. Cook posited that he “…cannot attempt to translate this remark or elucidate it. Its
utterance conveyed to me the impression that the South was most heartily sick of the war, and
anxious to get back into the Union and to peace.” I do not think this what Lee was thinking. The
General was privy to the logistical struggles of impressing slaves and, while he wanted to use
them, he saw how slaveholders resisted it.
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His work was more popular than Early himself; most southerners identified him with
wealthy planters—and for good reason. He was alarmed by any attempt to expand political power
beyond the political and economic elite.473 Nonetheless, using his elite position, he was able to
market a slavery-less history of the Rebel’s war through the Southern Historical Society. The
society organized other former Rebel soldiers and officers in writing their history of the war. Early
and his cohort attacked as inaccurate and unfair any work of history which attempted to
demonstrate how slavery influenced the war.474
Early and Lee laid the military history groundwork for an intellectual approach to erasing
slaves and slavery from the war. But it was former Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephens
who became the most successful spokesman for this view. This may be surprising, because he was
typically considered a “Unionist” and spokesman for poorer southern whites. But he had
dramatically outlined the C.S.A.’s commitment to protecting slavery during his “Cornerstone of
the Confederacy” speech:
Our new government…its cornerstone rests upon the great truth, that the Negro is
not equal to the white man; that slavery…is his natural and normal condition. This,
our new government, is the first, in the history of the world, based upon this great
physical, philosophical, and moral truth…I recollect once of having heard a
gentleman from one of the northern States…[state] that we of the South would be
compelled, ultimately, to yield upon this subject of slavery…The reply I made to
him was, that upon his own grounds, we should, ultimately, succeed, and that he
and his associates, in this crusade against our institutions, would ultimately fail.475
After the war, he complained that reporters did not transcribe his remarks accurately; they were
“very imperfected and hastily corrected by me.” He insisted that his speech was about how the
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north caused the war when it disregarded the all constitutional guarantees.476 By 1868, Stephens
fully pivoted away from slavery as central to the Confederate government’s commitments. During
that year, the ex-Vice President published A constitutional view of the late war between the states:
its causes, character, conduct, and results. He provided the intellectual tools for explaining why
slavery was neither a cause nor a part of the war. In a two-volume collection of “colloquies,”
Stephens denied that slavery played any role in causing secession; slavery was merely an issue
that revealed the deeper cause of the war. Rather, the war had its origins in “opposing principles,”
namely, differing opinions about the nature of the “general government.” In Stephens’ telling, it
was a war started over and fought for the principles of Federation (the Confederacy) and
Centralism or Consolidation (the Union).477 Federation prioritized states’ rights, while
Centralism/Consolidation supported more authority for the central government. If the sectional
conflict over slavery was, as Stephen believed it to be, a mere representation of a systemic violation
of Constitutional rights, then it would play no role in the war itself or the downfall of the Rebel
government.
Stephens wrote what would become the intellectual heart of the Lost Cause movement,
thereby eclipsing arguably the most important figure in the history of the Confederacy, Jefferson
Davis. As with the other Lost Cause writers, Davis’ postwar views are at odds with his earlier
stances. But the fact that his statements are so exhaustively documented makes his case unique.
Early in the war, Davis used the defense of slavery and the hope to expand the institution as a
rallying cry in public speeches. As the war progressed, Davis shifted his emphasis; he soft-pedaled
the Confederacy’s dedication to the institution in interviews with Northern and European
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newspapers. Instead of extolling the virtues of slavery, the Rebel president claimed that the South
wanted the right to rule itself and “be left alone."
Part of this shift came from the fact that Davis realized their commitment to slavery was
hurting the war effort. In an 1861 speech before the Provisional Confederate Congress, Davis laid
out how and why the southern states left; the northern states, after they had received a “controlling
voice” in Congress, for decades had undermined laws and protections for slaveholders’ property
rights and the slave states’ ability to protect those rights. Most damningly, Davis stated;
Finally a great party [the Republican Party] was organized for the purpose of
obtaining the administration of the Government, with the avowed object of using
its power for the total exclusion of the slave States from all participation in the
benefits of the public domain acquired by all the States in common, whether by
conquest or purchase; of surrounding them entirely by States in which slavery
should be prohibited; of thus rendering the property in slaves so insecure as to be
comparatively worthless, and thereby annihilating in effect property worth
thousands of millions of dollars. This party, thus organized, succeeded in the month
of November last in the election of its candidate for the Presidency of the United
States.478

From 1863 to 1865, Davis often struggled with the loudest and most belligerent pro-slavery
members of the national government. Davis’ support for impressing and using slaves as soldiers
frustrated many in Confederate Congress and the statehouses. 479 His awareness of the need for
new priorities, however, amounted to only halfhearted changes in strategy, diplomacy, or policy
on the issue of slavery. He was effectively powerless to fundamentally change the nature of the
war the South had started.
Davis’ struggle with the competing priorities of military necessity and ideological purity
on the defense of slavery may sound like Lincoln’s oft-repeated assertion. Lincoln stated that if he
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could win the war without touching slavery, he would, or later, that if the war required him to do
so, Lincoln would emancipate slaves. The significant difference, of course, is that Lincoln and the
Republicans, from the beginning of the war, sought to weaken slavery and were empowered to do
so. Davis was not. Despite this difference, however, Davis could shift his view about what the war
meant; he came to care less about slavery and more about winning.
Davis’ views shifted even more strongly during and after 1865. In 1880, the defeated
Confederate published The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government. The two-volume set was
Davis’ effort to explain his actions and conduct during the war. Davis presents a study of slavery’s
history in the United States; it forwards the notion that slavery in southern society was morally
and legally right, and also that it was divorced from causing the war.480 The largest and arguably
most important part of the series is his analysis that the northern states refused to fulfill their oaths
to uphold the Constitution and federal law, which protected property and “states’ rights.” Further,
the former President claimed that under the compact theory, in which the Constitution was an
agreement among the member states, the southern states had the right to dissolve the Union if the
federal government or other member states did not uphold laws.481 His argument lends the reader
the impression that he believed that the war was not about protecting the right to own slaves, but
rather the right of self-government and “sectional” justice.
Selectively misremembering slavery in the Civil War was a decades-long process, which
began during the later phases of the war on the Rebels’ side. After Lincoln was reelected in 1864,
many Confederate commanders, soldiers, civilians, and politicians knew that the Union forces
were winning the war. Only “radical” strategies that used all the South’s remaining resources could
stave off defeat. Jefferson Davis, military commanders, and enlisted soldiers then tried to shake
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off the fetters that slaveholders had placed on the war effort, and to use slaves as soldiers. Davis’
efforts culminated in Confederate Congress eventually passing the “Negro Soldier Bill” during the
winter of 1865, though too late to affect the war’s conclusion. Military commanders, Lee most
prominently, believed that it was necessary, and white southern soldiers who remained in the
armies wanted to win to justify their losses. Some civilians also believed it necessary to win as
well and were willing to support it and encourage their representatives to pass the bill. By this
point, Davis, Alexander, and other Confederates who were willing to abandon slavery reversed
their ideological support for slavery.
Historians who wrote about the Confederate war, at times, fell into the simplistic view of
what the Rebels started the war to accomplish. This view was successfully popularized through
the Lost Cause mythos, in which southern writers specifically chose to remember the strategic,
political, and social tenor of the final months of the war. During those months, desperation and
military necessity overshadowed the defense of slavery. With a focus on the South trying to win
independence, historians have ignored military and political choices that prioritized defending the
rights of slaveholders. Historians overlooked the complexity of fighting to uphold slavery, and
they divorced military operations from the political, social, and economic imperatives of slavery.
The events before and during the war point to slavery’s integral role in the crucial areas of
the Confederate’s war.
Secession was a path to preventive war. It was a slaveholders’ revolt that reflected a desire
to retaliate against the rise of antislavery and Republican agitation. They perceived critiques of
slavery and the plan to lead it down the course of ultimate extinction as threats of a war on their
prosperity and security. When Lincoln won the 1860 election, proslavery Southerners quickly
united around the belief that the federal government, in the hands of the Republican party, was a
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hostile entity that would stoke a race war between whites and blacks in the southern states. The
secession movement acted to head off the Republican party’s enactment of their antislavery plan,
and had within the movement an eye towards violently assaulting those who threatened the
institution of slavery.
Confederate diplomatic missions revealed how Rebel leadership thought they could
convince European powers, the British and French, to recognize the Rebel states and intervene in
the war. Their efforts centered on demonstrating the importance of King Cotton, buttressed by
chattel slave labor. The cotton embargo, the bumper crop of 1860, and the British government’s
long-standing commitment to antislavery policies undercut Rebel appeals to economic and
industrial self-interest. Rebel diplomats continued to boldly proclaim the benefits of a slave-cotton
economy when there was little British public and government interest. Confederate international
representatives continued to extol slavery for the benefit of a domestic audience, to demonstrate a
consistent commitment to preserving the institution of slavery. Though some in the Rebel
diplomatic corps begged Davis and the cabinet to soft-pedal slavery, the administration did not,
until their situation was desperate.
On the battlefield, Southerners implemented military strategies that revealed that securing
slaveholders’ “property” was a central war aim. Defensive deployments around the coasts and
rivers were designed to counter the threat of raids on densely slave-populated counties. When the
war began, Rebel forces positioned themselves along broad front to defend as much territory as
possible, realizing that the presence of federal armies wreaked havoc on slavery. Davis and his
generals, however, were not content to passively respond to northern invasions; they wanted to
attack. Offensive campaigns served multiple purposes; to expand the boundaries of the proslavery
nation, to clear Confederate territory of Union armies by inducing the Yankees to chase the Rebels
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northward, and to end the war quickly, with as little damage as possible to the Peculiar Institution.
The preference for attack lead to the most catastrophic mistake of the war, Hood’s invasion of
Tennessee. Once the Union army had free reign to attack slavery, the Confederacy collapsed and
alternative strategies amounted to too-little-too-late.
Slavery directly impacted the war effort through the impressment of slaves as civil and
military laborers. While, prior to 1865, slaves could not fight as soldiers, the Rebel government
had no qualms about using slaves to construct fortifications and infrastructure and to fill roles in
the field armies—servants, teamsters, cooks, laborers—that would have otherwise been filled by
white men. Slaveholders complained loudly when the military took their “property,” and
complicated the effort to use slave labor. Owners worried that slaves would run away or be exposed
to the Union army. While Richmond was able to marshal thousands of slaves into Rebel service,
slaveholders undermined the system, trying to reassert the central purpose of the Confederate
government; preserve slavery and uphold slaveholders’ rights.
Confederate conscription policy exposed a slave society unable to withstand the burdens
of the war. Beginning in 1862, enrolling hundreds of thousands of white men into the army was
an innovative and necessary solution for a manpower shortage after volunteers no longer flocked
to the Rebels’ ranks. Overseers and the male relatives of slave owners, however, requested and in
some cases received exemptions from military service. While only a few thousand men claimed
such exemptions, the Twenty Negro Law soured many non-slaveholding Confederates on the war.
Conscription drew men into the army who feared that their homes and loved ones would be left
vulnerable to servile insurrection. As a result, men deserted, or served in local units away from
front-line field armies. The once-innovative policy, conscription, failed to fill the ranks of armies
because the demands of a slave society complicated the effort.
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Confederate efforts toward so-called military emancipation, which came late in the war,
were belied by their treatment of Union black servicemen. Armed African American men, for in
the service of either belligerent, was an unacceptable proposition for the Rebels. When
encountering black troops, the Confederates sought to enslave or re-enslave them. This stood in
contrast to the centuries-long tradition of recognizing slaves freed during wartime as forever free.
The federal government forced the Rebels to back down from a full application of the enslavement
policy, but Confederate troops continued to practice “no quarter” on an unofficial basis, and the
Union ended prisoner exchanges. The unwillingness to tolerate black men in arms influenced the
Rebel debate about arming slaves to fight for their own cause. Slaveholders and powerful members
of the Confederate government and military killed the possibility of arming slaves because it would
upend the foundations of slavery.
Rebel politicians and military commanders actively prioritized defending slavery before
and during the war. No matter how they crafted their narrative after the fact, slavery had shaped
and complicated the Confederate war effort. Rebel decisions do not make sense without reference
to the defense of slavery as a major, even as the prime, wartime objective.
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